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Abstract
Internet browsers include Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to support Web
applications that require complex functionality, e.g., to let end users watch videos, make
phone calls, and play video games. Meanwhile, many Web applications employ the browser
APIs to rely on the user’s hardware to execute intensive computation, access the Graphics
Processing Unit (GPU), use persistent storage, and establish network connections.
However, providing access to the system’s computational resources, i.e., processing,
storage, and networking, through the browser creates an opportunity for attackers to
abuse resources. Principally, the problem occurs when an attacker compromises a Web site
and includes malicious code to abuse its visitor’s computational resources. For example,
an attacker can abuse the user’s system networking capabilities to perform a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack against third parties. What is more, computational resource abuse
has not received widespread attention from the Web security community because most of
the current specifications are focused on content and session properties such as isolation,
confidentiality, and integrity.
Our primary goal is to study computational resource abuse and to advance the state
of the art by providing a general attacker model, multiple case studies, a thorough anal-
ysis of available security mechanisms, and a new detection mechanism. To this end, we
implemented and evaluated three scenarios where attackers use multiple browser APIs to
abuse networking, local storage, and computation. Further, depending on the scenario,
an attacker can use browsers to perform Denial of Service against third-party Web sites,
create a network of browsers to store and distribute arbitrary data, or use browsers to
establish anonymous connections similarly to The Onion Router (Tor). Our analysis also
includes a real-life resource abuse case found in the wild, i.e., CryptoJacking, where thou-
sands of Web sites forced their visitors to perform crypto-currency mining without their
consent. In the general case, attacks presented in this thesis share the attacker model and
two key characteristics: 1) the browser’s end user remains oblivious to the attack, and 2)
an attacker has to invest little resources in comparison to the resources he obtains.
In addition to the attack’s analysis, we present how existing, and upcoming, security
enforcement mechanisms from Web security can hinder an attacker and their drawbacks.
Moreover, we propose a novel detection approach based on browser API usage patterns.
Finally, we evaluate the accuracy of our detection model, after training it with the real-life
crypto-mining scenario, through a large scale analysis of the most popular Web sites.
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CHAPTER1
Introduction
Currently, most Web sites rely on JavaScript to present information to the browser’s end
user. Although there are many legitimate use cases for JavaScript, we analyse how an
attacker can deliver malicious JavaScript code to the browser and abuse the computa-
tional resources, e.g., processing, of the end user’s computer. A critical aspect leading to
this mishap relates to the evolution of browsers and how they have struggled to provide
additional functionality while keeping the browser and the underlying Operating System
(OS) secure.
The Web landscape has continuously evolved since Brendan Eich integrated Mocha Live-
Script, later known as JavaScript, into Netscape in 1995. Furthermore, the creation of
the Netscape Plugin Application Programming Interface (NPAPI) during the same year
opened the door for browser extensions which, in turn, allowed third-party applications
to integrate directly with the browser. Shortly after that, Jonathan Gay used the NPAPI
to create FutureSplash Animator, an extension supporting animations, which was later
acquired by Macromedia and re-branded as Flash [24]. Similarly, Microsoft released Ac-
tiveX in 1996, followed by the introduction of Java Applets in 1997 [27]. The struggle to
integrate additional functionality into the browser was far from over, even ten years later,
when Microsoft introduced Silverlight in 2007 [117].
However, browser extensions providing a proprietary runtime headed towards a down-
ward spiral. From the business point of view, Sun Microsystems engaged in a legal fight
over compatibility issues with Microsoft [218]. Also, despite the widespread adoption of
Flash in desktop computers, Apple’s founder Steve Jobs decided against supporting Flash
on tablets and smart-phones developed by his company. From a technical perspective,
extensions struggled with many vulnerabilities over the years while the research commu-
nity tried to remedy the situation; mainly, Drive-by Downloads were commonly used by
attackers to execute binary code and exploit vulnerabilities, e.g., through ActiveX [28, 41,
42, 50, 89, 96, 99, 126, 155, 161, 168, 175, 197].
After close to a decade of adoption struggle and vulnerabilities, browser vendors started
deprecating technologies, e.g., Flash, while providing more features through JavaScript.
Essentially, browsers standardized how to access persistent storage, processing, and net-
working under one umbrella specification, i.e., HTML5: the last version of the Hypertext
Markup Language (HTML). The spectrum of applications for modern technologies ranges
from entertaining to telephony. For one, persistent storage Application Program Inter-
face (API)s such as local storage let applications cache content that would be otherwise
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
only stored by a server. As a result, Web applications can, for example, provide similar
functionality without an Internet connection, e.g., oﬄine document editing. The journey
towards providing processing power started with WebWorkers, a technology to execute
JavaScript in the background to avoid freezing an active tab. Moreover, these efforts pro-
gressed so far that browsers can run sand-boxed binary code using WebAssembly or access
the Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), even within a WebWorker.
Also, networking APIs such as WebRTC and WebSockets provide the means to have
full-duplex communication between two browsers, or between a browser and a server.
Networking features let browsers perform audio or video conference calls, or synchronize
the application’s state quickly, e.g., to edit documents collaboratively with multiple users.
What is more, considering that HTML 5 features are not as exploitable as extensions used
to be, the previously mentioned features are available to any Web application without
explicit user consent, except when the microphone or camera are accessed.
From the security perspective, some researchers followed a natural path, i.e., explore
how to perform known attacks, such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), with the help of
HTML5 [43, 67, 104, 106]. In the meantime, there is a residual risk after removing ex-
tensions and fulfilling their use cases through JavaScript. Now, attackers can use com-
putational resources to perform malicious activities without the users consent, and what
is more, without compromising the browser. For instance, attackers have sporadically
abused browsers for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks; specifically, DDoS
attacks have been demonstrated at a hacking conference [65] and observed in real life with
China’s Great Cannon [109]. During this thesis, another abuse case emerged and obtained
widespread media attention. Essentially, attackers use the browser’s computation power
to perform crypto-currency mining without the user’s knowledge. This practice is known
as Drive-by Mining or CryptoJacking [92, 103, 112, 128].
Our primary goal is to provide a thorough analysis of computational resource abuse
through the browser and its feasibility; moreover, we also study possible countermeasures
encompassing enforcement and detection.
1.1. Outline
This thesis is divided into three main parts. Part I focuses on general aspects related
to computational resource attacks through the browser. First, we describe the general
attacker model, his motivations and possible ways to spread malicious code in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, we present the existing data-centric security model for the Origin concept
and explain why it fails to protect users against resource abuse attacks.
Part II includes four resource abuse case studies. Three resource abuse attacks were
discovered and evaluated in the scope of this thesis; further, we found the fourth case
study in the wild. We start with Chapter 4 by explaining a DDoS attack against third-
party Web servers using browsers. Then, we present two abuse cases where an attacker
can force browsers to create overlay networks of browsers for arbitrary content storage
and distribution or onion routing in Chapter 5 and 6. We finally conclude Part II with an
analysis of CryptoJacking in Chapter 7.
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Part III explores possible countermeasures. To this end, we discuss security features,
e.g., Content Security Policy (CSP), how they can help, and their drawbacks in Chapter 8.
Later on, we describe a novel detection approach based on resource-related API patterns
and its evaluation in Chapter 9. Finally, we draw conclusions in Chapter 10.
1.2. Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are the following:
• We present resource abuse as a generic attack case. Notably, we describe the attacker
model considering the attacker’s motivations and capabilities required to carry out
an attack; more to the point, we mention possible means to deliver code abusing
resources to multiple browsers.
• We studied the current Web security model and evaluated its usefulness to prevent
resource abuse. To this end, we review specific aspects related to the Origin-based
security model and the resource-related APIs. We also study the evolution of the
Origin concept, e.g., Suborigins, and its implications for computational resources.
To this end, we take excerpts of standards to exemplify decisions harmful for com-
putational resources.
• We produced three previously unknown attacks abusing the system’s resources through
the browser. For each attack, we implement a proof of concept, list the APIs and
interactions needed for the abuse. Furthermore, we also perform a thorough quanti-
tative analysis to assess the attack’s feasibility for every case. Throughout our case
studies, we cover abuse examples for every dimension encompassing computational
resources, i.e., networking, processing, and storage mechanisms.
• We present an analysis of the landscape of existing and upcoming Web security
standards from the computational resource perspective. In contrast to the study
of the security model, which considers the default browser settings, our review of
countermeasures considers possibilities for security-conscious users. Thus, we discuss
existing approaches, e.g., CSP, and how they can potentially help to prevent attacks
by restricting access to computational resources. Last but not least, we also discuss
challenges associated with the deployment of each approach.
• We further extend the discussion on abuse countermeasures by proposing a detec-
tion mechanism based on resource-related API usage patterns. Our approach uses
machine learning and is defined based on lessons learnt from existing work and the
attack scenarios studied in this thesis. We also evaluate the effectiveness of the
detection mechanism with a real-life resource abuse case, i.e., CryptoJacking.
This thesis brings state of the art beyond the previously published papers[140–144] by
describing the generalization of the resource abuse attack problem and its countermeasures.
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1.3. Associated Publications
This thesis includes parts and ideas from the following publications:
Juan D. Parra Rodriguez and Joachim Posegga. “Why Web Servers Should Fear
Their Clients”. In: Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm).
Dallas, TX, USA: Springer International Publishing, 2015, pp. 401–417. isbn: 978-
3-319-28865-9. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_22 [141]
Juan D. Parra Rodriguez and Joachim Posegga. “Local Storage on Steroids: Abusing
Web Browsers for Hidden Content Storage and Distribution”. In: Security and Pri-
vacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm). Lecture Notes of the Institute for
Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. Singa-
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CHAPTER2
The Browser Resource Abuse Attack
In simple terms, this thesis revolves around scenarios in which an attacker can abuse
resources such as processing power, network, and storage, through the browser. The main
concern is the following: when users open Web sites, their browser executes code which
can make excessive use of the system’s computational resources. In this way, attackers
can obtain a benefit without informing the user about the computation performed on
their system. To illustrate this from an abstract point of view, Figure 2.1 shows a user
intentionally visiting a particular site, i.e., the Intended Site. At this point, the user’s
browser obtains inadvertently an Abusive Script, i.e., malicious code abusing system’s
resources for the attacker’s benefit.
For the time being, we see the Intended Site as a collection of files regardless of their
location, i.e., some parts can be hosted by external servers. Also, at this point we neither
discriminate how the Abusive Script is included on the site, e.g., intentionally, nor how
does the browser execute such script, e.g., as third-party content or in the same Script
Context as the Intended Site. Later, we shed some light into reasons why isolation is not
relevant for resource abuse in Section 3.4. However, before we can do this, we must bring
the general attack into perspective.
We start by describing the motivation behind resource abuse scenarios in Section 2.1 and
describe the attacker capabilities required for abusing the system’s resources in Section 2.2.
Afterwards, we use Section 2.3 to depict a generic resource abuse attack, which will be used
throughout the thesis to map four specific case studies. Towards the end, we discuss in
Section 2.4 possible ways an attacker can use to deliver the Abusive Script while minimizing
his effort.
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Figure 2.1.: Abstract attack scenario
2.1. Motivation
There are three factors motivating attackers to use system’s resources through browsers
for their benefit: financial profit, hiding the attacker’s identity, or leverage the browsers’
high Churn Rate to gain a particular advantage, e.g., the resiliency of the attack delivered
to browsers.
Sometimes, attackers can obtain financial benefits due to the difference between re-
sources invested and received from an attack. Prominent examples when there is a busi-
ness model behind the abuse include the case of CryptoJacking presented in Chapter 7. A
less extreme example was a company acquired by Yahoo called PeerCDN [72]. According
to the creators, PeerCDN could achieve a 90% bandwidth reduction for a server by using
the browser’s bandwidth of its visitors to distribute static content using WebRTC data
channels.
In other cases, attackers can use browsers to hide their identity or make forensics analysis
more complicated. A real-life scenario took place when a snippet was allegedly delivered
to only certain browsers in China to perform a DDoS against anti-censorship services [79].
Explicitly, a technical report specifies that malicious code came from the analytics code
served from domains maintained by Baidu [15]. From a research point of view, we analyse
how an attacker can conceal his identity by using browser networks to distribute potentially
malicious content in Chapter 5 and to hide his identity using onion routing in Chapter 6.
The high Churn Rate of browsers visiting a site also offers exciting properties. For
example, Fifield et al. created FlashProxy [57] to use Flash, and later on WebSockets, to
bridge the Tor network through browsers. FlashProxy was more resilient than static entry
points because they cannot be easily banned due to the high volatility of users joining and
leaving a Web site, i.e., Churn Rate. Also, a similar approach is followed by SnowFlake
by using WebRTC data channels [174]. Although FlashProxy and SnowFlake were created
considering that users are willingly executing the code to bridge other users to the network,
it does not necessarily have to be that way. In the latter scenario, there is resource abuse
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due to the lack of consent from the browser end user. In the scope of this thesis, the high
Churn Rate helps to give resilience to the DDoS attack presented in Chapter 4 and the
browser networks discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
2.2. Attacker Model
Ryck et al. list attackers ranging from a forum poster, i.e., a user who can only send
requests to a Web application, to a network attacker capable of launching attacks against
servers and capable of reading, blocking, or modifying network traffic.
To abuse the browser, an attacker needs to execute code in the victim’s browser. As a
result, the least powerful attacker model described in by Ryck et al. [163] that covers all
attacks presented in this thesis is the Web attacker. This attacker was initially formalized
by Akhawe et al. [10] and included the following capabilities:
• Browser Capabilities: the attacker’s code is executed in the browser, and therefore
has access to the browser APIs; however, the attacker is still constrained by the
browser security model, e.g., the Same Origin Policy still applies to the attacker’s
code.
• Web server: the attacker can host content on the internet. This includes the possi-
bility to obtain a domain name (or several) for one or more servers, and configure the
server(s) with a valid Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate for his domain(s).
Usually this model allows the attacker to send responses, not necessarily complying
with Web standards; however, in our case, responses comply with standards.
• Network Capabilities: the attacker has no special network privileges, so he can
only respond to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests received by his Web
server.
To place the Web attacker in the grand scheme, it is the second least powerful according
to the classification performed by Ryck et al. [163]. The Web attacker is above the forum
post attacker, who can only interact with the Web application by sending requests to it,
and below the gadget attacker. The gadget attacker was introduced by Barth, Jackson,
and Mitchell [18] and it is more potent than the Web attacker as this model assumes an
attacker is hosting a component wilfully integrated with the application under attack. In
particular, the attacker’s code has direct access to the Document Object Model (DOM)
and the JavaScript context where the target application is executed. Typical cases of
gadgets are libraries such as JQuery or Google analytics which are included in today’s
sites.
2.3. Generic Attack
Browser resource abuse has some critical differences with other Web attacks such asXSS or
Drive-by Downloads. First of all, JavaScript malware, as well as attacks against the users’
sessions and data are executed once. Once the attacker has obtained the data, session or
control over the machine, the attack is successful and complete. In the case of resource
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abuse, an attacker benefits over longer periods because his earnings are proportional to
the resources he can use on the browser’s side. Similarly, users can tolerate resource abuse
for a limited time. Other cases of malicious JavaScript code, such as Heap Spray and
other mechanisms for Drive-by Downloads immediately compromised the whole system
irreversibly.
In many cases, the general attack presented in Figure 2.1 also involves a Command
and Control (CC) server controlled by the attacker to coordinate the abuse across several
browsers, i.e., coordinator server from Figure 2.2. The coordinator server is mandatory
for the attacks presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Figure 2.2.: Abstract attack scenario abusing several users
2.4. Code Delivery Methods
Although there have been cases where scripts are willingly included by popular sites to
use the visitor’s resources, e.g., like when the Pirate Bay acknowledged performing Cryp-
toJacking as an experiment [151], this practice is rather uncommon. Contrarily, most of
the times attackers include Abusive Scripts in Intended Sites site (or platform) owners
remain unaware. Thus, we discuss research and practical scenarios where malicious code
can be included in multiple sites.
2.4.1. Advertisement Networks
Back in 2007, Jackson et al. demonstrated it is possible to use advertisement networks to
recruit browsers to execute JavaScript code when users see an advertisement [84]. Even
though the focus of the paper is around DNS rebinding attacks, they recruited browsers
to evaluate the effectiveness of the attack by investing $100. In a period of three days,
the $100 budget obtained 50,000 impressions from 44,000 unique IP addresses1. In 2010,
Huang et al. used advertisements to test Transparent Proxy cache poisoning. Then, in
2013, Grossman et al. explained how to use advertising networks to perform a DDoS
attack against third-party sites in a Black Hat Conference [65]. Although their work was
1According to Musch et al. the average cost by 2018 is 1 USD for 1,000 impressions [124], i.e., half of the
price from 2007.
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a research-oriented demonstration, several real-life abuse cases followed. In 2014, an ad-
vertisement network was used to download malware affecting millions of visitors from
Yahoo, among other sites [167]. Furthermore, in 2018, TrendMicro reported that attackers
used Google’s DoubleClick advertisement service to display legitimate advertisements for
CryptoJacking [181, 191].
2.4.2. Modified Dependencies and Browser Plug-Ins
Thousands of sites inadvertently made their visitors mine crypto-currencies when the au-
thor of a dependency included in their site decided to go rogue. For example, a library pro-
viding live chat capabilities integrated into more than 1,000 sites was reported to perform
crypto-currency mining [31]. Also, more than 4,000 sites from the UK government included
a plugin for accessibility, called Brousealoud, which performed crypto-mining [25]. In ad-
dition to cases when the script was directly embedded in the site, there was a Content
Management System (CMS) widget showing weather information that injected mining
scripts into every site including it. [112]. Similar behaviour was observed in browser ex-
tensions; therefore, Chrome decided to remove all crypto-currency mining extensions from
their store [127].
In addition to the CryptoJacking wave, Gilbertson wrote a blog post with a sarcastic,
and hypothetical, tone explaining how easy it would be for a library maintainer to harvest
credit card numbers from sites. His hypothetical scenario is founded on the massive
entanglement of dependencies used in Node.js today [62] and how Web developers include
libraries without being aware of the potential side effects. Even though the blog post from
Gilbertson is not real, journalists have reported a library called Event-Stream that was
modified to harvest Bitcoins from sites including it [102]. Also, a developer broke the most
of the Node.js packages available when he removed a module doing left-padding on a string
[213]. From these reports we can assert that developers rely on libraries including code
controlled by multiple parties, and it is enough to have one party going rogue to inject
code in multiple sites.
2.4.3. Attacking Services and Networking
Recently, attackers used a CMS, i.e., Drupal, vulnerability to include CryptoJacking
scripts in over 4,000 sites [132]. However, there have been attackers who go beyond the
Web domain to include CryptoJacking scripts on browsers. For example, attackers have
taken advantage of misconfigurations of Amazon S3 buckets, i.e., a non-relational database
offered by cloud services. In certain occasions, administrators forgot to protect buckets
against write access. Specifically, attackers hacked S3 buckets in at least two instances:
a hack against the site of the L.A. Times newspaper [128] and a second one against the
AOL advertisement platform [116].
Attackers used vulnerable Mikrotik routers to get remote access, and instead of using
them to perform mining, attackers used the routers to inject mining scripts on every site
served over HTTP by the router. Initially, this attack was observed in Brazil [92], where
around 143,000 routers were used. Then, the same attack was found in other locations
around the globe [103]. Also, public Wi-Fi access points are known to inject mining scripts
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to force users of the network to perform mining [33].
2.4.4. Stale Inclusions
From a research perspective, Nikiforakis et al. showed many ways attackers can use to
execute malicious code, e.g., using stale IPs or domains that are still included but forgot-
ten [129]. Mainly, Nikiforakis et al. found out that 56 domains used to include resources
from the 47 top Alexa sites were available for registration at the time. Thus, to inject
code in sites it would be enough to buy one of these domains and add an Abusive Scripts.
2.5. Summary
We have shown how an attacker can abuse computational resources through the browser
from an abstract point of view and defined basic terminology. Subsequently, we described
possible incentives to abuse the browser’s resources, which could be: 1) financial gain due
to the difference in resources invested and obtained. 2) hiding the attacker’s identity or
complicating forensic analysis or 3) exploiting the volatility of visitors for a particular
purpose, e.g., resiliency or anonymity.
Afterwards, we positioned the resource abuse attacker in the grand scheme of attackers
referenced by the Web security community. At the end of our exercise, we conclude that
an attacker abusing resources needs the same capabilities as the classical Web attacker.
Explicitly, the attacker needs to execute code in the browser, send and receive messages
from the browser, and host a server on the Internet.
Even though resource abuse does not require access to data or sessions protected by the
Same Origin Policy, it poses a different challenge: distributing Abusive Scripts to enough
visitors to achieve the attacker’s goal. Thus, we cover possible ways to distribute Abusive
Scripts to as many browsers as possible. Furthermore, we show evidence of the massive
impact that attackers can achieve with relatively low effort. Some examples from real life
include the distribution of malicious code through advertisement networks or commonly
used dependencies, e.g., live chat libraries.
CHAPTER3
The Current Web Security Model and Its
Implications For Computational Resources
Security mechanisms need to remain backward compatible due to the nature of the Web;
particularly, introducing new security mechanisms should not create bugs for sites unaware
of new standards. Therefore, the Web security community favours opt-in features while
ensuring that previous versions have a safe behaviour. Furthermore, as content is delivered
from servers with names, using protocols through network ports, this information was used
to define an Origin. Since then, the Origin concept has been the cornerstone for security
mechanisms.
We now present an overview of the Same Origin Policy covering the browser APIs
relevant for resource abuse in Section 3.1. Then, we study how the Same Origin Policy
security model has, and currently is, being tailored to be more flexible in Section 3.2.
Then, in Section 3.3 we explain cross-protocol issues at the network level, which aggravate
the DDoS attack presented in Chapter 4. Last but not least, we explain why the Same
Origin Policy is not enough to protect against resource attacks in Section 3.4.
3.1. The Origin-Based Security Model
The first manifestation of the Same Origin Policy comes from the Netscape browser. Back
then, it became clear that when users opened multiple sites, JavaScript code from one site
should not be allowed to interfere with another’s site DOM. However, over the years, the
Same Origin Policy has evolved to the point where there is not a single Same Origin Policy,
but instead a policy implementation depending on the scenario. For instance, the seman-
tics behind the Same Origin Policy when applications access elements inside an Iframe
loaded from a separate Origin is not necessarily the same as how applications retrieve
resources from other domains using GET HTTP requests sent to a different Origin.
Considering the complexity of the Same Origin Policy, we do not expect to provide a
detailed study of the Same Origin Policy in all its dimensions. Instead, we try to capture
the essence of the Same Origin Policy in relation to browsers APIs providing direct access
to resources. Our analysis serves later on as the basis to discuss the effectiveness if the
Same Origin Policy, or lack thereof, to restrict access to computational resources through
browser APIs.
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3.1.1. CORS
Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) was introduced to relax the Same Origin Policy
and allow cross-Origin XMLHttpRequest (XHR) requests; specifically, CORS attempted
to remedy a previous bypass of the browser’s Same Origin Policy: JSONP [80]. The
main advantage introduced by CORS was to let a server instruct the browser whether
resources, e.g., scripts, loaded from a server can be accessed by resources loaded from
different Origins. An early sign of backwards compatibility in security specifications is
shown by Quote 1 where CORS leaves non-XHR requests using the GET and POST
verbs out of the specification [94] to be consistent with previous behaviour. Furthermore,
CORS defines simple XHR requests in an analogue way to non-XHR requests already sent
by browsers by the time. Simple requests are treated with a less cumbersome enforcement
than others.
A simple cross-origin request has been defined as congruent with those which
may be generated by currently deployed user agents that do not conform to this
specification. Simple cross-origin requests generated outside this specification
(such as cross-Origin form submissions using GET or POST or cross-Origin
GET requests resulting from script elements) typically include user creden-
tials...
(1)
To ensure that security mechanisms have safe defaults and do not introduce new errors,
servers using CORS need to opt in. A server opts in by providing an additional response
header for simple requests, or by implementing a pre-flight request for PUT and DELETE
methods. The latter includes an additional request and response interaction using an
OPTIONS request.
Figure 3.1.: Security-model:CORS
Figure 3.1 shows a browser with two documents loaded in different Script Contexts, e.g.,
different tabs. For the rest of this section, we present scenarios where “the developer”,
i.e., Web developer or administrator, of a benign application attempts to protect the
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confidentiality and integrity of the user’s data (depicted in grey) within his application.
Also, the Script Context on the left-hand side of Figure 3.1 was loaded from the devel-
oper’s server, while the Script Context on the right is loaded from an attacker-controlled
server. The figure shows a scenario in which an attacker attempts to execute an XHR re-
quest to the developer’s server. In this case, the developer’s server can provide the allowed
Origins to the browser. Subsequently, the browser verifies that the Origin of the Script
Context is allowed to access the data (or functionality) offered by the developer’s server.
Thus, the attacker can only gain access to the data if he can modify the headers sent
from the developer’s server to the browser. Furthermore, given that CORS is an opt-in
mechanism, servers unaware of the CORS specification will deny access to any other site
attempting to access their resources.
3.1.2. WebSockets
As applications became more interactive, developers started writing sites constantly polling
the server with XHR requests to receive updates. To relieve servers from the overhead im-
posed by the constant exchange of messages, a full-duplex asynchronous communication
channel was introduced within the browser, i.e., WebSockets. WebSockets use HTTP
with particular headers to establish a connection; afterwards, both endpoints transfer
bytes masked with a key over the network using a TCP socket. Masking information
ensures that programs processing the data during transit, i.e., proxies, do not get con-
fused allowing for cross-protocol attacks (discussed in Section 3.3.1). Additionally, the
special headers used during the handshake ensure that WebSockets are only established
with servers aware of the new protocol, i.e., it is an opt-in mechanism.
Servers that are not intended to process input from any web page but only for
certain sites SHOULD verify the |Origin| field is an origin they expect. If
the origin indicated is unacceptable to the server, then it SHOULD respond to
the WebSocket handshake with a reply containing HTTP 403 Forbidden status
code.
The |Origin| header field protects from the attack cases when the untrusted
party is typically the author of a JavaScript application that is executing in
the context of the trusted client. The client itself can contact the server and,
via the mechanism of the |Origin| header field, determine whether to extend
those communication privileges to the JavaScript application. The intent is not
to prevent non-browsers from establishing connections but rather to ensure that
trusted browsers under the control of potentially malicious JavaScript cannot
fake a WebSocket handshake.
(2)
The WebSocket security model from Quote 2 explains an Origin-based model where
the enforcement of access control must be done by the WebSocket server. To this end,
the browser communicates the Origin used for the execution of the script generating the
request in the browser. Thus, instead of following the same approach used by CORS where
the browser enforces the policy based on the headers provided by the server, WebSockets
require the server to enforce access to the functionality or data.
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Figure 3.2 shows how developers could protect the user’s data from an attacker who is
executing JavaScript code in the same browser (separate context) as the user. In addition,
Figure 3.2 includes another browser to represent that the same security model prevents
the attacker from accessing the WebSocket server data. According to the figure and
the specification, browsers include the Origin for the context attempting the WebSocket
handshake in an HTTP header. In turn, this lets the WebSocket server prevent malicious
scripts running in browsers from accessing the WebSocket server. We must note that
the second case is included for completeness and to illustrate the difference of the scope
between the security model in CORS and WebSockets. A very important difference is
that the browser enforces CORS rules provided by the server, while a WebSocket server
must validate the Origin and also enforce the rule.
Between both attacker scenarios shown in Figure 3.2, the most critical case is when
an attacker-controlled Script Context tries to open a connection to a server for which
the browser has authentication credentials, e.g., cookies. In this case, the browser would
include credentials in the request to the WebSocket server, unless a mechanism such as
same-site cookies has been used to prevent this from happening [208]. Precisely for this
reason developers must verify the Origin of incoming handshakes in WebSocket servers.
Figure 3.2.: Security-model:WebSocket
3.1.3. PostMessages
PostMessages are commonly used across windows, e.g., when a window wants to authenti-
cate a user with a separate tab already opened in the browser. However, this is not the only
purpose they serve; they are also required to communicate a WebWorker with the main
window. Scripts expecting postMessages need to register for an event listener; as a result,
postMessages are another opt in mechanism which ensures safe defaults, i.e., no com-
munication. Notwithstanding, similarly to the WebSocket specification, the postMessage
documentation instructs developers to perform security validations themselves. As shown
by the excerpt from the postMessage documentation [122] in Quote 3, a script processing
messages received from other windows must perform Origin and syntax validations.
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Figure 3.3.: Security-model:PostMessage
If you do expect to receive messages from other sites, always verify the sender’s
identity using the origin and possibly source properties. Any window (includ-
ing, for example, http://evil.example.com) can send a message to any other
window, and you have no guarantees that an unknown sender will not send
malicious messages. Having verified identity, however, you still should always
verify the syntax of the received message. Otherwise, a security hole in the site
you trusted to send only trusted messages could then open a cross-site scripting
hole in your site.
(3)
Figure 3.3 shows a message interaction from an attacker to the developer’s site. Assum-
ing the developer has included the postMessage listener, he must validate the Origin from
the window sending the message (provided by the browser). Upon reception of the mes-
sage, the developer’s application needs to ensure that only messages from trusted Origins
are processed.
3.1.4. WebRTC
According to the WebRTC project site1, WebRTC has been already implemented by
Chrome, Firefox and Opera as of November 2018. However, WebRTC faces a challenge
to rely on the Origin security model because both endpoints of the communication are
browsers. Therefore, it becomes difficult for one of the browsers to trust information
provided by the other, remote, browser. To solve this architectural problem there are
two Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) documents describing the WebRTC security
architecture [158] and security considerations [157]. Even though, there are not actual
implementations of the whole architecture yet, the standardization community has shown
support.
The WebRTC specification has included some ideas from the WebRTC architecture
and security considerations to enable sites to rely on third-party Identity Provider (IdP)s.
Particularly, cross-Origin channels can be created across browsers, while letting developers
verify the identity of users behind other browsers. More to the point, as more ideas were
added to the WebRTC specification to the identity sections, the W3C decided to separate
the identity specification [86] from the rest of the WebRTC protocol specification [125] in
June 2018.
To remain flexible, the WebRTC Identity specification foresees that a site can specify
1https://webrtc.org/
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which IdP is required by means of a URI. When the page registers an IdP, it must provide
the URI including its protocol, port, and domain. Subsequently, the browser loads the
proper JavaScript code from the URI which instantiates an IdP proxy, i.e., representation
of the IdP in the context of the developer’s site. Specifically, to register the IdP proxy, the
JavaScript from the IdP must register an RTCIdentityProvider in the browser: an object
to which the browser redirects all calls related to identity assertions. For security purposes,
the IdP proxy is executed in a separate realm, i.e., Script Context. The isolation between
the IdP and the site and other aspects of the communication are shown in Figure 3.4.
The RTCIdentityProvider must implement two methods to handle identity assertions.
On the one hand, it must provide identity assertions when the generateAssertion is
called; on the other hand, the IdP verifies the assertion when the validateAssertion
method is called.
In the context of WebRTC, the attacker is someone who tries to trick the developer’s
application into believing that his identity has been verified. As Quote 4 from the WebRTC
identity specification shows [86], the security model advises the IdP to use data confined
within its Origin to generate identity assertions. In this way, an attacker creating an
API imitating the IdP proxy cannot fool the developer’s application. Figure 3.4 shows
a scenario in which an attacker tries to establish a communication channel with another
browser. In this scenario, the validation proxy interacting with the IdP would need to
validate the attacker’s identity with an account accepted by the user.
Figure 3.4.: Security-model:WebRTC
An environment that mimics the identity provider realm can be provided by
any script. However, only scripts running in the origin of the IdP are able
to generate an identical environment. Other origins can load and run the IdP
proxy code, but they will be unable to replicate data that is unique to the origin
of the IdP.
This means that it is critical that an IdP use data that is restricted to its own
origin when generating identity assertions. Otherwise, another origin could
load the IdP script and use it to impersonate users.
The data that the IdP script uses could be stored on the client (for example, in
[INDEXEDDB]) or loaded from servers. Data that is acquired from a server
SHOULD require credentials and be protected from cross-origin access.
(4)
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Despite the necessity of a security model fulfilling the architecture, there has not been
a popular IdP implementation yet, e.g., Google. However, in addition to standardization
progress, Firefox already implements the APIs to register and query identity providers
within the browser.
3.2. Tailoring the Origin-Based Security Model
A security model based on Origins works well to isolate data under the assumption that
the triple comprised of domain, port, and protocol serve as a primary key to determine
a source of trusted information, i.e., policies. However, some issues have influenced this
security model because this model does not always reflect the desired principals.
3.2.1. Public Suffix List
Cookies have been problematic for the Origin-based security model for a long time. To
start with, Zalewski provided an overview of security issues including, but not limited to,
Same Origin Policy aspects [217]. One concern regarding cookies is a historic mismatch
with the Origin isolation because cookies are not set for an Origin but a domain instead.
Furthermore, cookies can be set for a parent domain which permits other sub-domains
of the parent domain to access the cookies. Barth explains the latter phenomenon in
the cookie specification as shown by Quote 5, taken from the HTTP state management
mechanism Internet Request for Comments (RFC) [17].
The Domain attribute specifies those hosts to which the cookie will be sent.
For example, if the value of the Domain attribute is “example.com”, the user
agent will include the cookie in the Cookie header when making HTTP requests
to example.com, www.example.com, and www.corp.example.com.
(5)
As time went by, applications were registered under domains that were not Top-Level
Domain (TLD)s but behaved similarly, i.e., Effective Top-Level Domain (ETLD). Classi-
cal examples are sites with names including the “co”” sub-domain to reflect a commercial
use, e.g., co.uk or co.jp. In addition to this case, it is common that multiple applica-
tions are hosted in sub-domains belonging to a big organization. Thus, it is common to
find domains belonging to big organizations such as Github which uses github.io to host
documentation pages or appspot.com used by Google to host multiple applications under
the same parent domain.
Allowing sites to set cookies for sub-domains creates two security problems. On the
one hand, users could be tracked across different applications without their consent when
applications set cookies for their parent domains, e.g., appspot.com. Furthermore, vul-
nerable applications could be exploited to set credentials to the parent domain , e.g.,
appspot.com, that will be passed to other applications hosted in a sub-domain, e.g.,
myapp.appspot.com.
To tackle the previously mentioned problems, Mozilla created the public suffix list which
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is currently used by all major browsers. According to Mozilla’s description “a public suffix
is one under which Internet users can (or historically could) directly register names” [59].
Thus, the suffix list can be used to prevent sites hosted by sub-domains of a public suffix
such as co.uk from setting cookies for the suffix itself. As the suffix list lets browsers
verify whether they should allow a site to set cookies to this level, e.g., appspot.com, the
two problems related to the scope of cookies have been solved. As we will see now, the
public suffix list can be relevant to handle local storage instances and protect the user
against resource abuse.
3.2.2. Local Storage
Browsers ensure confidentiality by isolating storage instances used by client-side JavaScript
depending on the Origin. In other words, only scripts from the same Origin can access
the local storage instance for that particular Origin. Moreover, each local storage instance
has a fixed space quota, i.e., 5 MB.
However, this model would still allow a developer to register multiple sub-domains and
use the maximum storage quota for each Origin. This sub-domain attack was already
considered in the W3C storage specification [70], from where we take Quote 6.
User agents should guard against sites storing data under their origin’s
other affiliated sites, e.g., storing up to the limit in a1.example.com,
a2.example.com, a3.example.com, etc, circumventing the main example.com
storage limit.
(6)
Although the W3C specification mentions user agents “should” guard against sites cir-
cumventing the storage quota, it fails to specify how. An approach implemented by Firefox
is to apply the quota to the first sub-domain of the TLD. However, this is conceptually
cumbersome because each site in a sub-domain would have its own local storage instance,
yet with a quota that is affected by other sites. Also, a1.example.com could use all the
quota and leave other sites in example.com without any space left. Also, domains could
find out how much space is used by its siblings by attempting to fill the quota, which
creates a side channel.
A Chromium issue has been open since February 2013 due to the complexity of this
kind of enforcement based on the Origin of the site abusing resources [2]. Previous to the
definition of the suffix list, developers mentioned the possibility to create a quota for the
TLD+1, i.e., the first sub-domain of the TLD. However, they mentioned also how this
would allow a site hosted under a sub-domain to starve other applications of storage2.
According to the most recent comments on the issue from May 2017, the preferred en-
forcement would take place using the ETLD+1 domain, i.e., sub-domain of the ETLD.
However, this has not been implemented yet in Chrome. Further, the comment mentions
ETLD instead of TLD; thus, we can conclude that by May 2017 Chrome developers were
already using a suffix list to differentiate effective top-level domains.
2the example given was that me.github.io could starve you.github.io, also used after this comment to
motivate the creation of the suffix list.
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In a nutshell, the isolation properties provided by local storage compartmentalize content
from different Origins; however, this mechanism can be abused by an attacker to obtain
multiple local storage instances by registering several domains, or sub-domains, depending
on the browser under attack. We go into details and explain how this can be abused to
store and distribute arbitrary content using a network of browsers in Chapter 5.
3.2.3. Suborigins
According to the draft specification for Suborigins, developers have requirements not man-
ageable with the current Origin-based security model [205]. Particularly, isolating mod-
ules of a Web application by using an Origin, i.e., referred to as a physical Origin in the
specification, is not easy to adapt once it has been deployed. On top, Origins are too
course-grained to protect separate modules of an application against XSS, even if CSP is
used. Alternatively, using sand-boxed environments is too restrictive for most use cases.
Thus, Suborigins attempt to create a specification to fill the gap between the state of the
art and what developers need.
Quote 7 shows the general objectives included in the Suborigins W3C draft specifica-
tion [205].
• Provide a way for different applications hosted on a single physi-
cal origin to isolate these into separate logical origins. For exam-
ple, https://foobar.com/application and https://foobar.com/widget, to-
day, are, by definition, in the same origin, even if they are different
applications. Thus an XSS at https://foobar.com/application means an
XSS at https://foobar.com/widget, even if https://foobar.com/widget is
”protected” by a strong Content Security Policy. Suborigins should allow
isolating /application and /widget.
• Similarly, provide a way for content authors to split their applications
into logical modules with origin level separation without using different
physical origins. Content authors should not have to choose between
putting all of their content in the same origin, on different physical ori-
gins, or putting content in anonymous unique origins (sandboxes).
• Provide safe defaults but also make it as simple as possible to retrofit
legacy applications on the same physical origin with minimal program-
matic changes. This includes providing security-model opt-outs where
necessary.
(7)
The first two goals of Suborigins explain how this standard would provide additional
flexibility for developers to isolate their application’s modules and protect them against
XSS attacks in a configurable manner if adopted. An important advantage of Suborigins is
that they allow developers to update their isolation based on headers. Although, in theory,
Suborigins would provide greater flexibility to developers, we show several problems in
24
Chapter 3. The Current Web Security Model and Its Implications For Computational
Resources
regard to safeguarding the browser against persistent storage abuse in Section 8.4.3.
3.3. Cross-Protocol Issues at Network Level
In 2006, Alcorn analysed the conditions under which encapsulating a protocol inside an-
other one triggers execution of commands for the inner protocol [11]. Particularly, the
report mentions how an attacker can use HTTP to execute IMAP commands. More to
the point, when the IMAP server parses the HTTP headers, errors do not terminate the
connection; thus, when the body contains valid IMAP commands, they would be executed
by the server. Alcorn’s idea was extended by Topf in 2008 to other text-based protocols.
Topf described how to use HTML forms from the browser to trigger actions on SMTP,
POP3, and IRC servers [188]. The approaches above have a characteristic in common
with the attack described in this section: they use a communication channel, e.g., HTTP,
to interact with a different protocol, e.g., IMAP. Similarly, we are using WebSockets to
interact with an HTTP endpoint in our DDoS attack in Chapter 4.
3.3.1. WebSockets
In 2010, Auger explained how using socket-capable plug-ins, e.g., Flash, to abuse trans-
parent proxies [14]. The main issue is that Transparent Proxys receive HTTP requests
from browsers and must choose how to forward the request. They can either rely on the
HTTP host header or they can use the destination IP to forward the request. Auger
observed that many transparent proxies used the HTTP host header. As a result, an
attacker can trick users into opening evil.com containing a plug-in that uses regular
sockets to send a messaging complying with HTTP back to evil.com. However, if the
HTTP host header mentions anothersite.com, the proxy forwards the request to the
third-party site (othersite.com). As a result, an attacker achieves a partial Same Origin
Policy bypass whereby his plug-in obtains information from a third-party site (accessible
from the proxy) in the context of evil.com. This constitutes a partial bypass because all
cookies an authentication information of anothersite.com is not visible to the malicious
plug-in, as the browser still treats it as evil.com.
Shortly after the Auger, Huang et al. extended the idea of misusing socket-capable plug-
ins (Java Applets, or Flash) to trick a Transparent Proxy into caching malicious content
under any hostname chosen by the attacker [77]. Aside from the observation made by
Auger, i.e., a Transparent Proxy can forward requests based on IP or HTTP headers,
Huang et al. noticed that some proxies were forwarding based on IP information but
caching based on HTTP headers. As a result, an attacker using a plug-in was able to
load his site (attacker.com) and then load a plug-in generating a request to the IP of the
attacker’s server, yet using a different host header (othersite.com). Afterwards, content
returned by the malicious server would be stored as if it belonged to othersite.com.
Thus, an attacker could poison the Transparent Proxy’s cache with arbitrary content
because future requests would be resolved with the content cached based on the hostname.
Furthermore, as the initial specification of the WebSocket protocol used plain text for the
communication, Huang et al. also noticed similar issues appeared when using a WebSocket.
They proposed to mask the bytes controlled by the Web site to prevent this attack; notably,
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their proposal was adopted in the final WebSocket specification resulting in the security
model shown in Quote 8.
The WebSocket Protocol uses the origin model used by web browsers to restrict
which web pages can contact a WebSocket server when the WebSocket Protocol
is used from a web page. Naturally, when the WebSocket Protocol is used by
a dedicated client directly (i.e., not from a web page through a web browser),
the origin model is not useful, as the client can provide any arbitrary origin
string.
This protocol is intended to fail to establish a connection with servers of pre-
existing protocols like SMTP [RFC5321] and HTTP, while allowing HTTP
servers to opt-in to supporting this protocol if desired. This is achieved by
having a strict and elaborate handshake and by limiting the data that can be
inserted into the connection before the handshake is finished (thus limiting how
much the server can be influenced).
It is similarly intended to fail to establish a connection when data from other
protocols, especially HTTP, is sent to a WebSocket server, for example, as
might happen if an HTML ”form” were submitted to a WebSocket server.
This is primarily achieved by requiring that the server prove that it read the
handshake, which it can only do if the handshake contains the appropriate
parts, which can only be sent by a WebSocket client. In particular, at the time
of writing of this specification, fields starting with |Sec-| cannot be set by an
attacker from a web browser using only HTML and JavaScript APIs such as
XMLHttpRequest.
(8)
Even though the WebSocket specification considered that WebSocket connections should
not be able to send payloads conforming to pre-existing protocols, its backwards compat-
ibility can be used to trigger HTTP responses from “regular” HTTP. In other words,
servers capable of serving HTTP content, yet unaware of the WebSocket protocol, es-
tablish a TCP connection and start sending content back to the browser. We analyse in
more depth the reasons behind this phenomenon when describing how WebSockets can be
employed for DDoS in Section 4.3.2.
3.3.2. WebRTC
The IETF active draft including security considerations about WebRTC already includes
cross-protocol aspects. Rescorla describes the danger of cross-protocol attacks referencing
the work by Huang et al. when he misused plug-ins for malicious caching [157]. In particu-
lar, Quote 9 shows how software interpreting HTTP messages in the network can be prone
to misinterpret communication that resembles HTTP. Precisely, these cross-protocol in-
teractions inspired us to explore cross-protocol communication between WebSocket clients
and regular HTTP servers, which is a part of the DDoS attack presented in Chapter 4.
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While consent verification is conceptually simple–just do a handshake before
you start exchanging the real data–experience has shown that designing a cor-
rect consent verification system is difficult. In particular, Huang et al. [huang-
w2sp][77] have shown vulnerabilities in the existing Java and Flash consent
verification techniques and in a simplified version of the WebSockets hand-
shake. In particular, it is important to be wary of CROSS-PROTOCOL at-
tacks in which the attacking script generates traffic which is acceptable to some
non-Web protocol state machine. In order to resist this form of attack, Web-
Sockets incorporates a masking technique intended to randomize the bits on
the wire, thus making it more difficult to generate traffic which resembles a
given protocol
(9)
3.4. Why Can Origin-Based Mechanisms Not Prevent Resource
Abuse?
In rough terms, our analysis from Section 3.1 considers an asset, i.e., data or session,
an attacker, a browser’s end user, and a developer (attempting to protect the asset).
However, there is a misalignment between the principals and their roles when the goal
shifts to protect a different asset, i.e., browser’s resources instead of the user’s data. This
issue stems from several aspects such as whether the security model provides safe defaults,
or how access to the resource is obtained.
The current Origin-based security model trusts the developer to protect the confiden-
tiality and integrity of the user’s data. To this end, the developer can isolate untrusted
elements and execute them in different Script Contexts. A classical example of isolating
untrusted content are advertisements, i.e., they are isolated using Iframes. Also, the devel-
oper can use mechanisms such as CORS or the Origin headers to validate whether data
must be shared with another Script Context or not. Further, all Origin-based security
mechanisms provide safe defaults because they were implemented as opt-in mechanisms
with a secure default setting.
At the same, computational resources do not have safe defaults because scripts executing
in any Script Context can access all resources, e.g., WebAssembly, by default. Also, as
developers consider isolated content to be “safe”, attackers can deliver resource-abusive
content to isolated containers, e.g., an advertisement inside an Iframe, and still achieve
their goal. More to the point, isolation can be exploited in favour of an attacker abusing
resources. For example, an attacker can register more than one domain, or create sub-
domains, to deliver multiple times the same code that colludes against the user by claiming
each time a separate quota for storage. Thus, for all these reasons we argue that placing
the trust to safeguard the browser’s resources on the Origin delivering the code executed
by the browser is, generally speaking, not a viable option.
Throughout the rest of this section we come back to the security model abstractions
presented in Section 3.1 and show why they are insufficient to protect resources. To
emphasize the difference between the data-centric model and the problem studied in this
thesis we highlight the resources in grey, instead of the data from the user. Also, We
3.4. Why Can Origin-Based Mechanisms Not Prevent Resource Abuse? 27
coloured in grey the interactions that are under the attacker’s control, e.g., requests. Last
but not least, we represent the validations that are under the attacker’s control with a
dashed line to show that they are optional for the attacker.
3.4.1. CORS
Sending requests to servers controlled by the attacker is out of the scope of the CORS
specification. As Figure 3.5 shows, as soon as an attacker controls his own server, he
can instruct the browser to include the data into the browser’s Script Context for further
processing. Also, we show that resources are available by default to the Script Context of
the attacker.
Figure 3.5.: Security-model:CORS and computational resources
3.4.2. WebSockets
WebSockets can be used in two ways to exploit resources. An attacker can either use
WebSockets to optimize the resource abuse across browsers, or abuse the networking ca-
pabilities of the browser as a computational resource itself. The former is shown in this
thesis when we use WebSockets to coordinate efficiently different browsers in the networks
presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Also, the same aspect has been abused by in-browser
crypto-currency mining practices described in Chapter 7. Figure 3.6 shows how an at-
tacker controls the data in the WebSocket server and the resources in the browsers; for
example, this applies to delivering specific workload to multiple browsers performing min-
ing, i.e., using computational resources such the CPU or GPU. We also have one case
study where WebSockets are abused as a network resource per se: the DDoS attack using
browsers described in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.6.: Security-model:WebSocket security and computational resources
3.4.3. PostMessages
As Figure 3.7 shows, when an attacker controls both Script Contexts, regardless of whether
they are workers, Iframes, etc., he can let both Script Contexts communicate with postMes-
sages. Although this seems trivial, allowing multiple contexts to communicate with each
other lets the attacker write scripts colluding against the user. Naturally, the validations
could ensure that the contexts only communicate with scripts under the attacker’s control
or be skipped altogether. For example, in-browser crypto-currency miners explained in
Chapter 7 create several workers and use postMessages to coordinate tasks. Also, we show
how multiple frames can collude against the user to increase the total amount of spaced
occupied in the browser in the case of a cross-browser storage network in Chapter 5.
Figure 3.7.: Security-model:PostMessage and computational resources
3.4.4. WebRTC
Quote 10, taken from the WebRTC security considerations draft [157], downplays the im-
portance of throttling WebRTC channels. Specifically, Rescorla emphasizes that browsers
provide already many mechanisms to download large amounts of data to developers.
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Note that consent verification is not sufficient to prevent overuse of network
resources. Because WebRTC allows for a Web site to create data flows between
two browser instances without user consent, it is possible for a malicious site to
chew up a signficant amount of a user’s bandwidth without incurring significant
costs to himself by setting up such a channel to another user. However, as a
practical matter there are a large number of Web sites which can act as data
sources, so an attacker can at least use downlink bandwidth with existing Web
APIs. However, this potential DoS vector reinforces the need for adequate
congestion control for WebRTC protocols to ensure that they play fair with
other demands on the user’s bandwidth.
(10)
On the other hand, Quote 11 from the WebRTC security architecture [158] mentions
that developers could achieve the same result obtained by a data channel by forwarding
data through the first-party server. Be that as it may, enabling direct browser-to-browser
channels without the user’s consent lets anyone capable of executing JavaScript code in the
browser to use these peer-to-peer browser links to move data arbitrary from one browser to
another. What is more, malicious attackers can move data around without the associated
computational overhead for the data transfer.
Clients MAY permit the formation of data channels without any direct user
approval. Because sites can always tunnel data through the server, further
restrictions on the data channel do not provide any additional security.
(11)
As Figure 3.8 shows, an attacker can establish browser-to-browser channels and either
implement his own identity validation, or not use it at all. Basically, this is an extension
of the postMessage API to another realm. The postMessage API implements cross-
window communication, and WebRTC provides a cross-browser connection. In any case,
an attacker can control multiple windows or multiple browsers colluding with one another
for his own benefit.
Similar to the case of WebSockets, an attacker can use WebRTC channels to increase the
potential of abuse across browsers by coordinating browsers, or as a networking resource.
We use it mostly to show in this thesis how attackers can abuse WebRTC as a resource
to distributed unintended data in both browser networks in Chapters 5 and 6. We do not
use WebRTC channels to coordinate different browsers because it is more complicated to
implement than centralized mechanisms such as WebSockets due to the high Churn Rate
of browsers.
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Figure 3.8.: Security-model:WebRTC and computational resources
3.5. Summary
We started by presenting an overview of how the Origin concept is useful to protect the
user’s data and sessions in the current Web security model. Also, we discussed cross-
protocol issues rising at the network level, as well as the ongoing evolution of the Origin
model. Finally, we came back to the security model based on Origins to analyse it under
a new light, i.e., resource abuse. We conclude that, despite the usefulness of Origins to
protect the user’s information, they fail to provide the right mechanisms to protect the
user’s computational resources available through the browser; fundamentally, this happens
because protecting resources is an orthogonal dimension to data protection.
When the concern shifts from protecting data to prevent abuse of computational re-
sources, several aspects change dramatically. First, data isolation serves its purpose for
data access control; however, data isolation does not influence whether scripts obtain
access to resource-related APIs. What is more, data isolation based on Origins can be
abused by an attacker to increase its resource consumption based on Origin quotas, i.e., by
creating multiple windows where each one gets a new storage quota. Last but not least, the
current security model has been implemented as a set of opt-in mechanisms, which provide
safe defaults for data access. Unfortunately, the same mechanisms do not provide safe de-
faults for computational resources. The underlying problem is that the principal granting
access to the resources should be the end user instead of the author of the JavaScript code
running in the browser. However, involving users poses challenges because they commonly
lack the knowledge and security expertise to decide whether particular APIs should be
used by an application.
Part II.
Resource Abuse Case Studies
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CHAPTER4
Abusing Browsers for Denial of Service
against Third-Parties
This chapter explores the power of browsers when an Abusive Script instructs them to
send WebSocket requests to a third-party server to perform DDoS. Figure 4.1 shows a
particular instance of the attack presented in Figure 2.2 where a user’s browser is used
to use its network resources to attack a targeted site unknowingly. Even though we used
WebSockets against a targeted site, the attack is most effective when the site under attack
is a regular Web server instead of a WebSocket server.
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Figure 4.1.: Scenario for denial of service [141]
4.1. Background
As the motivations for resource abuse presented in Section 2.1 point out, using browsers
makes it hard trace an attack back to its creator and makes the attack more resilient due
to the Churn Rate present on the Web as browsers enter and leave Web sites. Although
the attack shown in Figure 4.1 can be enhanced to include a CC server (as the coordinator
server in Figure 2.2) steering browsers to attack particular targets in a real-life deployment,
we do not include it in this chapter. Instead, we focus our efforts on studying the power
held by browsers when it comes to denial of service attacks.
Shortly before we published the attack described now, Marczak et al. found a real-life
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attack using browsers for DDoS. According to Marczak et al., the Chinese government
used browsers to perform a DDoS attack against cloud providers resisting censorship.
Notably, a technical report analysing the attack [15] shows that code in delivered to
browsers was neither using WebWorkers nor using WebSockets like the attack described
herein. Previously to this, Lam et al. referenced a DDoS attack using browsers reported
by a Vietnamese electronic newspaper in 2005. According to the newspaper, a DDoS was
observed in the wild where an attacker used browsers running Flash to generate requests
towards a particular site.
In the scope of this thesis, we explore how WebWorkers [71] can be used to create
several WebSocket connections in the background, and measured the attack’s impact on
a targeted server. To precisely quantify the power of browsers against an external Web
server, we count connections opened on the server side and analysed characteristics of the
network traffic.
During our work, we discovered different behaviour when an Abusive Script attempted to
use a combination of WebWorkers and WebSockets across browsers. For instance, Firefox
did not allow the creation of WebSockets from WebWorkers at the time, so it was immune
to extreme resource abuse. On the contrary, Safari did not implement WebSocket throt-
tling at the time. For Chrome and Chromium, we identified that connections were held
back until the tab or the connections were closed; however, once the tab or the connections
were closed through the WebSocket API, all connections were generated at once. This
way of handling connections allowed an attacker to use Chrome to overwhelm third-party
Web servers with a sudden wave of network requests. Luckily, the Chromium developer
team fixed the bug we reported quickly [160]. Also, we found that Web servers started
replying with content upon receiving the first message for the WebSocket handshake due
to issues related to backward compatibility.
4.2. Proof of Concept
Producing a proof of concept to create as many network requests as possible requires only
a few lines of code. First, we created four WebWorkers to execute the script shown in
Listing 4.1. The first line lets the WebWorker call the socket function 500 times1. In
turn, each time this function is called it opens a socket towards victim.domain. What
is more, the event listener on lines 8 and 9 ensures that a new WebSocket handshake is
triggered every time the current WebSocket is closed.
Since this attack is targeted towards a regular Web server, i.e., not supporting Web-
Sockets, WebSocket connections are not fully established. However, since the browser
performs the WebSocket handshake over HTTP, the code shown in Listing 4.1 success-
fully opens and closes TCP connections with third-parties, i.e., victim servers. Also, due
to backwards compatibility and how Web servers process HTTP requests, the initial re-
quest sent by the handshake is enough to trigger a reply with content from the targeted
server. These aspects are discussed in Section 4.3.
1We established these parameters by experimenting across browsers until the most aggressive configura-
tion was found.
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1 for(var j=0; j <500; j++){
2 socket ();
3 }
4
5 function socket (){
6 var wsUri = "ws:// victim.domain";
7 var websocket = new WebSocket(wsUri);
8 websocket.onclose = function(evt) {
9 socket ();
10 };
11 }
Listing 4.1: WebSocket recursion inside WebWorker
4.3. Analysis Concerning Browser APIs
There are two critical aspects related to how the browser implements the JavaScript APIs.
First, browsers handle WebSockets in combination with WebWorkers differently. Second,
favouring backwards compatibility for WebSockets allows an attacker to trigger TCP con-
nections from JavaScript; what is more, in some cases the first request for the WebSocket
handshake triggers a response with content from the Web server.
4.3.1. Implementation Differences in Handling WebSockets and WebWorkers
Previous research has shown that browsers have many implementation differences. When
Akhawe et al. proposed a formal security model for the Web, they had to model differ-
ent browsers separately because they do not behave exactly in the same way [10]. Also,
Schwenk, Niemietz, and Mainka have shown that browsers expose different behaviour when
applying the Same Origin Policy to regulate access between a host and an embedded doc-
ument. By running 544 test cases on the ten most popular browsers, Schwenk, Niemietz,
and Mainka found different behaviour in 23% of the cases [169]. On top, Zalewski mentions
that isolation of content in local storage mechanisms differ across browsers; for example,
some browsers consider the protocol (HTTP, or HTTPS) while other browsers just use
domain and port. Thus, it is not surprising that WebSockets created from WebWorkers
are also handled differently across browsers.
First of all, even though there is no reference to throttling connections in the current
WebSocket specification [114], many browsers implement it. Thus, there are different
approaches that, accompanied by the inherent complexity from browsers, lead to software
bugs such as the one we discovered in Chrome and Safari. Unlike Chrome’s team, Apple
neither acknowledged the report for Safari as an actual bug nor did they specify whether
they intended to fix it2.
In some cases, factors making browsers more prone to abusing network resources are just
side effects. For example, Firefox did not let WebSockets to be created from a WebWorker
by the time we executed these experiments; however, this was a result of thread safety
2As there is no clear specification across browsers some vendors may consider the lack of throttling not
to be a bug.
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issues in the code-base instead of actual security concerns [108]. Eventually, some months
after we performed our experiments, Firefox implemented WebSocket connections from
WebWorkers.
4.3.2. WebSocket HTTP Header Misinterpretation
The WebSocket specification preserves backward compatibility with HTTP-based soft-
ware and intermediaries on the network, e.g., proxies. Also, the standard envisions Web
servers capable of serving HTTP content and WebSocket requests using a single port.
Therefore, the WebSocket handshake uses an HTTP request with additional headers, e.g.,
Upgrade [114]. For future reference, we include the example presented in the specification
to illustrate the first HTTP request sent by the client during a WebSocket handshake in
Listing 4.2.
1 GET /chat HTTP /1.1
2 Host: server.example.com
3 Upgrade: websocket
4 Connection: Upgrade
5 Sec -WebSocket -Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ ==
6 Origin: http:// example.com
7 Sec -WebSocket -Protocol: chat , superchat
8 Sec -WebSocket -Version: 13
Listing 4.2: WebSocket Handshake HTTP Request
Quote 8 from Section 3.3.1 shows that despite keeping backward compatibility with
HTTP for the sake of existing software and proxies, the security model of the specification
explicitly mentions two critical aspects regarding interoperability. On the one hand, the
WebSocket protocol must not be confused with pre-existing protocols such as SMTP. On
the other hand, data sent over WebSockets must not be confused with other kinds of
communication, e.g., HTML forms.
By ensuring that browsers do not allow to set headers starting with the Sec- keyword,
i.e., the necessary headers observed in lines 5, 7 and 8 of Listing 4.2, it is ensured that an
attacker executing JavaScript cannot fake a WebSocket request from the browser. Also,
banning ports commonly used for other protocols from the WebSocket destination ensures
that attackers cannot attempt to connect to other services such as SMTP. However, despite
explicitly mentioning that a WebSocket server should not react to other kinds of data, e.g.,
forms, the RFC does not consider how Web servers not capable of opening WebSockets
react to a WebSocket handshake.
As the first request from the WebSocket handshake contains a superset of headers com-
monly observed by Web servers, the servers we tested replied with content as soon as they
obtained the handshake request. Servers reply because the first two lines of the request
comprise a valid HTTP request for the index page. Also, additional headers in the re-
quest, i.e., those needed for the handshake, are ignored by the server. Upon receiving
content from the server, the browser closes the connection because it can determine that
the server did not complete the handshake. Notwithstanding, at this point, there has
been a TCP connection established between the browser and the server, and the server
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has delivered content to the browser as well. These are the two factors leveraged by the
attacker who uses browsers for DDoS.
4.4. Evaluation
To put the effectiveness of the attack in perspective, we compared the execution of the
proof of concept attack presented in Section 4.2 to two DDoS attack tools. We chose tools
for SYN flood attacks and HTTP attacks, namely Syn-GUI and Low Orbit Ion Cannon
(LOIC). By coincidence, we found out that aside from Chrome (also Chromium) and
Safari, the attack also affects a more modest browser called Rekonq; nonetheless, we did
not analyse how the attack performs for this browser due to its low participation on the
browser’s market.
We focused on the most popular and aggressive browsers, i.e., Safari and Chrome, and
targeted them towards the two most popular servers, i.e., Nginx and Apache [199].Also,
to quantify the impact of browsers and attack tools on the servers we used:
• the number of TCP connections opened by the server.
• the number of SYN packets sent by the client (browser or attack tool).
• the number of ACK/SYN packets sent back by the server.
• the number of successful HTTP responses, i.e., the status code 200.
• the number of errored HTTP responses, i.e., the status code 500.
During each run of an attack, we obtained the number of connections from the OS
where the targeted server is running; besides, the other metrics, e.g., the number of SYN
packets, were calculated based on a raw network capture.
4.4.1. Set-up
Figure 4.2 illustrates the set-up chosen to evaluate the attack. We used one router shown
in the dashed box (MikroTik RouterBoard RB750 Series) and four physical machines:
three Dell Inspiron 15 with 6 GB RAM memory and with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4200U
CPU @ 1.60GHz processor (gray), and one Lenovo T430S with 16 GB RAM memory and
with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3520M CPU @ 2.90GHz processor (white). On every grey
machine, we installed a fresh Kubuntu 13.10 Saucy image. Also, an Ubuntu 12.04 TLS
was installed in the Lenovo T430S hosting the Intended Site. For the targeted site, we
used Apache version 2.4.6 and Nginx version 1.4.1.
Considering that Syn-GUI and Safari do not run on Linux, the only way to ensure
fairness across comparisons between browsers and attack tools was to run them on a
Virtual Machine (VM), using the same OS. We used the same base VM, with Windows
7 Enterprise Service Pack 1, to install the following software: LOIC version 1.0.7.42,
Syn-GUI version 2.0, Chrome version 39.0.2171.95 Official Build, and Safari version 5.1.7.
We executed the VM using VirtualBox version 4.3.18 and configured it with a Bridged
VirtualBox network adapter, 4 GB of RAM and 1 CPU core without capping the execution.
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Figure 4.2.: Evaluation set-up and data collection [141]
From the networking perspective, every link between machines in Figure 4.2 (dashed or
not) represents an Ethernet cable between the machines and the router. In this way, we can
ensure a fast and reliable physical connection between the machines for the experiments.
However, Figure 4.2 distinguishes connections between machines used to transfer content
related to the attack (links shown by regular lines), from the connection used to extract
network the capture from the router (dashed line).
The router forwarded the traffic between the targeted site and the host running the
attack to an external host (dashed line) for further, oﬄine, analysis. As a result, we
hinder interference of the network capture with the measurements as much as possible.
The external host received the traffic encapsulated with TaZmen Sniffer Protocol (TZSP),
a protocol designed to encapsulate network traffic over the wire. Afterwards, the external
host stored the traffic at the end of the experiment. This configuration provided better
results than capturing and storing traffic inside the router.
To monitor the number of TCP connections on the targeted server, we stored the
connections to port 80 listed by the OS with a 100 milliseconds (ms) interval approx-
imately. We observed that connections were left inactive for longer or shorter periods
depending on how each server implementation handled socket and thread pools. Thus, we
considered not only fully established connections, i.e., ESTABLISHED, but also connec-
tions in an intermediate step or momentarily unused. The latter included connections in
state SYN RECV, TIME WAIT, or FIN WAIT.
4.4.2. Methodology
We performed an attack for 20 seconds with Safari, Chrome, and the DDoS tools. Before
each experiment, we restarted the server to avoid letting the load generated by previous
executions influence the server’s performance. In the case of Chrome, we found that even
though it implemented WebSocket throttling, the browser generated all queued requests
whenever it closed the tab, or when the close function was called on the WebSocket.
Thus, we performed measurements for Chrome by executing the Abusive Script, waiting
for 20 seconds, and then closing the tab. For consistency, we show measurements using
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the same graph format throughout this section.
4.4.3. Results
The left y-axis represents the information obtained from the network capture, i.e., the
number of packets or requests, observed in a 100 millisecond (ms) timespan. As men-
tioned previously, we used the network capture to calculate the quantity of the following
elements: SYN packets, SYN/ACK packets, successful HTTP requests and HTTP re-
quests resulting in an error. On the one hand, the number of SYN packets let us determine
how many connections have been requested by the client. The number of SYN/ACK pack-
ets show how many SYN packets, i.e., the second step of the TCP connection, have been
acknowledged by the server. Last but not least, successful HTTP responses let us see
when the server replied with content, and responses with error codes show the cases when
the server is incapable of replying with content. The latter happens only due to resource
problems. We are serving a static HTML page with every request.
On the right-hand y-axis, the number of connections monitored inside the Linux machine
hosting the targeted server. This representation gives us additional insights on how each
server handles connections with a default configuration. We use the same scale when
comparing the same client to the two servers; further, we tried to keep the same scale for
every axis across figures. Nonetheless, in some cases, we had to adjust the scale for the
right y-axis depending on the client performing the attack due to the divergence of the
number of connections.
From now on, each subsection shows the measurements for the attack tools, i.e., LOIC
and Syn-GUI, when targeting a particular server. Then, we proceed to analyse the
browsers’ results.
LOIC
LOIC is a Windows application commonly used to performDDoS attacks usingHTTP [1].
LOIC floods the Web server with HTTP messages using a configurable amount of threads.
We observed that using four threads, i.e., equivalent conditions to our attack using four
workers, had a significantly lower impact on the server in comparison to using Safari or
Chrome. Thus, we used default configurations from LOIC which included 10 threads.
The client producing the behaviour with the least differences between both servers is
LOIC. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show the results for Apache and Nginx respectively. The
number of connections requested, i.e., SYN packets drawn with the continuous line, by
LOIC is usually below 50 connections per 100 ms for both servers. Also, the number of
acknowledged connections, i.e., SYN/ACK packets shown with red dots, is close to the
number of connections requested at any point in time. Also, the red dots are almost
always on top of the black lines, which shows that the server keeps opening connections
requested by LOIC. More to the point, for many connections established, a successful
HTTP response is sent back from the server to the client. We conclude the former thanks
to the grey filling of the curve the requested connections, i.e., SYN packets.
Withal, there are still some subtle differences between both servers. For example,
40 Chapter 4. Abusing Browsers for Denial of Service against Third-Parties
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 0  5  10  15  20
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000
N
u m
b e
r  o
f  P
a c
k e
t s
N
u m
b e
r  o
f  C
o n
n e
c t
i o
n s
Seconds
Client SYN packets
Server SYN/ACK packets
HTTP 200 responses
Connections
Figure 4.3.: LOIC against Apache [141]
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Figure 4.4.: LOIC against Nginx [141]
Apache has sharp peaks, while Nginx has more square peaks for the total number of
connections. As a result, Apache closed connections faster than Nginx, although they
have similar values overall, i.e., sudden changes between 500 and 2,500 connections. Also,
Apache seems to take longer to respond in some cases. Specifically, toward the end of the
measurement (after the tenth second) the grey filling goes beyond the number of requested
connections. Most likely, this behaviour occurs because there must have been pending re-
quests which were not served previously and accumulated over time. Also, unlike Apache,
Nginx replied in several cases with a 500 status code. After inspecting the server’s log
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files, we encountered that the server had exceeded the maximum number of file descriptors
allowed by the OS in its default configuration. Even though this may not be obvious at
first sight, excessive socket connections result in file descriptor starvation because Unix
systems represent sockets as file handles.
It is not surprising that the behaviour of both servers looks similar considering that
LOIC is sending regular HTTP requests to the server and waiting for the response. The
fact that LOIC waits for the server’s response limits the number of requests that can
be sent by the client. However, this is expected for this tool, as it is meant to send a
continuous and steady stream of requests hoping that when several clients do the same,
the server cannot reply to all of them simultaneously. In fact, Nginx already runs out of
file handles because it does not close the connections quickly. In practice, real-life servers
configure the OS to enforce a higher limit of connections; however, as our goal was to have
a reference to compare browsers instead of a detailed performance evaluation, we do not
modify configurations on the OS to keep the feasibility study concise.
Syn-GUI
Unlike LOIC, which implements an HTTP attack, Syn-GUI [177] performs a SYN flood
attack. The main idea of a SYN flood attack is to send as many SYN packets to the server
as possible, yet without implementing the HTTP, or even the TCP protocol. If a server
does not implement any countermeasure against this, it reserves one connection for each
SYN packet; eventually, this prevents the server from opening new connections because it
is expecting a final ACK packet for many connections to establish the TCP connection.
A consequence of this kind of attack is that we cannot monitor HTTP responses as there
are none created by the client. Withal, analysing this attack complements the point of
view about possible attack vectors and how servers react to them.
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show similar behaviour for both servers in the case of Syn-GUI.
Particularly, Syn-GUI generates waves of SYN packets lasting approximately seven seconds
and then stops for a period. Although this seems to be related to scheduling, we could not
confirm how the attack internally works because Syn-GUI is not open source and its licence
prohibits any manipulation of the program, e.g., reverse engineering. However, when Syn-
GUI sends SYN packets, it always generates between 50 and 100 packets for every 100
ms. Also, like LOIC, Syn-GUI coerces Nginx to open considerably more connections than
Apache.
Safari
Using Safari to target a Web server in the way described in our proof of concept produces
significantly different results for each server.
On the one hand, Figure 4.7 shows that Safari sends substantially more SYN packets
than Syn-GUI, i.e., peaks of 200 instead of 100 packets per 100 ms. Apache cannot open all
the connections requested by Safari, i.e., the red dots (SYN/ACKs) are scarce and never on
top of the line showing the attempts to open the connection (SYNs). Furthermore, there
are very few successful HTTP responses during the experiment, i.e., few grey vertical bars
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Figure 4.5.: SynGUI against Apache [141]
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Figure 4.6.: SynGUI against Nginx [141]
towards the end of the experiment. Unlike the case of Syn-GUI where the tool does not
send HTTP requests, Figure 4.7 should fill the curve with SYN packets with grey vertical
lines if the server would be functional. So, we conclude that Safari overwhelms Apache
with too many SYN packets as soon as the browser executes the Abusive Script. The
server stops replying to HTTP requests with a comparatively low amount of connections
established. In other words, the high throughput of SYN packets lets Apache open only
500 connections before crashing, unlike LOIC which provides a steady stream of HTTP
requests that keep the server functional but busy with up to 2000 connections.
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In the case of using Safari against Nginx, shown in Figure 4.8, the peaks of SYN packets
have a smaller magnitude than Apache, i.e., 50-10 packets/100 ms approximately. We can
also observe that the initial stream on SYN packets made it impossible for the server to
reply with HTTP responses in time, i.e., the vertical bars are delayed after some seconds
since the beginning. Withal, Nginx seems to be capable of providing successful responses
afterwards. Like previous cases, Nginx opens a higher amount of connections, i.e., around
2000, than Apache on the OS level; notwithstanding, in this case, Nginx does not run out
of file descriptors during the experiment.
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Figure 4.7.: Safari against Apache [141]
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Figure 4.8.: Safari against Nginx [141]
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Vulnerable Chrome
As described in Section 4.4.2, Chrome and Chromium performed WebSocket throttling
unlike the Safari version we tested. However, when users left the tab or when sockets were
closed, Chrome generated a flood of requests to the server. For this reason, we leave the
tab with the abusive script open for 20 seconds and then close it.
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Figure 4.9.: Chrome against Apache [141]
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Figure 4.10.: Chrome against Nginx [141]
In Figure 4.9 and 4.10, when the user leaves the tab after 20 seconds, there is a peak
of SYN packets sent by the browser, i.e., 100-200 packets/100 ms for Apache and 100-150
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packets/100 ms for Nginx. At this point, the Web server stops replying with content. In
the case of Chrome, it was possible to hinder both servers from replying with successful
HTTP requests.
The lack of grey filling under the curve shows that the Web server cannot reply to
requests. Additionally, both servers failed to acknowledge all the connections requested,
i.e., red dots for acknowledgements appear below the continuous black line depicting the
number of connection requests.
Also, whereas the network traffic is similar in both captures for Chrome, i.e., Apache
and Nginx, we observe the same behaviour as before regarding server-side connections.
That is to say, the amount of server-side connections for Nginx is more than twice of the
values observed for Apache.
Fixed Chrome
As soon as there was a fix available for the vulnerability related to WebSocket handling,
we executed the trunk raw build of Chromium to test the browser’s performance after the
security fix. For this graph, both of the y-axes have been adjusted to a narrower scale
to show the behaviour of the packets in the network, and the connections opened. In
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12, there are no additional connections when the user leaves the
tab. Further, the number of requests and SYN packets in the network is kept stable at 8
packets/100 ms.
On the one hand, the fact that this vulnerability was fixed allowed this thesis to have
real-life impact. On the other hand, this browser fix would not prevent an attacker from
abusing several browsers to accumulate their overall power against a server. Even though
DDoS attacks remain viable for attackers capable of delivering code to a broad set of
browsers, e.g., like the real-life scenario presented by Marczak et al. [109], we believe
that applying a mechanism based on usage pattern detection such as the one presented
in Chapter 9 would help to detect suspicious behaviour requiring interactions between
different browser APIs.
Overview
There are some common characteristics in our experiments. For example, Nginx tends to
open more connections and to keep them longer, in comparison to Apache. This observa-
tion is consistent with design decisions taken for Apache and Nginx. Initially, Apache has a
modular architecture with a single module implementation where each httpd process han-
dled one connection. Later on, Apache provided additional modules to manage multiple
processes and connections more effectively. One of these modules, i.e., event, can provide
similar performance to Nginx when dynamic content is served using Apache; however,
Nginx still performs better than Apache when the content delivered is static [119].
Nginx was built with a more complicated, yet more efficient, asynchronous architecture.
An asynchronous architecture lets the server handle connections better. The price paid
by Nginx is that development of Nginx modules is a considerably more cumbersome task
than in the case of Apache. Mainly, developers have to integrate their code with several
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Figure 4.11.: Chromium fixed against Apache [141]
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Figure 4.12.: Chromium fixed against Nginx [141]
asynchronous calls and carefully avoid blocking the server [61].
Since we measure the power of the attack with only static content, Nginx performs
better than Apache in several cases. More to the point, the initial goal for Nginx, i.e., to
handle as many connections concurrently as possible, leads to opening more connections
faster. In turn, too many sockets, i.e., file descriptors, are used which creates the error
observed in Figure 4.4.
The comparison between browsers and the SYN flood tool demonstrated that the
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amount of connection requests generated from the browser is comparable to the num-
ber of requests generated by the SYN flood application. Nevertheless, abusing browsers
has an additional advantage in respect to SYN flood: the browser implements the full TCP
and HTTP network stack. As a result, server-side countermeasures against browsers need
to be more complicated. For example, SYN cookies would thwart the SYN flood attack
but fail against a Web browser attack.
From the perspective of the measurements, collecting network traffic during a DoS
attack characterises it better than only counting TCP connections on the server side;
however, this method still yields results specific to the server platform. Unfortunately,
it is impossible to obtain results that can be generalised for every server implementation
because many resources could be exhausted, such as open ports, files opened by the server;
besides, resources are handled differently by each server. Notwithstanding, our evaluation
used several servers, attack tools, and browsers to find common characteristics. These
characteristics allowed us to conclude the strong and weak points of each attack and how
they perform.
4.5. Related Work
In 2006, Lam et al. published Puppetnets: a paper describing how browsers could be used
for port-scanning, DDoS and worm propagation [105]. Moreover, Lam et al. describe a
simple denial of service attack without exploiting any implementation flaws of the browser.
Notwithstanding, they spent significant efforts to estimate the potential power of a browser
network performing DDoS attacks based on several data sources. On the one hand, Lam
et al. used data from companies publishing statistics about the number of visitors and
length of visits (Webalizer and WebTrends) to estimate an average number of visitors.
Additionally, they used four data sources to estimate the length of visits to different
sites. For example, they instrumented their institution’s site to ping the server every 30
seconds to calculate a rough estimate for the time spent by users on their site. Also,
they experimented with a browser extension used by 20 users and collected around 9,000
views. With this information, Lam et al. estimated that, in 2005, the mean time for a
page visit was around 74 minutes. Also, according to their estimations, more than 20 per
cent of typical commercial sites would let a malicious user abuse 10,000 clients. Moreover,
Lam et al. calculated Round Trip Time (RTT) between server and browser to estimate
the power of the DDoS attack. In puppetnets, Lam et al. enumerate several possible
countermeasures against the three attacks mentioned above considering relatively simple
solutions; for example, disabling JavaScript in the browser or imposing a limit on the
number of requests sent from a site. All in all, Lam et al. concluded that none of the
presented options was entirely satisfying.
Simultaneously with Lam et al., Grossman and Niedzialkowski held a technical presenta-
tion on how networking capabilities of browsers could be misused against services located
in the Intranet, i.e., systems behind firewalls but accessible to the browser. Notably, the
presentation sows how to use Java Applets and JavaScript to fingerprint devices in the
local network. Grossman and Niedzialkowski coined the term “JavaScript Malware” to re-
flect this abuse. Then, Johns and Winter collected these results and other similar attacks
and published several defence strategies. Strategies presented by the authors included a
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fine-grained Same Origin Policy, rerouting messages through a server outside of the net-
work, and implementing a policy to ensure that requests generated towards the Intranet
can only be triggered by sites loaded from sites also within the Intranet. Johns and Win-
ter conclude that the best mechanism considering the trade-off between protection and
drawbacks introduced by each mechanism is to forbid requests from sites loaded from IPs
outside of the Intranet.
In 2008, Athanasopoulos et al. misused a social network to perform DDoS attacks [13].
They rely on the fact that social networks have: 1) a large and highly distributed user-
base, 2) clusters of users share same social interests, developing trust with each other, and
seeking access to the same resources, and 3) platform openness for deploying fraud appli-
cations that lure users to install them. In this work, the authors created a real Facebook
application called Photo of the Day which displays images from National Geographic to
the user. However, the applications would generate 4 requests in a hidden iframe to load
a 600 KB image from a victim server, hosted by the authors. Based on their observa-
tions, Athanasopoulos et al. found that users may open Facebook sessions lasting from
few to tens of minutes; further, after tracking the origin of the requests (IP address), the
authors found out that the geographical location of users was broadly distributed despite
the fact that the Facebook application was a simple proof of concept. Within ten days the
Facebook application was installed by 1,000 users with up to 500 active daily users. Like
Puppetnets, they use an analytical model to estimate the “firepower” of the most popular
Facebook applications, by extrapolating the results they have measured with their proof
of concept implementation.
In 2013, Grossman and Johansen demonstrated a denial of service attack using adver-
tisement networks to deliver the malicious JavaScript code [65]. Furthermore, although the
attack was already feasible due to the vast reach of an advertisement network, Grossman
and Johansen discovered a vulnerability in Firefox. The exploitation consisted of using
the browser’s JavaScript API to attempt to load an image but changing the HTTP scheme
to FTP in the URL. Loading images allowed an attacker to create a higher amount of re-
quests. Instead, we use the WebSocket API combined with the spawning of WebWorker to
generate requests from the browser. Like Grossman and Johansen we found a vulnerability
with more significant impact. Also, Grossman and Johansen show the effectiveness of the
attack by measuring the number of HTTP connections on the server side for one server
implementation, i.e., Apache. Instead, we monitored not only the established connections
on the server side but also the network traffic on the router level for two different server
implementations, i.e., Apache and Nginx.
4.6. Summary
After we presented the generic aspects of the attacks studied in this thesis in Chapter 2,
the current chapter presents the first detailed resource abuse attack. We have evaluated a
particular case of resource abuse where an attacker uses multiple WebWorkers to spawn
a large number of WebSocket connections towards a third-party server, from the visitor’s
browser.
We have also deepened the analysis on cross-protocol issues, started in Section 3.3.
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Mainly, we shift our focus towards a particular cross-protocol misinterpretation when the
browser sends a WebSocket handshake to an HTTP server unaware of the WebSocket
protocol. Irrespective of this misinterpretation, we also discovered two vulnerabilities
in popular browsers handling WebSockets from WebWorkers. The fact that one of the
browsers fixed the vulnerability we reported allowed our research to have an impact in
real life.
We performed a quantitative evaluation of the attack’s power towards the third-party
server. To this end, we used several set-ups with different servers and browsers. For each
set-up, we measured the number of connections opened on the server, and the number of
packets to start or acknowledge a TCP handshake as well as requests successfully fulfilled.
Using the data sources mentioned before, we performed a comparison with existing DDoS
attack tools. Moreover, the variety of servers and browsers we evaluated let us present the
most detailed technical analysis of a denial of service attack abusing browsers thus far.
Last but not least, based on our evaluation we conclude that browsers can have significant
power for denial of service in comparison to existing attack tools.
This chapter contains ideas and content from the associated publication “Why Web
Servers Should Fear Their Clients” [141].

CHAPTER5
Abusing Browsers for Arbitrary Data
Storage and Distribution
This chapter describes how attackers can abuse browsers to store data beyond the intended
quota per site persistently; furthermore, an Abusive Script makes use of WebRTC and
postMessages to interconnect several browsers and frames to create a unified cross-Origin
network of browsers, yet without notifying the browser’s users about this behaviour. An
attacker would be motivated to carry out this attack for two main reasons. First, the
quantity of resources consumed across browsers are less than the resources he has to
invest. Second, an attacker can complicate forensic analysis and repudiate owning the
content distributed through the browser network because information is stored persistently
and distributed by browsers instead of an attacker’s server.
Figure 5.1 shows how this attack corresponds to a particular instance of the general
resource abuse scenario presented in Figure 2.2. Unlike the DDoS attack given in Chap-
ter 4, building the storage network requires a CC server, shown as the Coordinator server
in the picture, to negotiate connections between network peers.
Coordinator (Signal and Index) Server
Intended Site
1. Download 
abusive script
2'. Transfer 
Content
User
2'. Transfer 
Content
: WebSocket
: WebRTC data channel
: HTTP/Ajax
Figure 5.1.: Scenario for data storage and distribution [143]
51
52 Chapter 5. Abusing Browsers for Arbitrary Data Storage and Distribution
5.1. Background
The Web security community has invested significant effort into protecting and advising
developers on how to use client-side APIs. Lekies and Johns described how using local
storage for content caching can result in script injection, and how to prevent it [106].
During the early stages of the postMessage specification, Barth, Jackson, and Mitchell
proposed a modification to the API to ensure that the browser delivers messages only to
windows matching a specific Origin. Later on, Hanna et al. analysed the use of postMes-
sages and illustrated how faulty Origin validations lead to the execution of undesired
functionality [67]. Provos et al. showed how zero pixel frames are a common attack vector
used for Drive-by Downloads [154].
Also, popular browsers have started to provide users with more tools to control privacy-
related functionality. For example, users can disable WebRTC to ensure that IP addresses
cannot be leaked without the user noticing [179]. Also, browsers let users ensure that third-
party frames cannot use persistent storage mechanisms to prevent persistent tracking [63,
123].
Despite all the valuable effort to fix security issues that stem from a single API, consid-
ering consequences arising from client-side API combinations is rarely done, even though
it is just as important as securing APIs separately. We show how using the browser’s local
storage, the postMessage API, Iframes, and WebRTC simultaneously can allow attackers
to use browsers to store and distribute arbitrary data.
Storing the content in the browsers and transferring it over direct browser-to-browser
links relieves the server from the responsibility, liability, and performance overhead asso-
ciated with hosting and distributing the content. Moreover, an attacker keeps the site’s
visitor oblivious to the malicious behaviour, i.e., storage and distribution of unknown
content, since no warnings or messages are presented to the user. Lack of awareness on
the user’s side is particularly concerning when data stored in his browser is of sensitive
nature, legally or morally. To clarify the concern regarding the nature of the data stored
and distributed through the browser, let us analyse a real example where the blockchain
has been misused.
Karam and Kamluk analysed the Bitcoin’s blockchain to find which kind of data is stored
in the ledger [90]. Mainly, they found a picture of Nelson Mandela, the original Bitcoin
paper, some WikiLeaks, among other media; moreover, Karam and Kamluk mention the
concern that the blockchain could be potentially used to store illegal information, e.g., child
pornography [58]. More recently, Matzutt et al. analysed the contents of the blockchain and
found copyright violations, malicious XSS attacks, in case the transactions were opened
by a browser, politically sensitive content and illegal content, i.e., links to hidden services
distributing child pornography [111]. Naturally, browser’s users should be shielded from
abusive scripts storing potentially illegal content, as blockchains should.
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5.2. Proof of Concept
We have built a proof of concept where every browser that opens a site including an
Abusive Script, replicates data stored across all browsers in a unified browser network.
In our implementation, there is no central server hosting the files; on the contrary, every
browser can register files in the network to let other browsers automatically replicate them.
5.2.1. Client-Side Building Blocks
There are two main building blocks on the clients side required to build the proof of
concept. On the one hand, the attacker needs to increase the storage limit imposed
by the browser. On the other hand, the attacker needs to spread information to keep
content alive. Both factors comprise a novel attack vector in which the visitor’s browser
is coerced, not only to store data permanently but also to transmit such data directly to
other browsers without the user’s knowledge. Figure 5.2 depicts the technical aspects of
the implementation discussed in the following sections.
Increasing the Local Storage Limit
By default, browsers enforce a 5 MB quota per Origin, which is applied browser-wide. The
storage quota can be overridden by a user’s decision when developers use the browser’s
APIs to ask for permission to extend the quota. Since the attacks covered in this thesis
intend to keep the user oblivious to the malicious behaviour, it is imperative for attackers
to find ways to extend the quota without notifying the user.
From the Origin’s point of view, there is no way to bypass the storage quota without
exploiting particular browser vulnerabilities; however, there is a way to bypass the storage
quota when two or more Origins collude against the user. In other words, an attacker can
use several so-called Storage Iframes: Iframes with different Origins to obtain access
to separate local storage instances, i.e., one for each Iframe. Furthermore, to keep the
attack visually undetectable, an attacker can use mechanisms described by Provos et al.
such as zero pixel or transparent Iframes[154]. Aboukhadijeh created an example of how
to use excessive space on the user’s disk through Iframes pointing to different sub-domains
of the site visited by the user.
So far, an attacker would be able to abuse the user’s disk space using Iframes; however,
each data item stored in an Iframe is not directly accessible to other domains due to the
Same Origin Policy. To provide access to data stored within each frame, we have used
postMessages. Every Storage Iframe can use postMessages to establish a bi-directional
communication channel with the main Abusive Script; moreover, for visual purposes,
we term “broker” as the function handling by-directional asynchronous communications
between Iframes and the Abusive Script. Thus, an attacker is now capable of retrieving
and storing information within every invisible Iframe even though each Storage Iframe is
loaded from a different Origin.
Figure 5.2 shows two browsers executing the Abusive Script; moreover, the Abusive
Script opens the Storage Iframes hosted on three different Origins, i.e., Origin1, Origin2,
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Origin3. The “broker” shown in Figure 5.2 also adopts a hierarchical approach where it
commands each Storage Iframe to execute actions, e.g., retrieve a file from another peer,
and receives callbacks with the status of the task afterwards. This provisions the Abusive
Script with an overview of the files that are stored locally. In turn, the network ensures
that files are not replicated more than once per browser. For our proof of concept, we host
the Abusive Script and the Storage Iframe in a Web server reachable under n different
origins, where n is the number of Storage Iframes created.
Inter-Browser Cross-Origin Communication
The previous storage quota bypass can be enhanced with inter-browser communication
to turn browsers into distribution hubs. Thus, an attacker can leverage WebRTC data
channels to not only store information in browsers, but also to force them to distribute it
for him.
WebRTC requires an initial negotiation phase during the protocol handshake. Such
initialization phase is solved by the implementation of the Interactive Connectivity Estab-
lishment. In particular cases, when browsers are behind a router with Network Address
Translation (NAT), a server providing Session Traversal Utilities for NAT allows them to
discover their public IP address and port. In most cases, a quick intervention of a STUN
server is enough to enable browsers to communicate with each other directly. In some
cases it may be impossible to establish a direct connection between two peers depending
on network conditions; thus, browsers can use a relay server implementing the Traversal
Using Relay NAT.
From the resource usage point of view, WebRTC has a significant advantage which
provides a surplus of resources for the attacker. In most cases, the STUN server only
exchanges connection information between browsers during the handshake; furthermore,
there are publicly available servers for free1. Thus, the only computational load required
for the attacker is to provide a CC server to coordinate the browsers. Thus, the resources
invested by the attacker are fewer than the sources he can use on the client’s side.
As shown in Figure 5.2, an attacker can let each Storage Iframe host an overlay peer,
i.e., a WebRTC peer capable of retrieving and storing files based on orders received from
other peers. Also, similarly to the asynchronous communication between different Iframes,
an attacker can establish cross-browser connections to instruct remote machines, i.e.,
browsers, to receive, send, store and delete files in the network.
1https://gist.github.com/mondain/b0ec1cf5f60ae726202e
5.2. Proof of Concept 55
Figure 5.2.: Proof of concept (based on [143])
5.2.2. Server-Side Services
The previous discussion was focused on client-side technologies used by an Abusive Script
to materialize the attack. Now, we describe server-side services, and the simple but ef-
fective replication technique, used for our proof of concept. Although services are imple-
mented and presented separately, they can be executed within one server. Moreover, we
show all services as a single CC server, i.e., the Coordinator (Signal and Index) server,
in Figure 5.1. This server corresponds to the Coordinator server shown in the general
resource abuse attack from Figure 2.2.
Signalling Server
Browsers must obtain information about each other before the connection can be estab-
lished, i.e., with Interactive Connectivity Establishment. Thus, browsers provide maxi-
mum flexibility by leaving the details of how this data reaches the other end out of the
specification. In general, the server delivering information to establish the browser-to-
browser connection is called the signalling server. To fulfil this requirement, we used a
local installation of the PeerJS Server [149]: an open-source server which, in combination
with a client-side library and WebSockets, provides a high-level abstraction to connect
and communicate peers in the network.
Peer and File Index
Aside from the signalling server, we need an additional service to keep a peer and file
index. To this end, we developed a custom peer and file index server using WebSockets
and the Tornado framework [190]. The peer and index server keeps track of files present
in the network as well as peers storing them.
Whenever a browser joins the network, a WebSocket is opened to the peer and index
server. Clients can notify the peer and file index server with updates at any time without
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incurring in the overhead of a full HTTP request. Such updates include, for example,
notifying the index that a new file is available in the peer. Thanks to the index server,
every browser in the network keeps an almost real-time synchronization with the file and
peer index. Further, since every browser keeps a WebSocket open with index server, it can
be safely assumed that a given browser (and all its Overlay Peers) have left the network
once the WebSocket connection is closed.
Even though the mapping between peers and files could be distributed across the browser
network, e.g., using a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [46], we implemented this index in a
centralized server because the DHT neither strengthens nor weakens our argumentation,
from the security point of view. Likewise, our prototypical implementation does not divide
large files into chunks to store them; instead, the proof of concept requires files with at
most 5 MB after encoding them in base 64.
5.2.3. Content Replication Technique
The replication technique followed by each Abusive Script is straightforward. When there
is space in a Storage Iframe, the Abusive Script determines a file which complies with
the following conditions based on the current state of the index. On the one hand, the
file should have the least amount replications in the network. On the other hand, the file
should neither be stored in the Storage Iframe with available space nor any of its siblings,
i.e., it is not replicated in the browser where the Abusive Script is running. Afterwards,
the Storage Iframe is instructed to download the file determined in the previous step.
Thus, the process allows that when peers leave, files with the least amount of replicas are
copied to other nodes before they perish. Although this is a simple replication technique,
it is enough to exemplify the implementation of a replication strategy.
We implemented a greedy replication approach in the proof of concept; specifically, we
assume an attacker prefers to waste networking resources from the browser to diminish
the risk of losing files currently hosted in the network. First of all, we must note that
the creation of a Storage Iframe requires a registration process that includes connecting
to the index server, creating the peer in the WebRTC network, and registering the files
stored already in its local storage. The greedy replication technique works as follows:
when the Abusive Script starts, it creates every Storage Iframe and starts distributing
tasks to replicate files immediately.
However, since the registration process executed inside each Storage Iframe, and the task
distribution performed by the Abusive Script happens concurrently, the Storage Iframe
could receive a command to download a file that is already replicated in the browser but
has not been registered in the index yet. However, in case the Storage Iframe requests a file
already replicated in the browser before the index has been completely updated, this file
is discarded once it is received. This approach uses more network than strictly necessary
in browsers that are coming back; however, this approach ensures that new visitors start
replicating immediately. We prioritize fast replication over network usage because files
not replicated in a timely fashion are lost. Further, using more network on the browser’s
side does not bring any cost to the attacker.
To describe the life-cycle of a Storage Iframe, Figure 5.3 shows a flow diagram reflecting
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the actions performed from the start and the infinite loop performed waiting for messages
from the Abusive Script.
Figure 5.3.: Storage Iframe execution flow diagram
5.3. Analysis Concerning Browser APIs
Figure 5.2 shows Iframes, local storage instances, postMessages, and WebRTC channels.
We focus our attention on specific characteristics from these APIs and why they enable
the attack presented in this section. This attack also uses WebSockets to keep the local
and remote index updated; mainly, the WebSocket API provides an efficient means of
communication between browsers and the peer and file index server.
Essentially, arbitrary storage and distribution through browsers are possible thanks to
the combination of four APIs: local storage, postMessages, WebRTC and the stealthy
creation of Iframes. As anticipated in Section 3.2, multiple frames with different Origins
give access to separate local storage instances. What is more, the composition of frames
with postMessages makes the data persistently stored in local storage instances available
throughout all Origins controlled by the attacker. Similarly, the addition of WebRTC
pushes the boundary beyond the browser whose local storage contains the file; instead,
the composition of browsers allows the attacker to retrieve the file from any browser
executing his JavaScript code.
5.4. Evaluation
There are two concerns we need to address to assess the feasibility of the storage and
distribution network. First of all, the browser network should keep files available in spite
of browsers joining and leaving the Intended Site. Also, network overhead imposed on
servers, e.g., the signalling server, should be negligible compared to the network use on
the browser’s side. In turn, low requirements for the attacker guarantees that the network
can scale without requiring high computational resources from the attacker. To this end,
we collect log files and network traffic from the experiments.
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5.4.1. Set-Up
We used Linux containers to evaluate whether the network can keep files alive in a browser
network when visitors join and leave the network. The main advantage of containers is
that they are a resource-friendly approach to execute software in an isolated manner.
Specifically, unlike virtual machines, containers reuse the host kernel. We have used
docker [48] Linux containers to ensure that tests have precisely the same initial state for
the file system, which helps reproducibility of experiments.
As Figure 5.4 shows, Docker containers to execute the so-called selenium controller : a
multi-threaded Java application providing a REST API. This application receives com-
mands, including actions such as open a website, close the window, or wait for a certain
time before the next instruction, through HTTP. These actions are then executed on a
Chromium browser inside the docker instance through a Selenium [172] driver. To run
a headless Chromium browser inside containers, we used Xvfb [216] as an X server to
simulate a terminal without using hardware for it.
Figure 5.4.: Evaluation set-up [143]
In addition to the containers for the selenium controller, an Apache2 server (hosting the
Intended Site, the Abusive Script, and the Storage Frames), a Peer and Index server, as
well as a PeerJS server were run in separate containers, in the same host machine. Also,
a specific /etc/hosts file was automatically generated and copied into every container, so
that it can address the servers by name regardless of the docker IP. Further, the n domains
used for the Storage Frames point to the same Apache server in the hosts file.
On the bottom of Figure 5.4, the orchestrator represents a Python program sending
actions to every selenium controller used for the experiment. The orchestrator is a multi-
threaded Python application using the Tornado [190] framework to implement an HTTP
server to receive callbacks from the selenium controllers, once they have finished a task.
The Orchestrator implements the waiting times between browser visits and specifies which
Chromium profile should be used for the browser session to be opened from the selenium
controller. Also, all instructions sent by the orchestrator to the controllers come from files
with the commands for the experiment, e.g., instr-1 in Figure 5.5.
Specifying a Chrome profile lets the Orchestrator control whether profiles including pre-
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viously stored information, such as cookies or local storage should be used. For example,
if the orchestrator wants to simulate a visitor that comes for the first time to a website, a
clean profile without any cookies, local storage items, or any other previous cached infor-
mation is used. Conversely, loading a Selenium session with a specific profile, which has
already been used by a browser session which visited the network’s site, would contain all
the stored files in local storage and is therefore used to represent a returning visitor. The
profiles are represented as folders in the case of Chromium and Chrome and allow us to
simulate one-time, or returning, visitors. Moreover, we used one host machine to run all
the containers: a Lenovo T430S with 16 GB RAM, and an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3520M
CPU @ 2.90GHz processor with Ubuntu 12.04 LTS.
We have tested our implementation by building a cross-origin network using Chrome
43.0.2357.81, and Firefox 38.0. In both browsers, the circumvention mechanism to increase
the storage quota available for the network worked. Each browser has a 5 MB quota limit
enforced per origin; as a result, if there are 2 origins capable of serving the content, each
browser can host up to 10 MB, if there are 10 origins, each browser can host 50 MB, etc.
In other words, we used ten Storage Iframes, i.e., n to increase the quota linearly. In the
set-up for the experiments presented in this chapter, we used n = 10.
5.4.2. Methodology
Figure 5.5 shows the data sources required for our evaluation in gray-shaded boxes. The
data sources were: the log files where the peer and index server stores the number of times
a file is replicated, and a network (tcpdump) capture including all the traffic during the
experiment. We use log files to calculate how long is a file available in comparison to the
duration of an experiment run. Also, we use the network capture to calculate the number
of bytes exchanged between browsers and servers.
Figure 5.5.: Evaluation data collection [143]
Furthermore, the content hosted by the network is comprised of 33 pictures with an
average size of 1 MB each, i.e., a total of 33 MB. This size ensures that 33 MB can be
stored in one browser (using up to 50 MB of local storage) once they have been encoded
in base 64. Although exploring how the network reacts when not all files can be stored in
one browser would be interesting, we omit this analysis because the performance of the
browser network is not our primary goal.
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5.4.3. Peer Behaviour
We automated ten browsers to visit the Intended Site and therefore execute the Abusive
Script. To evaluate the impact of returning and non-returning browsers we divide the
set of 10 browsers into two sets accordingly. In this way, a returning controller always
returns with its previous state during the whole experiment. On the contrary, a selenium
controller doing visits equivalent to a one-time visit also returns to the Intended Site, but
it loads a fresh profile every time. Since the latter kind of selenium controller represents
a one-time, or “non-returning” visitor, it is also called non-returning selenium controller
(or browser) from now on. For each returning or non-returning selenium controller, the
process to generate the visit length, i.e., time in which the browser keeps the Intended Site
open. The time between visits, i.e., time until the browser comes back, is generated using a
random number generator, see Figure 5.6. Thus, the time of the experiment is filled with
sequences of visits followed by waiting times between visits. The visit length is depicted
in the gray-shaded areas for each browser, while the time between visits is represented by
white sections.
Figure 5.6.: Browser behaviour for the evaluation [143]
5.4.4. Results
This section presents results after we analyse our two data sources shown in Figure 5.5.
Thus, we focus on content availability and network usage.
Content Availability
Figure 5.7 shows the result of 5-minute experiments with ten browsers with random visit
lengths between 30 and 50 seconds. Also, we have modified two aspects: the time between
visits, and the number of returning browsers. Precisely, we executed experiments where
the time between visits was randomly chosen within three ranges, namely 10-40, 110-140
and 210-240 seconds. Also, we instructed 3, 5 and 7 browsers to return with previous
local storage, while using the rest of the browsers for one-time visits. As a result, we can
map 3, 5, or 7 out of 10 browsers to a 30%, 50% and 70% visitor return rate without any
loss of generality. Further, for readability purposes, we grouped bars with results of file
availability (and their standard deviation) by the time between visits in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7.: File availability [143]
To assess whether “common” sites can be used to distribute enough Abusive Scripts
to have a functional storage and distribution network, we do an approximate estimation
based on average values. First of all, we calculate the average visits per browser using
Equation 5.1. This formula divides the time for the experiment, i.e., 5 minutes, by the
average time between one visit and the next. However, the actual average visit needs
to consider both the time spent on the site, as well as the waiting time between visits.
Afterward, as shown by Equation 5.2, the number of visits per browser times the number
of browsers yields the total number of visits in our experiment.
V isitsbrowser =
timeexperiment
(meantimevisit +meantimewaiting)
(5.1)
V isitstotal = V isitsbrowser ∗Browsers (5.2)
We use these equations to extrapolate to the number of visits required for 24 hours.
Using the formulas presented and an average visit time of 45 seconds always, i.e., mean
between 30 and 50, we obtain the number of daily visits in Table 5.1. Also, we include
the file availability expected in each scenario, depending on the return rate for visitors
towards the right-hand side of the table.
Now, we assess the feasibility for an attacker to obtain the number of visits, the visit
length, and the return rate to achieve high file availability from the distribution and storage
network.
• return rate: a marketing report from Clicktale shows that achieving a visitor rate of
30%, or even 50% for a site is realistic [36]. Explicitly, the report states that return
visitor rates commonly lie between 25 and 52%. From this point of view, the most
realistic scenarios are when sites obtain a 30 or 50% visitor return rate.
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• visit length: the visit length used, i.e., 30 to 50 seconds is conservative. The mar-
keting report previously mentioned concludes that visit lengths are between 293 and
310 seconds [36]. Further, Antonatos et al. reported Web sessions to have a mean
value of 74 minutes based on multiple data sources such as a browser extension in
a small study, databases with clickstream information from a commercial site and
search engines [12]. On the other hand, Athanasopoulos et al. found that Facebook
users commonly have sessions lasting from few to tens of minutes [13]. Last but
not least, in a recent in-depth study of monetization of CryptoJacking in the wild,
Musch et al. found that sites containing miners had an average visit length of 3
minutes [124].
• number of visits: The study about CryptoJacking in the wild from Musch et al. also
shows that sites exploited for crypto-currency mining attracted 24,721 visitors on
average [124]. As a result, all scenarios presented in Table 5.1 are below the average
behaviour of sites including mining scripts, so it is definitely possible to perform this
attack.
Assuming that an attacker can infect one site with a realistic return rate of 30% and
with an average visit length of 45 seconds, the attack would require 5,000 or 12,000 visitors
to deliver a 43% or 87% file availability. We argue this is realistic since CryptoJacking
sites exhibit twice the number of visits and four times the visit length required, i.e., 24,000
visits lasting 3 minutes on average.
Further, as discussed in Chapter 3, WebRTC channels can be opened to connect browsers
loading scripts from different domains. Consequently, an attacker does not need to com-
promise one site with the return rate and amount of visitors. Instead, he can inject the
Abusive Script in multiple sites in different Origins and create a cross-Origin network.
Thus, the return rate and the number of visits must be obtained from all the compro-
mised sites combined, instead of only one site. Last but not least, an attacker could lower
the prerequisites in terms of return rate and the number of visits by increasing the amount
of Storage Iframes beyond 10, i.e., the number used for our measurements.
Network Usage
This section evaluates the load imposed on the attacker’s servers and browsers to validate
whether there is an advantage for the attacker in terms of resource consumption. To this
end, we collected raw network traffic during every experiment; furthermore, we used the
dpkt [49] Python package to count the bytes aggregated by source and destination IP to
time between visits % availability
visits (s) per day 70% return rate 50% ret. rate 30% ret. rate
10-40 12342 95.7 95.2 87.8
110-140 5082 53.4 45.5 43.4
210-240 3200 36.0 34.3 26.4
Table 5.1.: Extrapolation to daily visits from 30-50 second visit lengths
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analyse properties of the browser network.
For readability reasons, the information is not shown on a per-entity basis, but instead
we focus on interaction between three groups of entities: the group of returning browsers,
the group of browsers executing the one-time visits, and the group of servers including the
index and peer server, the Web server, and the PeerJs server.
The nature of the network analysis requires to represent the network traffic for each
experiment run individually; however, as network captures do not vary significantly, we
chose two experiments to analyse the traffic, i.e., with 10-40 seconds between visits and
with a 30, 50% return rate. Mainly, we chose to analyse these two experiment runs because
they correspond to the most realistic scenarios, i.e., 87 or 95% file availability with 5,000
or 12,000 visitors respectively.
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the average amount of data (in MB) transmitted between the
group represented by the row of the matrix to the group represented by the column of the
matrix color-coded as a heat-map; that is to say, darker colours represent less amount of
data.
Non-returning browsers have a clean local storage every time they join, and therefore at-
tempt to replicate files continually; therefore, both figures show that browsers receive more
data in comparison to what they send to servers. It is also clear that browsers exchange
the highest amount of data in the browser network, as expected. Another interesting
fact is that returning browsers send more data to non-returning browsers than returning
browsers. Also, as the number of returning browsers increases, the overall browser net-
work uses less networking resources and achieves more availability. However, as browsers’
networking resources are free for an attacker, this trade-off is not relevant for him as long
as he obtains better file availability.
Even though servers do not host the content replicated, they send more data, i.e., HTML
and JavaScript, to non-returning browsers than to returning browsers. This disparity
happens because a clean profile has neither local storage nor Web resources cached. As a
result, browsers with new profiles must retrieve the static content every time. Contrarily,
returning browsers receive headers instructing the browser to use contents from the cache.
Figure 5.8.: MBs transmitted - 3 returning selenium controllers [143]
Figure 5.9.: MBs transmitted - 5 returning selenium controllers [143]
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Last but not least, returning browsers send a considerable amount of bytes to non-
returning browsers, which is not reciprocal. Figure 5.9 shows that non-returning browsers
receive 23.39 (18.9 + 4.49) MB from returning and non-returning browsers on average.
Moreover, non-returning browsers deliver 6.97 (2.48 + 4.49 ) MB to returning and non-
returning browsers on average. Nonetheless, the fact that they deliver almost 5 (out of
6.97) MB to other non-returning browsers is a sign of their contribution to keeping files
replicated. A similar argument can be applied to Figure 5.8.
5.5. Related Work
Using local storage to store information on the client without the user’s knowledge has
been introduced by Bogaard, Johnson, and Parody [23]. Their work focused on placing a
single file on a Web server and distributing pieces of this file to several browsers. Then, the
Web developer would deploy a different application to retrieve the content to the server
again. The attack studied shares the motivation to keep the user uninformed, but it neither
builds a browser network nor circumvents local storage quotas through PostMessages.
From the storage abuse perspective, Aboukhadijeh discovered that a single website
could instruct local storage to store data in many sub-domains. In turn, the use of sub-
domains leads to the abuse the users’ disk, filling it until the browser crashes or the whole
disk is occupied [3]. This trick relates to our quota bypass mechanism as both rely on
using different origins to increase the quota. However, we have enhanced this approach
to make the data accessible to the Abusive Script, by implementing letting several origins
collaborate through an asynchronous message channel, the broker shown in Figure 5.2
implemented through the postMessage API.
There have been previous browser networks using WebRTC to deliver static content
inspired by concept such as a Content Distribution Network (CDN) and distributed file
sharing.
PeerCDN [72] is a WebRTC-basedCDN using the visitor’s browser to share the website’s
static HTML content with other browsers. Owners of the company claim to achieve a 90%
bandwidth reduction for the server hosting the site. Zhang et al. implemented another
browser-based CDN called Maygh [219]. Maygh relies not only on WebRTC but also
on Real Time Media Flow Protocol (RTMFP), i.e., a closed source protocol accessible
from Flash plug-ins. The authors examined the performance and the applicability of the
CDN by conducting experiments where simulated browsers would visit the website using
the CDN. They conclude a reduction of 75% on bandwidth use on the operator of the
website’s side. Further, to avoid abusing the clients, the CDN network ensures that users
do not upload more than 10 MB to the CDN.
From a different perspective, there is research work to transmit video streams between
browsers using WebRTC [115, 131, 159] to ease the burden imposed on servers hosting
the video streams. Likewise, there is a tool designed to implement a similar protocol to
Torrent within browsers called WebTorrent [4].
Although these approaches execute JavaScript code to distribute content, there are
essential differences between the previously mentioned approaches and ours. First of
5.6. Summary 65
all, content and the video distribution networks do not use the browsers as a storage
system to put and retrieve information unrelated to what they are consuming. Instead,
these approaches replicate the content matching what is being rendered to the visitor of
the website. Also, these content distribution networks do not collude against the user
to bypass the storage restriction as the attack described here does. Also, previously
mentioned approaches do not exploit the cross-Origin aspect in WebRTC channels, which
can increase the harm of the attack presented.
5.6. Summary
In this chapter, we present the second resource abuse attack from our case studies; explic-
itly, we present a scenario in which an attacker creates a cross-Origin browser network.
Once Abusive Scripts are distributed, an attacker can force browsers to join a browser
network and perform persistent storage and distribution of arbitrary content for him.
Even though the attack presented in this chapter shares the resource abuse aspect with
the DDoS attack shown in Chapter 4, it introduces new dimensions relevant to resource
attacks. First, the current attacker is motivated to avoid the responsibility of hosting po-
tentially illegal content in browsers. Second, an attacker also obtains more resources than
those he needs to invest in the network. We have shown through a proof of concept that
local storage quotas can be bypassed when an attacker delivers multiple Abusive Scripts
colluding against the browser. The browser network serves as an example to confirm our
argument from Section 3.4: content isolation is not only useless for resource control, but it
can be employed for an attacker’s benefit. Also, this is the first abuse study that requires
a CC server in this thesis.
We also evaluate the feasibility of a real-life deployment of this attack. Thus, we in-
structed multiple browsers to visit a site with abusive scripts bypassing the storage quota.
During our experiments, we collected the file-to-peer mapping and the raw network cap-
tures. The former helps us to calculate the availability of files throughout the experiments.
The latter allowed us to confirm our hypothesis, i.e., an attacker invests significantly fewer
resources from the network point of view. Extrapolating from the number of visits per-
formed in our experiments, return rates, and time between visits, we concluded that the
attack is realistic. We reach a favourable conclusion because an attack with only ten
Origins requires fewer visits with a shorter length than a pre-existing attack, i.e., Crypto-
Jacking.
This chapter included content and ideas from the associated publication “Local Storage
on Steroids: Abusing Web Browsers for Hidden Content Storage and Distribution” [143].

CHAPTER6
Abusing Browsers for Anonymous
Communication
This chapter describes how attackers can abuse browsers creating an overlay peer network
performing onion routing with The Onion Router (Tor)’s approach [189]. Similarly to
Chapter 5, the attack presented herein considers an Abusive Script using WebRTC chan-
nels to interconnect browsers; however, instead of using browsers to store and replicate
data, the browser network is used to let an attacker and his collaborators communicate
anonymously. Similar to every other attack developed in this thesis, users remain unaware
of the abuse, i.e., onion routing, perpetrated through their browser. Figure 6.1 shows how
this attack corresponds to a particular instance of the general resource abuse scenario pre-
sented in Figure 2.2. Like the storage attack presented in Chapter 5, building the onion
routing network requires a CC server, shown as the Coordinator server in the picture.
A CC server is needed to negotiate connections between network peers; also, the server
keeps a list of available peers and their keys to perform ephemeral key negotiation.
From the possible scenarios exemplifying browser resource abuse, the onion routing is
interesting for several reasons. First of all, it requires intensive use of processing and
networking capabilities for cryptography and message forwarding. Also, the onion rout-
ing example highlights an ethical issue: the user’s consent should be a prerequisite for
joining an anonymity network; primarily, because they do not obtain benefits in return.
Further, an attacker would be motivated to create and tear down anonymity networks
spontaneously. In turn, this volatility lets an attacker use the browser network to evade
detection and complicate a forensic analysis.
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Figure 6.1.: Scenario for anonymous communication [140]
6.1. Background
There is existent work around anonymity and browsers. For example, Flash proxy is a
short-lived browser-based proxy (implemented in Flash) introduced by Fifield et al. [57].
These proxies are used to reach blocked Tor relays and therefore circumvent censorship.
The idea behind their system is to dynamically generate proxies, which are created for
new clients that want to connect to Tor. Since the proxies are dynamically generated,
it is hard for a censor to block them, and the proxies constitute just a one-hop bridge to
join the Tor network when users cannot reach a Tor relay directly. A successor of Flash
proxy is Snowflake [174] which is a JavaScript client using WebRTC instead of Flash.
Both approaches have the advantage that blocking browsers is much harder because their
IPs change constantly. Also, WebTorrent allows users to download content using torrents
through their browser [4]. However, we aim in a different direction. Previously mentioned
solutions enable users to provide an entry point to Tor, or download content using peer-
to-peer technologies, willingly. Instead, we show that browsers can be used as peers, i.e.,
termed Web Onion Peers (WOP), to build a browser network used to relay encrypted
packets1 between an attacker and other malicious actors, keeping the browser end user
oblivious to this behaviour.
6.2. Proof of Concept
Tor relies on the Onion Routers, i.e., nodes used to relay encrypted packets over the Tor
network, to protect their users’ anonymity. Therefore, Tor hosts several directory servers
containing the available routers in the network. In our implementation, we also require
1The term packet refers to data required for circuit creation, key negotiation or encrypted information
transferred between browsers, while the term message represents the information being shared end-
to-end within the overlay network. Also, a message may be split in more than one packet for its
delivery.
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a directory server to register all peers in the network, which can either proxy traffic as
Onion Routers do, or send messages to other peers over the WOP network.
For simplicity, we have extended the PeerJS WebRTC signalling server [149] to behave
as a directory server and handle WOP peer registration and lookup to support circuit
establishment. A circuit determines a list of peers over which the message is relayed. When
a message is sent over the network, several layers of encryption are applied recursively. In
this way, each peer along the circuit can only partially decrypt the packet and forward the
rest of the packet to the next peer. This process is repeated until the encrypted packet
reaches the final recipient. Only then, the intended recipient peer can decrypt the message.
An Onion Router is only included in Tor’s directory servers after they have been used
for a certain amount of time and are considered trustworthy. This validation is of utmost
importance for exit nodes, i.e., the last Onion Router that establishes the connection to
the Web site opened by the user, since exit nodes can potentially eavesdrop the traffic
and have already knowledge about one of the ends of the communication, i.e., which page
is being opened. In our network, WOP peers do not need to be trusted because they
do not have information about the end of the circuit, i.e., it is not possible to determine
whether the next peer is the recipient of the message or not. Further, every message is
encrypted with end-to-end encryption with an ephemeral key for the recipient; therefore,
eavesdropping the communication to learn the message is also impossible. As a result,
WOP peers can register and immediately be used to relay packets over the network.
Another essential difference between the Tor and the WOP network is that the former
was created for Web browsing, while the latter is meant to be used to exchange messages.
Tor’s design also heavily relies on the Tor proxy, i.e., a component running on the
local machine of the user protecting his anonymity, which chooses the path freely for each
circuit to relay encrypted communication. In our network, although WOP peers are not
real proxies, they behave similarly than proxies because they establish circuits to send
messages. To evaluate how much performance overhead is introduced if a WOP peer
chooses freely in comparison to receiving a predetermined path from the server, we have
implemented both versions, and from now on they are termed decentralized and centralized
WOP networks. We chose these terms because in the centralized case, the circuit paths
are specified by a centralized entity, i.e., the directory server. In both cases, every peer
can have at most 5 simultaneous WebRTC connections to other peers; thus, each peer can
relay packets for two circuits (4 connections) while sending or receiving messages over a
circuit of its own (1 connection).
Our proof of concept performs an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement
with JavaScript implementations of the same algorithms used by Tor. The ECDH gener-
ates the two parts of the symmetric key with the curve25519 algorithm2 and uses the RSA
implementation of the Cryptico library [184] when needed. Once the ECDH exchange suc-
ceeds, the AES-CTR algorithm provided by the AES-JS library [121] is used to encrypt
packets between peers. Like Tor, our implementation uses a single shared key to encrypt
the communication between every pair of peers, for each particular circuit. We used exter-
nal libraries instead of the Web Cryptography API [173] because the Cryptography API
is not accessible from WebWorkers in all browsers.
2we used the curve25519 algorithm included in the curve255.js library [20]
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Figure 6.1 shows from a high level how the WOP network relays messages sent from
Alice to Bob. For example, the message flowing over WebRTC between Alice and the first
peer (labelled as P1(P2(B(Message)))) represents a message that has been encrypted with
the ephemeral, symmetric keys of the peers in the circuit. In this case, the message needs
to be encrypted with Bob’s key, then with the second peer’s key (P2), and finally with first
peer (P1) in this particular order. This method of encryption follows the onion-layered
encryption used by Tor.
6.3. Analysis Concerning Browser APIs
This attack requires computation and an efficient mechanism to establish browser-to-
browser and browser-to-server channels. In our case we have used WebWorkers, WebRTC
and WebSockets to fulfil these requirements. To communicate WebWorkers performing
cryptographic tasks with the main window, we had to use postMessages. To perform the
onion routing efficiently, WebWorkers are critical; otherwise, the main window can crash
or freeze the browser.
6.4. Methodology
The goal of the evaluation is to confirm the feasibility of the attack in a real-life scenario.
Thus, we address two aspects. On the one hand, we evaluate the network’s scalability
with a reasonable number of peers, i.e., between 50 and 100 active WOP peers, because
they are needed for anonymity. On the other hand, we need to ensure that the attack is
stealthy; in other words, the attack is not feasible if the end user’s browsing experience
degrades due to the heavy computation needed for encryption.
To evaluate the attack’s scalability, we measured the time required for the network to
deliver messages and build circuits while several peers join and leave the network. To
this end, we modified the sizes of the network, as well as the amount of peers active,
i.e., generating messages to other peers. To study the impact of the attack on the user’s
browsing experience, we measured the time required by the rendering process of the top
5 Alexa sites when the browser was abused (or not).
Choosing the browser for each experiment is challenging. Although both, Firefox and
Chromium, support remote browser automation capabilities, e.g., using Selenium or Se-
lenium Grid [171], there are subtleties that we need to consider for our particular exper-
iments. On the one hand, Firefox requires less memory to spawn new tabs and browser
instances compared to Chromium, making it more attractive to run large scale measure-
ments, since it is possible to run more browser instances or tabs with the same hardware.
On the other hand, Chromium has a powerful built-in profiling tool, which is well docu-
mented and remotely accessible through the Chrome Debugging Protocol. This interface
allows us to analyse particular internal events during the rendering process of the browser;
therefore, we can study the responsiveness of the browser during page load time, among
other factors. As a result, we have decided to leverage the strengths of each browser
according to the experiment. So, we have chosen Firefox to execute the large scale mea-
surements while using Chromium to assess the browser responsiveness during an attack.
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6.5. Evaluation of Scalability
In our experiments, we modified two dimensions: the number of peers joining the network,
and the number of active peers sending messages3 over the network.
6.5.1. Set-up
As Figure 6.2 shows, we used the Selenium Grid architecture in which a program or-
chestrating the whole experiment and browsers’ behaviour, i.e., the automation program,
interacts with a centralized Selenium component, i.e., the hub. The hub, acting upon
requests from the automation program, sends commands to several Selenium nodes and
keeps an overview of the current load distribution on the different Selenium nodes on
the grid. In turn, each node spawns and controls browsers within the VM whenever in-
structed to do so by the hub. In addition to the Selenium-related programs required for
the measurements, we have a Node.js HTTP server shown as the Data Collection Server in
Figure 6.2, which stores the timestamps for circuits and messages measured by the WOP
peers running in each browser.
To build the Selenium Grid, we used 10 VMs running on a VMware ESX Virtualization
server. Each VM had 16 GB RAM, 8 cores, a 15GB hard drive and a fresh installation
of LUbuntu 16.4 LTS AMD 64. On top of the Linux installation, Selenium V2.47.1 was
used either as a hub or as a node. From the 10 VMs, there was one main VM in charge
of the orchestration of the selenium grid, building the WOP network and obtaining the
information measured, i.e., timestamps required to calculate the time needed for messages
and circuits. Additionally, the rest of the VMS, i.e., node VMs, just executed Firefox and
a plain Selenium node.
The automation program is a Java program that generates one WebDriver object for
each remote browser; however, as shown in Figure 6.2, one Selenium node opens more
than one browser instance during the experiments. To maximize the number of peers that
can be executed during the experiments, we have decided to execute several tabs in each
browser. We are motivated to use multiple tabs is to save resources in comparison to
running separate processes4.
In Selenium, the WebDriver must activate a particular tab in the graphical interface
before executing the code within that tab; furthermore, the WebDriver remains blocked
while it executes JavaScript code in a browser tab. To work around this, we keep a “con-
troller tab” active in the graphical interface at all times which receives instructions, i.e.,
build a circuit or send a message, for the other so-called “peer tabs”. In this way, the
controller tab pushes the instruction in a queue and returns. Our approach has several ad-
vantages. First of all, it avoids the overhead to switching active tabs constantly to execute
commands on them. Second, it significantly reduces the time in which the WebDriver is
blocked. Thus, peer tabs execute the time and resource consuming actions on their own,
in the background, without blocking any threads on the automation program.
3Messages are different than packets. To transfer a message several packets are required due to key
negotiation, circuits creation, etc.
4A Firefox instance needs 400 MB of memory. Each tab needs 30 MB
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Figure 6.2.: Set-up for the scalability evaluation [140]
Each peer tab reports data directly to the Data Collection Server, shown in Figure 6.2,
to record information during the experiment. Specifically, before sending or after receiving
a message, the participating peer contacts the data collection server and provides the mes-
sage identifier. A similar approach is followed before attempting a circuit establishment,
and after the circuit has been established5. This method is sufficient also to detect failed
messages or circuit attempts because the Data Collection server would receive an event
specifying an attempt to establish a circuit or send a message with a particular identifier,
yet without receiving a notification when the action succeeded.
6.5.2. Peer Behaviour
For this evaluation, we have classified peers into two categories: active or passive. Active
peers initiate new WOP circuits and send messages to other WOP peers in the network.
Passive peers neither begin the establishment of new circuits, nor send messages to other
peers; nonetheless, passive peers can receive messages from other peers, they can be used
as part of a circuit initiated by other peers, and they can also be used to relay packets in
the WOP network.
To introduce churn (for realism), passive peers rejoin with new keys every 3 minutes,
i.e., 180 seconds. Also, active peers follow instructions specified in a set of scripts that
are picked randomly. These scripts instruct the active peers to build circuits with peer
chosen randomly, send messages, wait for a given time between 0 and 5 seconds without
performing the next instructions, leave and join with the previously existing keys as well as
generate new keys and rejoin as completely different peers. Once a script finished execut-
ing, the active peer picks another one and starts again. Note that, regardless of whether
asymmetric keys are reused or not, all active circuits are lost when a peer disconnects or
rejoins the network.
5This ensures that the time required for the action is only based on the Data Collection server’s clock to
avoid imprecisions due to time offsets
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We configured the WOP network to ensure that every message sent go through three
hops before reaching its destination, i.e., two intermediate peers excluding the peer gener-
ating and receiving the message. Also, we orchestrated browsers using the Selenium Grid
for 30 minutes as part of each experiment.
6.5.3. Results
Now we present the results for both kind of WOP networks: centralized and decentralized.
Specifically, we modified the number of WOP peers spawned for the network, and how
many of the deployed peers are active. To determine the total number of WOP peers in
the network, we conducted an initial set of experiments to assert that delays measured
were principally induced by the WOP network implementation instead of the underlying
hardware. To this end, we built a centralized WOP network with 50, 75, 100, 125, and
150 peers. In each scenario, we executed the experiment with 50% of active peers and
analysed the number of messages delayed, the number of errors and the message delay.
We observed that the network delivered more messages when the network had less than
100 WOP peers. On the contrary, once more than 100 peers were used, the number of
successful messages decreased and the errors increased for 125 and 150 peers. Thus, we
execute our experiments with 25, 50, 75 and 100 WOP peers. Also, we chose to execute
experiments with 25, 50, 75 and 100% of active peers.
In total, without including the preliminary measurements, we present the result of
24 experiments, i.e., 12 for each kind of network. Also, even though we present the
circuit establishment and message delivery analysis in separate subsections, they were
both measured simultaneously during each experiment.
Due to the high amount of experiments, and the complexity of variables modified, each
figure in this section makes use of the left and the right y-axis for the sake of conciseness.
On the left-hand y-axis, we plot the number of successful and failed events are plotted
with two colours. The total height of each bar represents the total of events, i.e., successful
plus errors. On the right-hand y-axis, a white bar represents the average time taken for a
given action, i.e., build a circuit or send a message, along with its standard deviation.
The x-axis has three groups showing the number of peers in the network, namely 50, 75
and 100. We group results according to the number of peers to make variations produced
by modifications on the number of active pears for each network clearer. Specifically, each
group contains four measurements modifying the percentage of active peers between 25
and 100%.
Building Circuits
Figure 6.3 and 6.4 present the results for building circuits for the centralized and decen-
tralized WOP networks respectively. The success/failure rate is higher for the centralized
WOP network in comparison to the decentralized version; thus, the number of circuits
established in the decentralized network is lower than the centralized version. The dif-
ference between both networks occurs because, in the centralized version, the directory
server specifies a path containing peers with connections available. Contrarily, peers in
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the decentralized network pick peers randomly, therefore introducing delays with this trial
and error approach. Also, the number of failures increases (decentralized) because the
probability of a peer dropping the circuit due to a reconnection increases proportionally
to the time required to build a circuit.
Figure 6.3.: Circuits and mean time - centralized network [140]
Figure 6.4.: Circuits and mean time - centralized network [140]
Even though the centralized approach can produce more circuits, the average time, as
well as the standard deviation, are very similar for when 50, 100 or 75 peers are joining
the network. As a result, in almost all cases, the network has enough capacity to construct
circuits at its regular speed. As long as the network is not overloaded, the average time
required to establish a circuit and its standard deviation should not vary significantly
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when comparing the centralized and decentralized networks. Mainly, because the circuit
establishment algorithm requires the same cryptographic functions and the mean time
required to build a circuit only includes successful attempts.
However, in the case of 100 peers, with 100 active peers, the centralized approach
requires some more time to build the circuits. The increased efficiency establishing circuits
in the case of the centralized network leads to a heavier computational load on all the peers,
as browsers need to perform more encryption to establish more circuits and deliver more
messages. As a result, the computation of circuits takes longer as peers are busy.
Sending Messages
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the results obtained for sending messages between WOP peers
in the centralized and decentralized networks. Due to the correlation between circuits
and messages, the number of attempts to send messages over the network is lower for
the decentralized WOP network. The difference between both networks is a direct con-
sequence of the necessity of a circuit to attempt to send a message, regardless of whether
the message’s delivery is successful or not.
Inside each group according to the number of peers, e.g., 50, for the centralized network,
the number of messages increases monotonically as the number of active peers increases.
Nonetheless, for each group based on the number of peers, the number of messages for the
decentralized network increases monotonically between 25, and 75% and then decreases
for the case of 100% active peers. As in the previous case, this is a consequence of the
need to have a circuit to send an attempt to send a message. In other words, the number
of attempts to deliver messages in both networks is heavily influenced by the number of
successful (only the light gray bar) circuit establishments for each experiment.
All in all, the number messages successfully delivered is high when compared with the
number of failures for message distribution in both networks, i.e., the light bar is more
prominent than the and dark gray bars on top of the light bars. Also, the message delivery
has acceptable delays in both networks, even in the case of a high load; more specifically,
even in networks with 100 active peers, sending messages less than 9 seconds on average
in all the cases (white bar on the right-hand side).
Overview
Decentralizing the selection of peers to build a circuit has a significant overhead impacting
the WOP network’s performance; however, an attacker can still achieve his goal without
requiring a decentralized version of the WOP network. We argue that an attacker can
still achieve anonymity because he hosts the directory server; thus, there is no need to
protect the path information from the directory server. Furthermore, considering that the
experiments take 30 minutes, the centralized WOP network can build up to 15 circuits per
minute on average, i.e., 450 connections divided by 30 minutes. Likewise, the centralized
network can send 41 messages in average per minute, i.e., 1250 divided by 30 minutes. As
a result, following a similar argumentation, our prototypical implementation relying on a
relatively small server acting as a directory server can comfortably relay messages using
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Figure 6.5.: Messages and mean time - centralized network [140]
Figure 6.6.: Messages and mean time - decentralized network [140]
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TOR-like encryption mechanisms between 15 concurrent users, although each one of them
is sending 2.7 messages per minute in average.
We consider that using peers that re-join every 3 minutes is realistic because it matches
the average time observed for sites performing mining, according to a recent CryptoJacking
study in the wild [124]. Furthermore, a previous marketing report from Clicktale mentioned
visits of 293 and 310 seconds to most e-commerce sites [36].
6.6. Evaluation of Stealthiness
Evaluating the impact on the user’s browsing experience is a complex problem. To find a
proper measurement method we explored how Web site and browser developers verify the
responsiveness of Web sites. In the past, timing the window.onLoad event, which is only
triggered once all resources and DOM components have been loaded inside a particular
window, was common practice. Lately, a more advanced metric called the speed index [201]
is used. The speed index captures a video to measure the “visual completeness” for the
Web site; therefore, the speed index rewards sites rendering the site partially even before
all resources are there (onLoad).
We use a simplified version of the speed index: record the time when the browser paints
the site for the first time. As a result, our measurements are simplified because it is enough
to monitor the internal browser events involved in the pipeline to render every site and
record the time when the browser starts the rendering process. Then, we compare whether
the timing of this event varies when the browser is under attack or not.
To tackle this particular problem we looked at several possibilities. On the one hand,
Firefox and Google use Telemetry [29, 182] to collect performance information from each
browser; however, these tools are integrated with servers to automate the processing of
tests or collected information from browsers. In the case of Chromium, telemetry is used
as a platform for writing performance tests for new features to ensure that new features
do not damage user experience, and they execute tests based on the browser’s timeline.
Chromium’s timeline is a component that records activity for the Web application exe-
cuted within the browser [19]. Although the Web Tracing Framework [200] is a similar
open source alternative relying on browser extensions, Chromium offers this functionality
out-of-the-box; what is more, Chromium’s timeline data collection can be triggered re-
motely using the debugging protocol. Thus, we have implemented a Node.js program, i.e.,
profiling program, that interacts with Chromium through the debugging protocol based
on the Automated Chrome Profiling library [83]. Our profiling program instructs several
Google Chromium instances to open Web sites including the attack or not and locates
the MarkFirstPaint event in the trace captured to identify when the browser starts the
rendering process.
6.6.1. Set-up
Figure 6.7 shows the components used to evaluate the stealthiness for the attack. The
Node.js Profiling program creates Chrome objects provided by the Automated Chrome
Profiling library. Chrome objects allow a node to remotely control a browser to open one
78 Chapter 6. Abusing Browsers for Anonymous Communication
or more active tabs. More specifically, four browsers are started in separate VMs. From
the four VMs, three machines (VM 2, 3, and 4) open only the Web site including the WOP
peer, joining as a peer in this particular tab (Peer Tab). These three VMs are instructed to
perform actions such as join the network, establish circuits or send messages according to
the peer behaviour described in Section 6.6.2. Conversely, VM1 opens the WOP network
in one tab without actively sending messages, yet being used by the other WOP peers to
relay every message in the network and to be part of every circuit established, i.e., Peer
Tab in VM1. Simultaneously, the same browser instance in VM1 also opens a site from
the Alexa top 5, which is not under attack, in a second tab (Site Tab) which is monitored
with the Chrome profiling library to obtain the first paint event.
Figure 6.7.: Set-up for the stealthiness evaluation
To collect the data for the experiment, we rely on the tracing capabilities offered by the
Automated Chrome Profiling library and collect events for the Site Tab of VM1, in the
profiling program remotely. Afterward, we filter the events to find the first paint event,
therefore reflecting the load imposed on the browser. From the hardware point of view,
these experiments were executed in a Dell XPS15 9550 with 16 GB RAM an i7-6700HQ
(2.6 GHz Quadcore) processor, Windows 10 64-bit, running VirtualBox version 5.1.10.
Both, the profiling program (on Node v4.5.0) as well as the Web server (Apache v2.4.23)
hosting the WOP sites, were executed in the host OS (Windows). On the other hand,
each VM had 2 GB RAM and 2 Cores assigned, and each VM executed Ubuntu 16.04
LTS 64-bit; moreover, each VM executed a bash script to restart Chromium 55.0.2883.87,
without any cache information, whenever it was closed. A set-up with automated scripts
allowed us to automate several runs of the same experiment without human interaction.
6.6.2. Peer Behaviour
We assess the stealthiness of the attack by measuring the time required until the first
render event in Chrome. To achieve this, we execute an experiment 40 times in which the
browser in VM1 opens two tabs: a tab joining the network, i.e., Peer Tab, and another
tab opening one of the Alexa top 5 sites, i.e., Site Tab. The Site Tab joins the network in
three ways: as the baseline, sending messages, or sending a file. The baseline execution
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joins the network and does not perform any further actions. The second way is to send
messages continuously, waiting 250 milliseconds between messages. The third case is when
the tab compresses and splits a 3.1 MB file into multiple chunks (each with 4096 Bytes)
and sends them over the network, waiting 250 milliseconds between chunks. To ensure
that the first render is executed under heavy load in the last two scenarios and without
load for the baseline, the Site Tab is opened as soon as the browser starts, yet without
visiting any site. Then, the browser automation program waits one minute, to ensure that
circuit establishment is finished and messages or files are being sent, and then instructs
the Site Tab to open one of the 5 top Alexa sites. For clarity, we include a sketch of the
timing and peer behaviour in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8.: Browser behaviour for the stealthiness evaluation
6.6.3. Results
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the time required for the first paint for all the cases and both
networks. The differences between different loading sites for the baseline occur because
each Web site has a different rendering time influenced by many factors, such as layout,
JavaScript code, CSS properties, and most importantly network delays. In particular,
Baidu is taking longer than any other site to load. Apparently, delays can create an
issue when Chinese sites are accessed from the outside due to firewall rules placed in few
datacenters routing outgoing traffic from China, latency, and high prices for outbound
traffic charged by Chinese telco providers [212]. In any case, the scales for Figures 6.9 and
6.10 have been split into two sections to cope with the disparity between loading times.
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 evidence that the difference between the baseline and the messaging
scenario is negligible. Thus, executing a WOP peer in a user’s browser to relay messages
is undetectable in terms of performance. We argue that, although there is a slight increase
for the first paint event, this delay lies within tens of milliseconds: an unnoticeable delay.
Also, both figures show very similar loading times for the baseline.
Comparatively speaking, the decentralized network has a higher impact on the loading
time of sites sending messages. The difference between page-loading times is a natural
consequence of the fact that each peer is more likely to have a higher trial and error
ratio before being able to establish circuits and send files. Last but not least, exchanging
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files through the network has a higher impact on the users’ experience in comparison to
message distribution. However, using the user’s browser for file distribution could still be
viable for the centralized network. In particular in cases when the impact is around half
a second, which a user could attribute to network issues, for example.
Figure 6.9.: First paint (Alexa top 5)- centralized network [140]
Figure 6.10.: First paint (Alexa top 5)- decentralized network [140]
6.7. Related Work
As we already mentioned, Flash Proxy [57], SnowFlake [174] and WebTorrent [4] relate to
our approach because they help users to keep anonymity to some extent and use browsers
for it. However, our work differentiates from them because WOP peers send messages
to each other using onion routing and have a three-hop path. Instead, Flash proxy and
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Snowflake, are a one hop connection bringing to the actual Tor network.
Burgstaller et al. [26] present an anonymous communication framework for browsers
exchanging messages similar to the onion routing protocol. Although they developed a
proof-of-concept system using the WebRTC technology, they neither performed a thorough
evaluation nor presented the attack definition clearly; further, given that their analysis
only used a few nodes, their evaluation did not assess the effectiveness of the network
to the extent of our work. IAnonym [78] is a JavaScript implementation of a proxy
service that connects to Tor and relays the HTTP requests of a user through Tor or
a Tor-like network. Although iAnonym uses Web technologies such as WebRTC, it does
not implement its own browser network but connects to an existing anonymity network.
Peersm [150] is a mix of the Tor design and other projects, like bit-torrent, which enables
users to exchange files anonymously similarly to iAnonym. It works within browsers and
therefore uses Web technologies like WebRTC.
Although there have been previous implementations of bridges or anonymity networks
for the Web, our contribution goes beyond the implementation of a privacy-preserving net-
work. Instead, we explore the situation in which attackers use browsers to relay messages
for their benefit, whenever they need to be anonymous. We also evaluated the feasibil-
ity of the attack, as well as its impact on page-loading time. Further, we have covered
countermeasures against the attack based on current Web security technologies.
6.8. Summary
This chapter describes the second resource abuse attack using browser networks. However,
in contrast to Chapter 5, where we explained a content storage network, an attacker can
create networks ad hoc to perform onion routing and exchange messages with other actors.
This attack shows that the creation of data channels through WebRTC without the end
user’s consent can be misused by attackers to build overlay networks for routing. Also,
the volatility of browsers visiting a site can be used to hide the attacker’s identity.
To evaluate the attack’s feasibility, we focused on the scalability of the network and
its stealthiness. The former is required to improve anonymity with more users on the
network, while the latter is critical to avoid raising any suspicion due to the heavy encryp-
tion processes. From the scalability point of view, we performed a large scale evaluation
measuring how long the network needs to build circuits and send messages under different
load conditions. Overall, we observed that messages are delivered in 6 seconds commonly,
with rare set-ups where it took up to 10 seconds, using a network with up to 100 peers. To
assess the stealthiness of the network, we performed a separate evaluation. After loading
popular sites while browsers were being abused to send messages or files, we conclude that,
even though there is a slight delay during the browser’s rendering process, it is negligible
(tens of milliseconds). Both evaluations let us assert that, even though this attack has not
been observed in the wild, it is feasible.
This chapter used ideas or content from the publication “When Your Browser Becomes
the Paper Boy” [140].

CHAPTER7
Abusing Browsers for Crypto-Mining
This chapter presents a scenario where attackers use the browser’s computational power to
mine crypto-currencies without the user’s knowledge, i.e., CryptoJacking. CryptoJacking
is the last of the resource abuse case study presented in this thesis, and it has a significant
difference with previous attacks: it happened in real life. As a result, we do not include
an evaluation phase to ensure the attack’s feasibility. Still, we dedicate this section to
explain the background of the attack, and which browser APIs are used by attackers.
The most significant motivations for an attacker relate to financial gain while keeping the
identity of the attacker untraceable. On the one hand, financial benefits are derived from
the surplus of resources obtained versus the resources invested. On the other hand, the
widespread use of mining pools, and privacy-preserving properties of the crypto-currencies
mined, e.g., Monero, let attackers remain anonymous.
Figure 7.1 shows how mining is a particular instance of the general resource abuse
scenario presented in Figure 2.2. In the same way as the two networks used for content
storage and distribution and anonymous communication, this attack requires a CC server
to distribute mining tasks and share the wealth with the whole mining pool. Figure 7.1
shows how users inadvertently obtain an Abusive Script from an Intended Site, which
makes his browser calculate hashes and send proofs of work to the mining pool server.
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Figure 7.1.: Scenario for mining
7.1. Background
In 2001, Baraba´si et al. coined the term parasitic computing [16]. The main idea behind it
is to trick servers into performing computations through specially crafted network packets.
Essentially, by accepting or rejecting a part of a message, the server is computing basic
logical operations; thus, it could be used to solve any computation problem, e.g., a SAT
problem. This concept can be generalized to other technologies and applies very well to
the Web, where browsers already receive scripts from servers.
Although some frameworks have been created to use computational power provided vol-
untarily by browser’s end users [55, 74, 136, 164], there is also research on the effectiveness
of using browsers for arbitrary computation without notifying the user[137, 138]. For in-
stance, Tendulkar et al. used Cloud-based services meant to execute JavaScript code for
low-end devices for rendering purposes to perform arbitrary computation [183]. Also, other
initiatives explored the possibility to use browsers to calculate cryptographic hashes [110,
113]. All the approaches mentioned above come from an academic background; however,
a real-life case of computational abuse in browsers was yet to come, i.e.CryptoJacking.
In 2009, Bitcoin was created to provide a peer-to-peer system for financial transactions
among users of the platform, yet without a trusted entity, e.g., a bank. Instead of trusting
a third party, Bitcoin relies on a distributed ledger and a consensus algorithm whereby
a set of miners validate transactions. A transaction is validated when a miner solves a
computational challenge, similar to a lottery, for which there is no known strategy; in
other words, the only way to solve the puzzle is through brute-forcing the solution. In
the case of Bitcoin, a hash with a particular property is needed; for example, a hash with
n trailing zeroes must be found, using as input a set of transactions and some padding
under the miner’s control. Once the miner has solved the challenge by finding the right
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padding, the miner can append the block of transactions to the current blockchain, and
generate a new coin for itself as a reward.
As Bitcoin became an established coin, in-browser miners appeared [21, 47, 85]; however,
in-browser mining flourished only for a minimal amount of time. The main problem was
that as Bitcoin’s popularity grew, hardware manufacturers created solutions to solve the
challenge with less energy by providing a Bitcoin Application Specific Integrated Circuit
(ASIC). In this way, investors were able to buy specialized hardware and improve the
probability of mining Bitcoins. Eventually, in-browser mining became infeasible, due to
the JavaScript runtime overhead; what is more, native mining in a regular PC also stopped
being viable due to the hardware optimizations used by miners in the network.
Another factor vanishing stand-alone set-ups where users configured their computers
to perform mining was the creation of mining pools. Mining pools pay for proof-of-work
evidence supplied by multiple miners. In turn, pools can pay every miner for its work,
even though it may not have been able to solve the current puzzle. In turn, when a miner
finds the solution to the challenge, its reward is shared with the mining pool.
Bitcoin records all transactions publicly using source and destination address. However,
this transparency raises a privacy concern: transactions using the same address can be
linked together (linkability), and it is clear who is generating the transaction (traceability).
To counter linkability, users can create a single addresses for every transaction; however,
this makes it difficult when users want to publish a single “account” to receive payments.
For instance, this makes it difficult to receive donations, or publish the Bitcoin address
to receive payments in a marketplace because this address needs to be regenerated by the
owner for every transaction.
To counter traceability, Miers et al. proposed a system extending Bitcoin to protect
privacy; however, the authors mention efficiency problems to deploy this in real life [118].
Additionally, Miers et al. reported several “laundering services” active in the black market;
however, these services are a trusted third-party who can steal Bitcoin’s users’ money or
leak information about transactions. In response to this, the CryptoNote system was
described [165]. The main idea behind CryptoNote, and its successive implementations,
e.g., CryptoNight, was to ensure unlinkability and untraceability of transactions.
In CryptoNote, users have a single address which is not used to receive funds. Instead,
a single key must be generated for each transaction while keeping the mapping between an
address and its keys private. Also, ring signatures are used to prevent someone analysing
the blockchain from finding out who generated the transaction and how much money
was spent. In addition to countering these two factors, CryptoNote focused its efforts to
ensure that the computational challenge to be solved by miners was not viable for ASIC
hardware. As a result, CryptoNote and CryptoNight used an algorithm that required many
sequential accesses to the CPU cache memory. In this way, existing hardware optimized
for GPU mining was not useful. In particular, because mining ASICs available were
optimized for bandwidth and not speed when accessing memory and they parallelized the
execution of hashes. In fact, the most popular coin relying on CryptoNight, i.e., Monero,
modified the algorithm for miners as soon as they found out that an ASIC had been
created for their coin in 2018, to ensure that regular computers were still able to mine the
crypto-currency [120].
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The creation of Monero and its commitment to prevent massive miners from cannibaliz-
ing the mining business turned into an attractive opportunity for attackers to infect regular
computers and use them for mining. Specifically, Pastrana and Suarez-tangil estimate that
malware has generated profits in the order of 56 Million USD through unauthorised crypto-
currency mining [147]. In addition to this, the adoption of browser APIs providing access
to resource intensive operations such as WebWorkers and WebAssembly gave a rebirth to
crypto-mining in the browser. In addition to these technical factors, an in-browser mining
library, i.e., Coinhive1, made it easy for developers or hackers to leverage the end user’s
computation power through the browser by including a simple script mining Monero in
the browser and providing proof-of-work evidence to its mining pool.
7.2. Analysis Concerning Browser APIs
During the development of the crypto-mining detection presented in Chapter 9, and as
it was reported by papers and reports produced simultaneously with our work [100, 124],
it became clear that in-browser miners commonly used WebWorkers, WebAssembly and
WebSockets. Notably, in-browser miners usually spawned several WebWorkers, and within
each one of them a WebAssembly program was initiated, to perform hashing natively.
Communication between WebWorkers and the main script requires postMessages. In ad-
dition to this, in-browser miners rely on WebSockets to communicate with the mining pool
server. Mainly, Konoth et al. and Musch et al. reference the Stratum protocol commonly
used by Coinhive and review the necessary aspects to obtain proof-of-work evidence to
estimate the number of hashes calculated by a client [100, 124].
7.3. Summary
After presenting three new attacks abusing browser resources, we conclude our case studies
with a real-life attack, i.e., CryptoJacking. We dedicated this chapter to discuss how
this attack relates to our general attack presented previously and its background. Most
importantly, CryptoJacking allow us to evaluate our detection approach to resource abuse
based on API patterns, thus bringing state of the art forward for malicious JavaScript
detection.
1https://coinhive.com/
Part III.
Countermeasures
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CHAPTER8
Enforcement Mechanisms
We have already explained an overview of the current security model implemented on
browsers and its default values in Chapter 3. Specifically, we have shown that Origin-based
mechanisms, e.g., the Same Origin Policy, provide safe default values to protect the user’s
information; however, default settings regarding computational resources leave the user’s
browser open for attacks. Additionally, we have discussed four case studies of resource
abuse through browsers highlighting practical examples where the Origin-based models
fail to protect computational resources available through the browser. Now, we provide
an overview of existing mechanisms that could impact resource abuse scenarios based on
the existing Web security model, when developers or users take additional measures to
protect themselves. In other words, this chapter revisits the characteristics of the abuse
cases and exposes a detailed analysis of existing security mechanisms available to browser’s
users and application developers to restrict the use of resources.
To this end, we divide mechanisms and standards that could help against browser re-
source abuse from three different perspectives: browser-controlled, user-controlled, and
developer-controlled mechanisms. The browser enforces all mechanisms; however, we still
differentiate enforcement that cannot be overridden by the browser’s user, i.e., browser
mechanisms, from mechanisms that need to be actively enabled by the browser’s user, user-
and developer-controlled mechanisms. In an abstract sense, browser mechanisms can be
seen as Mandatory Access Control, while user-controlled mechanisms resemble Discre-
tionary Access Control. After presenting existing features having an impact in one way or
another on the computational resource availability for an attacker, we cover shortcomings
of the approaches presented in this chapter.
8.1. User-Controlled Mechanisms
We dedicate the following sections to explain countermeasures that can be applied by the
browser’s end user.
8.1.1. Blacklists
In the case of CryptoJacking, many blacklists have emerged [73, 93, 192, 214] to forbid
connections to domains delivering scripts associated with CryptoJacking using black lists.
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This approach depends on a large community of users reporting sites confirmed to do
crypto-currency mining. There are two critical downsides of this approach. On the one
hand, blacklists are prone to evasion because an attacker maintaining a black-listed server
can obtain a new domain for the same server. On the other hand, the blacklisting of
domains leads to many false negatives, as it takes time for blacklists to be updated with
new malicious domains.
8.1.2. Disabling Networking APIs
There are several ways to restrict access to networking-related API, either through a
built-in configuration property from the browser or by installing a browser extension.
For one, there are extensions blocking WebSockets to counter attacks such as the one
presented in Chapter 4 [134, 156]. In this way, security-conscious users could enable and
disable sockets based on their knowledge whether they are required for a given site. In
the case of WebRTC, there is a security concern because WebRTC can be used to execute
JavaScript code to obtain private IPs of the browser [179]. Even though this concern
does not relate to resource attacks, Mozilla included the media.peerconnection.enabled
configuration attribute to let Firefox disable WebRTC mechanisms; concurrently, multiple
extensions block WebRTC channels to protect privacy [44, 76, 202].
8.1.3. Third-Party Tracking Protection
The research community has documented multiple questionable practices from the adver-
tisement industry [52, 53, 130, 185]; luckily, browser vendors reacted by adding third-party
tracking protection [63, 123]. The underlying idea of third-party protection is that scripts
included as Iframes in an Intended Site lose all access to persistent storage mechanisms on
the browser’s side; that is to say, scripts inside Iframes cannot use local storage, cookies,
etc.
Third-party protection is disabled by default, but when it is enabled, it can prevent
the storage and distribution network attack presented in Chapter 5. Notably, when an
attacker includes Storage Iframes in his Abusive Script, they are considered third-party
content from the perspective of the script context where the Abusive Script is running. As
a consequence, they lose access to all persistent storage mechanisms, e.g., local storage.
When an end user has enabled third-party protection, attackers can use only one local
storage, therefore losing the capability to bypass the storage quota. Ironically, the con-
tent isolation giving the attacker additional powers when users do not have third-party
protection enabled also becomes problematic if they enable the protection.
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Figure 8.1.: Storage network with one local storage instance
Without bypassing the storage quota, the storage and distribution attack faces prob-
lems keeping files alive with the number of visitors and return rates we observe today.
Figure 8.1 shows the results of the experiment for file availability, using the set-up shown
in Chapter 5, when an attacker can only use one local storage instance. From these results,
we conclude that the storage and distribution attack becomes significantly less attractive
for an attacker, as file availability drops to 20% instead of 80 or 90% for the same scenarios
when 10 Origins are used.
8.2. Developer-Controlled Mechanisms
Now, we discuss mechanisms that can be employed by developers to protect end users
from resource abuse.
8.2.1. Sand-boxed Environments
The research community continuously proposes different mechanisms for JavaScript iso-
lation [5, 194, 195]. To some extent, the browser also supports isolation of code using
Iframes through the sandbox attribute for Iframes [196]. Further, the same capability is
now included in CSP3 [39] as a directive with the same name has been introduced. Even
though this mechanism provides less granularity than what most researchers argue for, it
helps to isolate content in frames while letting the main window communicate with it using
postMessages in practical scenarios. For example, West shows how to embed the Twitter
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“tweet” button using an Iframe and which permissions are required [209]. The default
setting for a sandboxed frame is to disable script execution to prevent attacks, although
Heiderich et al. have shown that script-less attacks are not solved by the sandbox [69].
For practical reasons, developers can grant script execution permissions to the sand-
boxed content with allow-scripts. However, even if scripts are allowed within a sand-
boxed frame, the browser assigns a random one-time Origin to the frame. In turn, this
makes it impossible for isolated content to use local storage mechanisms, as it cannot
retrieve the content when it is loaded again. As a result, sandboxing content is effective
against the storage and distribution attack presented in Chapter 5.
8.2.2. CSP
The CSP specification is a tool for developers and Webmasters to restrict functionality and
limit privileges of resources loaded from their sites, through headers in the HTTP response
or additional attributes in HTML. Restrictions include, but are not limited to whitelisting
content or script sources or which resources can execute scripts or fonts. CSP is not meant
to supersede proper output encoding and input validation, but it offers a second line of
defence implemented by browsers when a Web application has been compromised. Also,
CSP has already three versions of its specification [37–39].
Stable Directives
We base our analysis on the latest specification, i.e., CSP3 [39]. Also, we confine our
analysis to directives that have a direct impact on preventing resource abuse attacks.
For example, we leave out generic directives such as script-src, which ensures that
scripts are loaded only from a trusted origin. More to the point, we leave them out of
our analysis because even though such directive could prevent resource abuse on a secure
site without advertisements or third-party scripts, it does not restrict access to particular
computational resources per se.
In a scenario where a developer can specify CSP headers enforced over the attacker’s
Abusive Script, the following CSP directives protect against resource abuse attacks.
• connect-src restricts XHR and WebSocket requests sent by the browser. This
directive can be used to block the DDoS attack presented in Chapter 4; further-
more, restricting the use of networking APIs also impairs the attacks using browser
networks mentioned in Chapters 5, 6 and the CryptoJacking attack described in 7
because they all need effective communication with a CC server.
• frame-src restricts locations from which frames can be loaded. This directive would
prevent an attacker from using a compromised site, as a Storage Iframe, to bypass
the storage quota as described in Chapter 5.
• worker-src restricts locations from which WebWorkers and SharedWorkers can be
loaded. This mechanism would prevent the computational-related attacks, namely
the anonymous browser network from Chapter 6 and the CryptoJacking attack from
Chapter 7.
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• child-src covers features already addressed by frame-src and worker-src.
• sandbox restricts functionality in an equivalent way to the Iframe HTML attribute
with the same name, and this restriction prevents the storage quota bypass presented
in Chapter 5.
Directives Under Discussion
Aside from the stable directives included in the CSP specification, we have followed stan-
dardization mailing lists and discussions in public repositories; particularly, because there
have been previous recommendations from academia to include restrictions for postMes-
sages and WebRTC channels in CSP.
PostMessage API Early on, Barth, Jackson, and Mitchell recommended a modification
to the postMessage API to ensure that the browser delivers content directly to sites with a
given Origin. Also, as we mentioned in Chapter 3, the postMessage specification instructs
developers to perform Origin and encoding validations on messages postMessages received
from other frames [122]. Such checks are essential to prevent websites from acting on com-
mands sent by malicious windows and to avoiding possible script injection attacks. Despite
warnings from the specification, Hanna et al. found several real-world applications using
postMessages insecurely and proposed an extension to CSP to restrict the set of windows
interacting with a window loaded from an Origin. The power to restrict postMessages
could potentially facilitate the developer’s job while making applications more secure for
two reasons. First, developers would not have to remember to place checks every time.
Second, faulty checks, e.g., validating only that a domain ends with a pattern, would not
introduce more vulnerabilities. Instead, developers could theoretically let the browser do
the checks once they have specified the list of Origins declaratively.
After Hanna et al. published their paper on postMessage usage and recommended the
change in the paper, one of the authors of the original paper reached out to the team
standardizing CSP. Akhawe proposed to address the postMessage issue by providing a
declarative way to specify which sites can interact with other origins (whitelist) as part
of CSP [6]. The initial report from Akhawe triggered discussions about whether CSP
should care about controlling run-time aspects of scripts, whether the report relates to
data exfiltration, and whether data exfiltration should be a part of CSP. However, there
was no clear decision on whether this mechanism should be implemented.
In 2017, 5 years after the initial discussion posted by Akhawe, a new issue has been
created prompting the Web security community involved in standardization to address
the need of enforcement of outgoing postMessages [7]. The discussion revolves around
CSP3, lessons learnt from the unification of directives and past misadventures in CSP;
thus, it is not clear whether postMessage API enforcement will be implemented.
However, even if such a mechanism would exist, it would be useless against resource
abuse attacks. As we described in Section 3.4, in all the resource abuse scenarios, the
attacker controls both sites exchanging messages, e.g., as shown in Figure 5.2 for the stor-
age and distribution network. As a result, CSP cannot address this situation because
CSP follows the Origin-centric security model in which an Origin containing private data
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uses his authority to define policies enforced by the browser. Even though this approach
is effective to isolate content, it falls short when the attacker controls both frames ex-
changing postMessages because he can define his validations for incoming and outgoing
messages. Further, the same concept applies to every other attack relying on postMessage
communication, such as the anonymous browser network presented in Chapter 6 and the
CryptoJacking attack from Chapter 7.
WebRTC Back in 2014, Thomson summarized some questions that emerged during a
standardization about access to video, audio, and data streams [186]. The report was
concluded with a recommendation to add webrtc-data and webrtc-media to block data
or media streams; alternatively, Thomson proposes to use one keyword for both kinds
of channels. Shortly after this, West created an issue the same text included in the
proposal[210]. However, this was not implemented.
Kesteren created an issue in 2016 reviving the discussion about controlling which Origins
would be allowed to connect to [95]. However, people involved in this issue had not found
consensus by the end of 2017 regarding whether a CSP directive to protect WebRTC
would be sensible.
In 2018, West started the process to add webrtc-src as a keyword under connect-src
to let developers control, separately, which Origins can interact with a site using We-
bRTC [211]. However, discussions became more complex for several reasons. First, We-
bRTC APIs tend to use IP-based URLs which is not compatible with the match-host
algorithm specified to evaluate which URLs are covered by a CSP directive [39]. Also,
implementing Origin checks to assign WebRTC calls to a script responsible is a blurry line
because currently, except for Iframes, scripts are executed in the same script execution
context. After a long discussion, the group was close to proposing a way to block WebRTC
channels adding a keyword under connect-src to enable developers to turn on or off the
WebRTC capabilities (including data and media channels). However, this discussion was
abruptly closed in June 2018 without including a modification in CSP3.
8.2.3. Feature Policy
Recently, the W3C started a new draft for a standard called the feature policy [35]. The
idea behind this specification is to allow developers to enable or disable various browser
features andAPIs selectively. So far, the specification is on an early stage and includes only
examples of geolocation and camera API access. However, given its broad specification
at the moment, we consider it would be feasible to include also computationally intensive
APIs in the specification.
8.3. Browser Mechanisms
The only mechanism currently applied by the browser to all sites, irrespective of the Origin
serving them is throttling; therefore, we discuss the throttling mechanisms found related
to browser’s resources.
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8.3.1. Processing Power
There has been some discussion on an open Chromium issue regarding abusive sites con-
suming the CPU resources for CryptoJacking [193]. So far, it is clear that Chromium
developers intend to update the browser to give the user possibilities to monitor or in-
struct how their CPU is used. Although there is no consensus as of September 2018, there
seem to be three positions. On the one hand, the browser could give additional feedback
to the user, or block a site when a tab has high CPU consumption over a specific period.
A third option would be to include a configuration parameter letting the user specify
whether he wants to run Web sites in “battery saving mode”. In turn, the battery saving
mode would throttle the CPU of the browser. Another option would be to have a list of
blacklisted domains which the user could control.
From another point of view, the Firefox team started discussing whether WebWorkers
executed by background tabs should be paused back in September 2017. By February
the 7th 2018 [91], the Chrome team decided to throttle the amount of CPU consumed by
WebWorkers executed by background tabs too [187]. Even though the implementation
of throttling has been reported to be performed by Chrome in 2018 [34], the discussion
for Firefox stopped in February 2018 without a clear decision on whether this should be
implemented or not.
8.3.2. WebSockets
All major browsers throttle WebSocket connections, e.g., limit up to two or three active
connections per tab. This limitation prevents the browser from creating a local denial of
service and helps against an abusive script using the browser to perform a DDoS. As a
result, the browser becomes a less attractive platform for DDoS, yet without preventing
the attack entirely. For instance, we have already discussed in Section 4.1 how a massive
DDoS attack took place in real-life without bypassing any browser throttling.
8.3.3. WebRTC
The Quote 10 from Section 3.4.4 ( page 29 ) mentions the importance of “adequate con-
gestion control for WebRTC protocols to ensure that they play fair with other demands
on the user’s bandwidth”; however, according to a forum discussion, there is no specific
quota for the maximum amount of information transmitted over the network [135]
8.4. Shortcomings
The first obvious shortcoming is that many implementations are either non-existing or have
serious mismatches between popular browsers. More interestingly, there are shortcomings
related to the methodology to fix resource abuse with existing specifications. First, we
cover challenges related to involving browser end users in the process to control resource
abuse, and then we focus on the challenges of including developers. Finally, we analyse a
specific conflict between third-party tracking prevention and Suborigins.
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8.4.1. Challenges to Involve Users
There are two approaches for a browser end user to enforce access to his resources: passive
or active. Therefore, we consider that for passive approaches, the browser must prompt
the user for input. On the contrary, for active approaches, the user must initiate actions
to control the resources used by a particular site. Following this reasoning, we first discuss
consent, i.e., when the browser prompts the user for information. Then, we discuss what
the user should know to take actions, e.g., enable a configuration property to block an
API, such as WebRTC channels, on the browser.
Consent
Requesting consent may seem like an obvious choice, but excessive warnings can also be
counter-productive for security if users start clicking through them carelessly. Browsers
need to be cautious before introducing new warnings because users already have to deal
with HTTPS, malware, phishing, and other security-critical warnings. For instance, after
WebRTC started being used to leak the browser’s private IP, the discussion around consent
for data channels [107] spiked1. However, instead of implementing this mechanism, some
browser vendors decided to add a flag to disable WebRTC altogether in a browser-wide
fashion. This decision shifts the responsibility to the end user as he needs to be aware of
the threats and countermeasures he can use.
Also, there is an ongoing discussion around the computer’s microphone and camera
access in WebRTC. The draft security architecture document specifies that browser should
rescind access to camera and microphone after the user has left the site [157]; however,
based on information from 2017, Chrome does not withdraw permissions after they have
been granted [97]. One possible reason for this could be that storing user’s decisions favours
usability.
Chrome has already undergone a phase of changes with their HTTPS warnings. Initially,
Akhawe and Felt showed that Chrome had a significantly higher click-through rate than
Firefox for HTTPS warnings [9]. Afterwards, Weinberger and Felt addressed this when
they performed a large-scale analysis and established new policies for remembering HTTPS
security exceptions, i.e., now Chrome remembers HTTPS exceptions for one week [206].
Shedding some light on WebRTC consent discussions and on how browser vendors tackle
HTTPS warnings gives us an insight: asking for user’s consent is a complicated venture. As
a result, we consider that prompting browser end users before granting access resource-
related API requires extensive research and motivation from browser vendors which is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Users’ Knowledge
As mentioned previously, the second option to involve users is to let them be active
and configure their browser properly to avoid resource attacks. However, this would
1We have cited in Section 3.4 a draft specification stating that data channels do not need to get user
consent in Quote 11
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require regular users to be aware of third-party tracking protection, browser configuration
properties, and extensions controlling their resources. In this regard, even though there
may be users aware of all these technologies, they form a small subset of the browser’s
user base. Also, in the case of browser resource abuse, there are many APIs involved for
each attack scenario; therefore, expecting users to be aware of all possible APIs related
to computational resources is unrealistic in most cases. Instead, users should have a
single configuration property to protect against particular resource abuse attacks, e.g.,
CryptoJacking.
8.4.2. Challenge to Involve Developers
Mechanisms such as CSP can protect users from resource abuse if appropriately used; how-
ever, this poses a challenge because developers need to understand every script executed in
their script context and to be able to specify complex policies to secure it. Particularly, one
of the reasons why CSP has three versions of the specifications so far is because developers
keep failing to leverage the full potential of CSP. On the one hand, Weissbacher, Lauinger,
and Robertson performed an extensive study of hurdles developers went through trying
to integrate CSP policies, e.g., automated methods to derive policies did not work [207].
More recently, Weichselbaum et al. revealed that more than 90% of CSP policies were
ineffective in 2016 due to unsafe keywords and proposed to include the strict-dynamic
directive to improve the standard [203]. CSP has not achieved widespread adoption yet;
thus, it is unlikely that developers start not only using it against popular Web attacks,
e.g., XSS, but also to prevent resource abuse.
Also, there are several indicators that developers use a massive amount of dependencies,
probably transitively, and this results in a lack of control of resources. For example, Garcia
Murillo recently posted a link to a blog post from Gilbertson to the W3C security mailing
list [60]. The blog post mentions how a developer can hypothetically harvest vast amounts
of credit card numbers [62] with a modified JavaScript library, i.e., similarly to the injection
methods observed in the wild for CryptoJacking.
Also, the number of compromised sites through modified JavaScript libraries, CMS
plug-ins, stale inclusions and similar attack vectors described in Section 2.4 show that
most developers currently do not have an overview of they include in their sites. The lack
of control for software dependencies poses a threat to countermeasures such as CSP be-
cause in most cases developers use over-permissive policies to avoid breaking functionality
provided by some library.
8.4.3. Conflict with Future Standards
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, Suborigins are a reaction to the limitations of the current
Origin-based security features. Overall, Suborigins attempt to bring more flexibility to
developers such that they can compartmentalize their Web applications without the need
to spread their application throughout multiple Origins, most likely through different
domains. Also, Quote 12 from the Suborigin specification clarifies that sandboxed frames,
mentioned in Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2, fail to provide enough flexibility. Specifically, the
use of one-time random origins for the sandboxed content makes the use of local storage
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impossible.
Since user agents assign sandboxed frames a random, unpredictable origin,
it is very difficult, by design, for them to communicate with other frames or
use modern, origin-bound mechanisms like postMessage and CORS. Further,
there is no easy way to persist client-side state (e.g., using localStorage or
sessionStorage) in random, unpredictable origins.
(12)
With these convincing arguments, the ongoing specification of Suborigins would allow
developers to send HTTP headers to isolate different parts of an application. In technical
terms, if Suborigins were adopted, a server can instruct the browser to isolate two parts of
an application hosted in one “physical” Origin, e.g., google.com2. A typical motivation ex-
ample is that google.com may want to isolate google.com/maps from google.com/mail.
So, by providing a Suborigin header in the HTTP response, google.com could instruct
the browser to isolate both applications and create a separate script context for each one
of them.
The problem from the resource control perspective is that, with the current security
model, an attacker bypassing the storage quota would require fewer efforts if Suborigins
are in place. Currently, an attacker abusing local storage must serve JavaScript code from
different Origins to let them collude with each other; however, with Suborigins, he can
simply instruct the browser to create separate Suborigins for free. As a result, a single
Web server can potentially instruct the browser to create unlimited script contexts by
providing different headers in each response.
Furthermore, the discussions about the specification indicate that each Suborigin would
have its own local storage instance [204]. What is more, one of the possible countermeasures
against the storage abuse, i.e., third-party tracking protection discussed in Section 8.1.3,
would become void with Suborigins. The problem is that when an application includes
Suborigins, they would not be treated as a third-party resource [8]. So, not only Suborigins
allow attackers to create multiple script contexts with their own local storage instances
for free, but these Suborigins are also not losing access to persistent storage mechanisms
when users enable third-party tracking protection.
We conclude that, even though there are countermeasures against resource abuse for
security-aware developers or users, they are merely side effects of other security require-
ments. Thus, new standards bringing more flexibility can easily jeopardize the little ad-
vances against browser resource abuse because it has not been considered as a relevant
problem by the standardization community yet.
8.5. Summary
In Section 3.4, we have already established that the current Origin-based Web security
model fails to provide safe defaults against resource abuse; however, we dedicate this
2The specification uses this term to differentiate a Suborigin from the typical Origin, i.e., host, port and
scheme, also called “physical” Origin
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chapter to studying possible countermeasures offered by the Origin-based security model
for security-conscious users or developers. After reviewing throttling mechanisms offered
by the browser, CSP directives, sandboxing, and privacy-preserving technologies, i.e.,
third-party tracking protection, we move on to their shortcomings.
Notably, involving the browser end user raises challenges. On the one hand, obtaining
consent for resource-related APIs risks creating warning fatigue, a phenomenon already
observed in HTTPS warnings recently [9]. Besides, asking users to download extensions
or modify the proper browser settings, e.g., media.peerconnection.enabled to disable
WebRTC, is not realistic considering the lack of security awareness of the typical browser
user; also, the granularity of configuration properties enforcing access to resource-related
APIs would require security-aware users to disable many browser APIs.
Involving developers, e.g., to add CSP directives against resource abuse, poses other
challenges. Developers have more technical expertise than browser’s end users; however,
developers rarely verify dependencies to ensure they are secure. For example, an initial
analysis of the Web inclusions by Nikiforakis et al. showed that stale inclusions could
be used to inject scripts in many popular sites [129]. More to the point, recent Crypto-
Jacking attacks evidence that the situation has not improved; for instance, CMS plug-ins
and JavaScript libraries were modified, therefore affecting thousands of sites in a mat-
ter of days [25, 31, 112]. Considering this, most developers are not ready to assume the
responsibility to prevent resource attacks.
Last but not least, we close the chapter by revisiting the ongoing adaptation of the
Origin to Suborigin in an attempt to achieve greater flexibility. From our analysis, we
conclude that adopting Suborigins would remove a side effect whereby third-party tracking
protection prevents the storage quota bypass presented in Chapter 5. So, even though
Suborigins are not a reality yet, and having an enforcement mechanism is better than none,
we consider that existing countermeasures for resource attacks are threatened because they
are side effects of preventing a different security threat.
Withal, we argue that resource abuse can be prevented most effectively by solutions
deployed directly in the browser such as a single configuration property similar to third-
party tracking protection. Further, the resource abuse situation resembles third-party
tracking protection because developers have conflicting interests with the browser’s end
user; specifically, developers are prone to include scripts for their financial profit leading
to undesirable side effects for users such as advertisement and mining. On the other hand,
in this situation browser vendors have to step in and protect the browser’s user interests,
e.g., protecting their privacy. Alternatively, browser extensions preventing resource abuse
would simplify the process in comparison to requiring users to change configurations to
disable specific APIs, such as WebSocket or WebRTC separately.
Sections 8.2.2 and 8.4.3 includes ideas from the associated publication “CSP & Co. Can
Save Us from a Rogue Cross-Origin Storage Browser Network! But for How Long?” [142].

CHAPTER9
Detection Based on API Usage Patterns
We focus now on the development and evaluation of a novel detection mechanism based on
resource-related API usage patterns to detect resource abuse. Even though our approach
is built on concepts that apply to every resource attack presented in this thesis, we validate
the approach with the case study presented in Chapter 7, i.e., CryptoJacking. We have
chosen crypto-currency mining due to its prevalence and also because there is real-life
data available for our evaluation. Precisely, a large number of samples collected through
a large scale study in the wild provided us an excellent dataset to validate our approach
to resource abuse detection.
We start from a literature review from previous approaches to detecting JavaScript
detection. Afterwards, we describe general aspects observed from all case studies from a
technical point of view. Then, we use our insights from previous abuse cases along with
inspiration from some approaches described in our literature to detect API patterns for
resource abuse. Finally, we evaluate our detection algorithm precision, recall, and the
impact of a prototypical implementation on the user’s browsing experience.
9.1. Literature Review on Malicious JavaScript Detection
The idea of detecting malicious JavaScript has been explored through different approaches
over more than a decade. As a result, we cover the most relevant approaches based on
Virtual HoneyClients, i.e., programs mimicking a full-fledged browser to detect malicious
behaviour, real-life browsers such as Firefox, and proxies. Afterwards, we discuss systems
that have been proposed in the literature to support malicious JavaScript detection, e.g.,
to prevent attackers from doing small changes to evade detection. In Section 9.6, i.e.,
dedicated to related work, we discuss which concepts from the approaches summarized in
this section helped us to propose our detection.
9.1.1. Virtual HoneyClients
Naziro implemented PhoneyC [126], a virtual honeyclient emulating different browsers,
with particular vulnerabilities. PhoneyC integrated the SGML HTML parser along with
SpiderMonkey to fetch Web sites and assess with an anti-virus whether they were malware
or not. Although PhoneyC was capable of detecting malicious software delivered to the
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client in the wild, it has several performance, and practical, limitations, e.g., it can be
easily fingerprinted to avoid detection, and it only recognizes malware previously seen
before. Chen et al. extended PhoneyC by adding Shellcode simulation and completed the
implementation of the DOM API calls in WebPatrol [96].
Cova, Kruegel, and Vigna used HtmlUnit, a headless browser, to create JavaScript
Anomaly-based aNalysis and Detection (JSAND) [41]. Authors of JSAND describe four
phases observed in Drive-by Downloads: redirection and cloaking, deobfuscation, environ-
ment preparation, and exploitation. In the redirection and cloaking phase, JSAND collects
the number and targets for redirections during the page load. The number of redirections
and targets represents malicious behaviour common in Drive-by Downloads whereby the
browser is redirected several times to complicate detection. Also, as part of the redirection
and cloaking phase, JSAND modifies the browser configurations presented to the server
and collects whether the same machine obtains different pages based on its configuration,
which is another feature presented by Drive-by Downloads as they create custom exploits
based on OS, browser version and plug-ins installed.
During the Deobfuscation phase, JSAND collects the number of function calls related
to string processing, e.g., a substring. Another feature is the number of calls to a function
doing dynamic execution of code, e.g., eval, and the length of the arguments. As the
environment preparation is a phase when the attack allocates memory to place its Shell-
code, JSAND counts the number of bytes allocated through string operations. Moreover,
JSAND also counts the number of strings containing non-printable text which are longer
than 256 Bytes, i.e., likely to be Shellcode. During the exploitation phase, JSAND col-
lects the number of instantiated components, i.e., plugins, the values for the arguments
passed to them, and the sequence of method calls. Based on the features above, JSAND
applies anomaly detection models from libAnomaly. In their evaluation, Cova, Kruegel,
and Vigna compared their tool to PhoneyC [126], Capture-HPC [170] and the Clam AV
anti-virus software. Their evaluation shows that they offer better performance and few
false positives. Also, JSAND was publicly available for some time as Wepawet, and the
authors validated around 140,000 pages by 2010.
9.1.2. Browser-Based Systems
Hallaraker and Vigna presented the first JavaScript interpreter monitoring code to detect
malicious functionality based on Mozilla’s SpiderMonkey. Their work focuses on extract-
ing information from interactions with the JavaScript engine in an XML report [66]. Fe-
instein and Peck created another extension of SpiderMonkey to perform de-obfuscation of
JavaScript code called Caffeine Monkey [56]. To validate their work, they monitored the
execution of malicious samples of JavaScript code and showed that there is a considerable
difference on the number of calls to specific functions used by obfuscation techniques, e.g.,
eval, in comparison to benign sites. After these efforts, several approaches surfaced to
detect and prevent the execution of malicious JavaScript code.
HoneyMonkey, an automated crawling framework to detect malware downloads through
the browser, was created by Wang et al. [197]. HoneyMonkey simulates human behaviour
during visits to malicious sites, under Windows XP, while monitoring operations to the
registry performed by the machine. As the program simulating the user was not instructed
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to accept to download or install malicious software, activities observed in the registry after
the end of the visit flagged exploit sites. Wang et al. found that 752 unique URLs operated
by 287 sites were capable for exploiting an unpatched Windows machine at the time.
Capture-HPC uses several HTTP clients, such as Firefox or Internet Explorer to orches-
trate a set of clients and monitor the file system, registry, or processes a kernel level. As a
result, it can flag malicious behaviour whenever an unexpected change takes place [170].
Capture-HPC has been used by Egele et al. [50] to compare their detection results with
malware detected in a Capture-HPC client. Egele et al. proposed to do Heap Spray Shell-
code detection through the execution of a modified Firefox, with a modified SpiderMonkey
instance [50]. Egele et al. modified SpiderMonkey to monitor all string concatenation and
construction operations, to attempt to emulate the bytes stored therein through Libemu,
a library emulating x86 code and offering Shellcode detection capabilities. Moreover,
their Heap Spray detection approach implemented an ActiveX emulator to obtain samples
meant to be executed under Internet Explorer. A downside of this approach is that it is
focused on Heap Spray attacks; therefore, it failed to detect several exploits detected by
the Capture-HPC client. However, if only Heap Spray attacks (without requiring Visual
Basic) are considered, the detection proposed by Egele et al. has an accuracy of 93%.
From the performance point of view, Egele et al. executed the Alexa top 150 for their
comparison. Specifically, sites using an unmodified Firefox instance needed 3.5 seconds
while their approach required 8.25 seconds or 5.8 seconds in a version optimizing the per-
formance by doing the emulation of strings in memory only when the execution left the
JavaScript interpreter.
Song et al. introduced an approach to prevent Drive-by Downloads via inter-module
communication monitoring [175]. The authors observed that browsers are comprised of
modules, usually loaded and invoked dynamically; moreover, they also leverage that Drive-
by Downloads involve several stages before the client is exploited. As a result, they created
a module to monitor when Component Object Model (COM) modules were created, in-
voked or freed. Also, to increase the number of malicious samples that would attack the
browser, they implemented an ActiveX emulator, to simulate several vulnerabilities. Fi-
nally, to evaluate the inter-module communication monitoring tool, the authors created
a Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) for a set of known exploits, i.e., 37 signatures,
manually. Thus, whenever the DFA for a site reached a dangerous state, an exploit alert
was generated. The approach based on the DFA yields low false positive rate and has a
15% time overhead on average, but it cannot recognize attacks which have not been seen
before by the tool.
Ratanaworabhan et al. proposed NOZZLE against Heap Spray attacks [155]. NOZZLE
uses Detours, a Windows binary instrumentation framework, to modify Firefox’s routines
to validate objects in the heap during garbage collection. Unlike Egele et al. [50] who only
checked strings, NOZZLE inspects all objects allocated the heap. Then, NOZZLE tries to
disassemble their binary representation to find valid x86 sequences. However, due to the
high amount of x86 instructions, there are many cases when valid instruction sequences are
found in regular JavaScript objects. Therefore, NOZZLE disassembles the code creating a
control flow graph and analysing data flows to ensure the reachability of particular blocks.
Also, NOZZLE defines an overall heap attack surface area based on the previous anal-
ysis. The main idea is to configure a spray detection threshold to flag malicious software.
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NOZZLE improves the false positive rate as the whole heap is considered instead of sin-
gle objects. The authors of NOZZLE concluded that a threshold higher than 15% was
required to avoid classifying any site on the top 150 Alexa sites as malicious, i.e., no false
positives. Also, they found out that, from 2,000 exploits generated by Metasploit and
twelve published attacks, NOZZLE would detect every attack with a 50% threshold, i.e.,
no false negatives. NOZZLE introduces an 8% and 69% CPU and memory overhead re-
spectively. Both, NOZZLE and the Heap Spray detection proposed by Egele et al. [50]
check the heap and attempt to detect attacks; however, NOZZLE covers objects while
Egele et al. considered only strings. As both approaches were published in 2009, they
were not compared with each other.
Curtsinger et al. created ZOZZLE [42] to achieve better performance than NOZZLE. To
this end, ZOZZLE uses the Detours instrumentation library to perform JavaScript code
deobfuscation by hooking calls to the eval function on the JavaScript engine of Internet
Explorer. Once the deobfuscated code is available, ZOZZLE parses the JavaScript and
obtains the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST). The authors compared the classifier’s accuracy
in two scenarios. On the one hand, they chose a set of features based on their experience
detecting malicious JavaScript code. On the other hand, they created an algorithm to
automatically select features based on a labeled dataset of malicious and benign Web
sites. An automatically generated feature has two properties, the context where it is, and
the text or some substring present in the AST, e.g., variable name shellcode inside a loop.
The authors’ conclusion is that features generated automatically perform better than their
hand-picked set of features. To obtain the malicious and benign set of contexts NOZZLE
was used. NOZZLE has a false positive rate of 0.0003% and a false negative rate of 9.20%.
Heiderich, Frosch, and Holz created an in-browser solution to detect and mitigate mali-
cious Web sites called IceShield [68]. IceShield is implemented in JavaScript. More specif-
ically, IceShield has been implemented as an Internet Explorer and as a Firefox extension
redefines browser APIs to monitor JavaScript code, extracts features and then uses Linear
Determinant Analysis (LDA) to detect malicious Web sites. To achieve its goal, IceShield
listens for the DOMContentLoaded event, then it redefines native browser APIs such as un-
escape, substring or eval, through the Object.defineProperty and then it protects it its
properties against write operations with Object.freeze. Moreover, to protect IceShield
against fingerprinting, IceShield also redefines the toString functions on the redefined
objects, to prevent an attacker from obtaining the instrumented code instead of the usual
“{[native code]}” response from the browser when the toString function is called on a
native JavaScript API.
As the most important contribution is to provide a safe and lightweight manner to
rewrite the browser APIs to detect malicious software, the evaluation of their LDA is not
as extensive as others found in the literature. They used the first top 50 Alexa sites as
benign sites and 30 malicious sites selected from a malicious dataset to train their classifier.
Then, they classified the rest of the dataset, i.e., 61,000 benign sites and 51 malicious sites
to calculate their false positive rate, i.e., 2.17%, and their accuracy, i.e., 98%. Heiderich,
Frosch, and Holz mention that they have included LDA to exemplify the integration with
a classifier due to its simplicity, but they acknowledge that other approaches have better
classification results, e.g., ZOZZLE.
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9.1.3. Proxies
Kirda et al. created Noxes [98], the first client-side solution to mitigate XSS attacks. The
main idea of Noxes is to place a proxy between the browser and the Web; therefore, the
proxy forwards requests only if they were whitelisted by a local policy. As a result, when a
particular URL does not comply with the policies, the user must decide whether to accept
or reject the origin. For usability purposes, Noxes offered a way to “learn” a browsing
profile, i.e., add Origin rules for a particular visit to the policy.
Rieck et al. created Cujo: a Web proxy performing static and dynamic analysis of
JavaScript code to detect Drive-by Downloads [161]. The proxy retrieves the HTML,
parses it, retrieves any resources referenced by the content; afterwards, the proxy extracts
JavaScript code from HTML event handlers and script tags. Then, Cujo uses a custom
YACC grammar to extract tokens through lexical analysis. The result of the lexer shows a
simplified representation of the code replacing variable and function names, string values
and their length and numeric values by different tokens, e.g., ID = ID + STR reflects
an instruction where the concatenation of a variable and a string is assigned to a vari-
able. Then, Cujo uses ADSandbox [45], a modification of SpiderMonkey, to execute the
JavaScript code to extract abstract operations. Particularly, SET global.c to “0” or CALL
eval would reflect the assignment of “0” to c and calling the eval function respectively. To
relate the static and dynamic analysis with one another, Rieck et al. create q-grams from
the reports generated by the static analysis and ADSandbox. To achieve this, they take
sliding windows of tokens from the reports, separated by spaces. Then, they embed the
q-grams in a space with the size of the all possible q-grams, where each dimension contains
a boolean value reflecting whether the JavaScript code contains a particular q-gram or not.
Thus, as each Web site is a point a high-dimensional space, a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) with a linear kernel is used to create a plane dividing malicious and benign code
in this space. To validate the accuracy of Cujo, Rieck, Krueger, and Dewald used the
top 200,000 Alexa sites at the time, and 20,000 URLs that were visited by employees of
the University as benign samples and they used a combination of several known malicious
samples with 600 real Drive-by Downloads. In addition to that, Rieck, Krueger, and De-
wald split the datasets between a training set (75%) and an evaluation set (25%). They
used the training set to calculate the optimal length of the q-grams and arguments for the
SVM, and then the evaluation dataset was used to determine the accuracy of the model.
Based on their analysis, they conclude a true positive rate of 94% and a false positive rate
of 0.002%. Also, Cujo introduces a delay of 500 ms due to the proxying, analysis and
classification required to detect Drive-by Download attacks.
EarlyBird SVM [168] is an optimization from Cujo. EarlyBird SVM a modified linear
SVM with the same features as Cujo, yet giving higher weights to malicious events occur-
ring in the early stages of an attack. On the one hand, EarlyBird gives higher weights to
events commonly appearing early in malicious scripts in the training set, while leaving the
weight for events mostly seen in benign sites constant. Also, according to Schu¨tt et al.,
the authors of EarlyBird, this approach would produce a regular linear SVM whenever
the data available for training is not useful to identify which events are present early in
malicious Web sites.
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9.1.4. Systems Supporting Malicious Activity Detection
Canali et al. proposed Prophiler: a filter relying on static properties of the HTML,
JavaScript code and URLs for sites to detect malicious Web sites [28]. Prophiler eval-
uated 77 features, obtained without executing any code from the Web site, with several
machine learning classifiers depending on the feature set, e.g., HTML features. Prophiler’s
goal is to reduce the number of Web sites analyzed by JSAND, i.e., Wepawet. Therefore,
the priority for Prophiler is to reduce false negatives, instead of reducing false positives.
In the worst case, the dynamic framework would evaluate a false positive and discard it;
therefore, Prophiler flags a Web site as malicious whenever one or more classifier detects
malicious properties. Using Wepawet as ground truth, Canali et al. trained their models
with 10-fold cross-validation on a training set containing 51,000 sites. When validating
their solution with a validation set with 153,000 sites, they obtained a false positive rate
of 10.4% and a false negative rate of 0.54%.
ROZZLE [99] is a framework to overcome malware fingerprinting, i.e., malware only
reveals itself once it has been verified the right plug-ins, OS and browser versions are
present. ROZZLE uses symbolic execution to provide multi-execution of divergent paths
on the code to “amplify” the power of malware detection mechanisms.
Kapravelos et al. proposed Revolver [89] as an automated approach to detecting evasive
Web malware. Similarly to ZOZZLE [42], Revolver obtains all the JavaScript code com-
piled in the course of a Web site’s execution and performs static analysis on it. However,
instead of detecting exploits, Revolver’s focus is to determine similarities between a Web
site and samples previously to detect when attackers update their exploits to evade detec-
tion. To this end, Revolver interacts with an oracle, i.e., a Drive-by Download detection
system, to find out whether the current sample is classified as malicious code or not. Thus,
whenever similar code samples are classified differently, Revolver flags this as an evasion
attempt.
During the development of Revolver, the authors used the JSAND Wepawet service [41]
as an oracle. Further, they observed scripts that, through small changes that influenced
the control flow or exploited bugs of the oracle, managed to be misclassified as benign. To
determine similarity, Revolver creates a normalized node sequence by listing all the node
types in preorder. Then, it removes duplicated sequences and performs pattern matching
on the sequences. Also, Revolver stores an 88-dimensional point in an Euclidean space
where each dimension represents the number of occurrences of an AST node type1.
9.2. Revisiting Technical Aspects of Resource Abuse Cases
Even though there is not one unique way to use a particular computational resource, e.g.,
computation can be performed by the GPU or the CPU, Web applications have efficient
access to computational resources through relatively few APIs. However, the amount
of APIs is not trivial enough to bring an end user in the decision of granting access to
particular APIs such as WebRTC, local storage, postMessage etc. Considering this, we
propose to use a supervised machine learning model to detect resource abuse within the
1There are 88 AST node types in JavaScript.
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browser. Furthermore, we built this model on aspects shared across all the previous case
studies, and we also use concepts from previous approaches to battle malicious JavaScript.
9.2.1. Lessons Learnt from Case Studies
We propose an approach to automatically detect particular resource abuse cases based on
observations valid throughout our attack case studies presented in Part II of this thesis:
• access to a computational resource: although this obvious, it is a requirement to
abuse resources.
• multiple instances: to maximize the attack’s profit, an attacker must obtain control
of multiple instances giving him access to a particular resource. For example, the
DDoS and CryptoJacking use several WebWorkers to increase the use of networking
or processing power. Also, the storage abuse case creates multiple Iframes to access
local storage instances.
• cross-window communication: A consequence of controlling multiple instances is
that an attacker must coordinate them. Therefore, window-to-window and window-
to-worker communication become essential for this endeavour.
Two arguments follow from our previous observations. On the one hand, even though
particular APIs are essential for resource abuse, we cannot generalize that every time an
application uses a particular API, e.g., postMessages, there is a resource abuse attack.
On the other hand, resource attacks raise from a particular combination of APIs granting
access to resources and collaboration between multiple instances, e.g., WebWorker.
Thus, instead of disabling access to all computational resources or cross-window commu-
nication, or asking developers to provide policies to protect users against resource abuse2,
we propose a mechanism that detects particular API patterns matching the abuse we
want to prevent.
9.2.2. JavaScript Resource-Related Events
Before we can collect usage patterns we must identify events, from particular APIs, con-
sidered relevant for browser resource attack. Following our previous remarks, we start by
considering APIs consuming particular resources, i.e., CPU, GPU, persistent storage, and
networking. In this regard, we took information from the sections describing the APIs
involved for every case study and added not only those APIs but also other functions
providing similar functionality.
For each API, we collect a timeline comprised of events shown on the right-hand side
of Table 9.1. Also, we include events when inter-window communication channels were
used from a window, WebWorker, or a SharedWorker. Further, we enhanced Table 9.1
with the case studies where each group of APIs was used; moreover; we also include the
section where we have discussed the particular attack.
2We have challenges associated with this approach in Section 3.4 and Chapter 8; specifically, we discussed
this in 8.2.2, and 8.4.2
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We corroborate our statement that combinations of APIs are critical for resource abuse
because every attack previously represented contains at least two groups. For conciseness,
we label the storage and distribution network as “Storage” and the anonymity network
performing onion-routing as “Anonymous”. For similar reasons, and to avoid confusion
with the distribution and storage network from Chapter 5, we describe the persistent
storage capabilities of the browser as a resource called “Persistence”.
Sect. Attack Resource Monitored APIs
4 DDoS
CPU
WebWorkers (creation)
6 Anonymous WebAssembly (creation)
7 CryptoJacking
7 CryptoJacking GPU
WebGLRenderingContext (all functions)
CanvasRenderingContext2D (all functions)
5 Storage Persistence
LocalStorage (set, get and remove)
IDBObjectStore (all functions)
4 DDoS
Networking
WebSocket (creation, send and receive)
5 Storage RTCDataChannel-WebRTC (all functions)
6 Anonymous EventSource (creation and receive)
7 CryptoJacking
5 Storage
Inter-Window
Window (postMessage and onMessage)
6 Anonymous WebWorkers (postMessage and onMessage)
7 CryptoJacking SharedWorker (postMessage and onMessage)
Table 9.1.: Resource-related events monitored [144]
Our ultimate goal is to use patterns of resource-related events to classify sites into
two classes: abusive and benign. Specifically, we envision an approach based on machine
learning whereby we can useAPI events listed in Table 9.1 to detect patterns only observed
when particular abuse scenarios are present, e.g., CryptoJacking.
9.3. Methodology
We explore the effectiveness of monitoring resource-related events mentioned in Section 9.2
to detect resource abuse patterns in a real-life case study, i.e., CryptoJacking. Further-
more, we only monitored APIs observed in our previous case-studies (or APIs giving
access to the same resources) following our lessons learnt. Therefore, even though we can
only measure the detection performance for a particular case, we are confident that similar
results would be obtained for other resource abuse cases if there would be enough data
available. More to the point, we argue this is the case because we did not consider any
feature that is only specific to CryptoJacking that is not present in the other case studies
presented in part II of the thesis.
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9.3.1. Data Collection
There have been several approaches to automate browsers for data collection, e.g., Open-
WPM created by Englehardt and Narayanan [52], yet we decided to implement our own
mechanisms for various reasons. Most importantly, we needed to control and instrument
the browser remotely to receive the events created by our instrumentation through a
highly efficient communication channel. Based on these requirements, we decided to use
the Chrome Debugging Protocol with Chromium3.
In addition to collecting resource-related events, we faced the challenge of quantifying
the resources used by each browser during the experiments. To tackle this, we used docker
containers to isolate the browser processes and count the amount of memory, processor,
and networking used. Additionally, through the docker API, we were able to create, stop
and delete containers for each visit.
Figure 9.1 shows the logical architecture of our crawling system. A Crawler Node selects
a pending job (site visit) from the database, creates a new chromium container and starts
listening for memory, CPU, and network consumption events through docker APIs. Then,
each node instructs one browser to instrument all pages loaded and to visit a particular
page. During the visit, which lasts 35 seconds, the node receives all resource-related events
detected by the instrumented code from the browser through the Chromium debugging
protocol. Finally, it stops the tracing and waits until all data has been received. Once all
tracing data is received, the Crawler Node stops the resource monitoring, e.g., amount of
memory, for the container and then removes the container.
Additionally, there is a shared MongoDB database holding all pending jobs and results
obtained so far. The database was designed to ensure that several nodes can be executed
in parallel without conflicting with each other. We used one VM with 700 GB of disk to
host the database and four VMs with 15 GB of disk for crawling. All VMs were executed
inside a single physical host running a VMWare ESX Virtualization server. Each VM had
8 virtual processors and 8 GB of RAM. Moreover, each crawling VM had seven nodes
(each node controlling one browser). To run Chromium on headless mode, we used the
X virtual frame buffer tool (Xvfb) to execute it without requiring a screen for the servers
visiting the sites.
Overall, we obtained 285,919 sites out of the top 330,500 Alexa sites. We tried to re-
execute sites that failed due to network time-outs or operational errors after the first run
was finished. The main error causing crashes during our experiments was that Chromium
stopped non-deterministically due to Xvfb [152, 153]. From the 285,919 sites that were
adequately visited, we found 656 sites performing mining using the labelling technique
described in Section 9.3.2.
3A key advantage is that Chromium enables us to leverage the internal network and profiling protocol to
send events from the browser to the monitoring program by calling console.timeStamp() within the
instrumented code.
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Figure 9.1.: Crawler’s logical architecture [144]
System’s Resource Monitoring
We monitor all the resources used by the container running (only) the Chromium instance
that opened a site. Particularly, our Crawler Node obtains events including memory,
processor, and network consumption. Afterwards, we aggregate the total number of ticks
used by the processor, the total number of Bytes used from main memory, sent or received
over the network separately.
Resource-Related Events
To monitor the APIs used by each site, we used the Chrome Debugging Protocol and let
the Crawler Node instrument the browser remotely using the addScriptToEvaluateOnLoad
and setAutoAttachToCreatedPages calls from the Page Object. In combination, both
calls inject scripts when a new document or script is created. Despite what the term
addScriptToEvaluateOnLoad suggests, this function injects the code before the site is
loaded [81]. To receive events through the Chrome Debugging Protocol, we used the
Tracing.dataCollected function to get events generated by Chromium’s console when-
ever the function console.timesTamp was called from the instrumented code.
To instrument the browser we followed an approach attempting to introduce the least
performance impact possible. That is to say, whenever it was possible, we added a listener
to the event without redefining the API. For instance, this is possible when our script
needs to get the postMessage events from the window, as we can add an EventListener
to the window for the event “message”. In other cases, when we only needed to monitor
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a few specific calls, we redefined the functions. Whenever there were APIs intensively
used by Abusive Scripts, such as the GPU-related calls, we opted for redefining all the
functions and notifying the Crawler Node through the Chrome Debugging Protocol. To
redefine methods we used the method Object.defineProperty, as it has been previously
used by IceShield [68] or the OpenWPM Firefox extension instrumenting JavaScript [51].
We stored the timestamps for each function call; consequently, the result can be seen
from the browser’s point of view as a sequence of events observed during the execution of
a site.
9.3.2. Labelling
We performed the data collection from the top 330,500 Alexa sites between October the
2nd and November the 8th 2017; this time window was very convenient. On the one hand,
this collection started shortly, i.e., less than 3 weeks, after CoinHive started operating.
Also, we must note that by January 2018, CoinHive was classified already as the number
one threat currently according to the ESET anti-virus company [198].
On the one hand, the time between the release of CoinHive and our measurements was
enough to evidence the overwhelming adoption of crypto-currency mining in the browser,
described in their first-week report [22]. On the other hand, data collection also took place
before miners started using their domains to avoid detection and avoid paying fees to
Coinhive [32]. Fortunately, evasion techniques were rarely used since late November 2017
and only became a trend towards March 2018. The lack of evasion techniques allowed us
to obtain high-quality data for labelling our learning dataset.
To label the mining and benign classes, we queried our database to find sites who had
sent, received messages or opened WebSockets with any domain that had been blacklisted
by the existing extensions blocking mining scripts based on blacklists [88, 215]. A detailed
list of the domains used is shown in Table 9.2.
Our approach does not deliver any false positives because only sites performing mining
would send messages to a mining pool. For this reason, we obtained proportionally more
miner samples by analysing the site’s behaviour during runtime in comparison to other
work analysing queries on the static content provided by Web sites over time4. Although
false negatives are a risk, the timing of our crawling helps to mitigate this factor because
the evasion techniques were not actively used; therefore, false negatives are more likely to
happen due to a late detection of mining scripts instead of active evasion.
9.3.3. Feature Selection
At this point, we have described how we obtained two data sources: resources consumed
(memory, network, and processor), and JavaScript API Events (a sequence of resource-
related events that occurred for each visit). Now, we describe how several features were
calculated to compare our approach based on event pattern detection to an approach
4 Eskandari et al. report approximately 1,000 CryptoJacking sites on the Alexa top million [54]. We
discovered 656 sites from 285,919 sites.
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Domain Match
*2giga.link *afminer.com *cloudcoins.co
*coinblind.com *coinerra.com *coin-have.com
*coin-hive.com *coinhive.com *coinhive-manager.com
*coinlab.biz *coinnebula.com *crypto-loot.com
*edgeno.de *inwemo.com *joyreactor.cc
*jsecoin.com *jyhfuqoh.info *kissdoujin.com
*kisshentai.net *kiwifarms.net *listat.biz
*lmodr.biz *mataharirama.xyz *minecrunch.co
*minemytraffic.com *minero-proxy*.sh *minero.pw
*miner.pr0gramm.com *monerominer.rocks *papoto.com
*ppoi.org *reasedoper.pw *webmine.cz
Table 9.2.: Expressions for blacklisting mining domains [142]
based on pure resource consumption, e.g., the number of ticks of the processor. Mostly,
we dedicate this section to explore possible features to represent both resources consumed
and patterns based on resource-related events.
System’s Resource Monitoring
In the case of the computational resource monitoring we have four dimensions: the num-
ber of ticks used by the processor, Bytes sent over the network, Bytes received over the
network, and Bytes of memory used. Therefore, a first approach would be to represent
the resource consumption for each visit as a vector with four dimensions, i.e., a vector in
N4, with the sum of each value over the visit.
However, in the case of system’s resources, not all features have the same scale; for
instance, the count of processor ticks is likely to have higher values than the number of
bytes sent over the network. To improve the performance of the learning algorithm, we
to perform scaling of each vector component to a fixed range for all features. However,
scaling can be harmful when outliers are an essential aspect of the problem (uncommon
sites performing CryptoJacking). So, we used a robust scaling preprocessing algorithm
from Scikit-learn to map vectors to R4 attempting to affect outliers the least possible. To
validate this step, we compared precision and recall of the prediction algorithm, and we
witnessed an improved performance after scaling.
Nonetheless, the fact that we have to perform scaling of each feature in comparison
to all other samples observed has a downside. The scale for each feature, e.g., min and
max number of processor ticks, is fixed after scaling; as a result, scales depend on each
computer executing the prediction, e.g., big desktop PCs would observe different ranges
than phones in practice. In turn, this imposes an engineering challenge when the detection
algorithm is deployed directly in the browser.
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Resource-Related Events
In the case of the resource-related API events, we face a different challenge: mapping
the sequence of events for every visit as a set of numerical features in a way that they
reflect patterns. To this end, we explore two approaches to map events to vectors: bag of
words, and q-grams. Luckily, Rieck, Krueger, and Dewald already introduced a notation
to describe q-grams in Cujo [161]. Schu¨tt et al. later used the same q-gram representation
and set of features for EarlyBird [168]. Thus, we use the same notation used by EarlyBird
and Cujo to show the bag of words and q-grams approach.
Bag of words: let E be the set of all possible resource-related events and let φb map
x to the vector space N|E| representing the bag of words. In particular, we associate every
resource-related event, from Table 9.1, e ∈ E to one dimension in the vector. So, we can
define φb which maps every event to a dimension in the vector like this:
φb : x→ (φbe(x))e∈E
where the φbe(x) counts the number of times that e appears in x. We observed 173 resource-
related events throughout our crawl, so |E| = 173.
Q-grams: let S be the set of all possible q-grams and let φq be a function mapping x
to the vector space B|S|. Like Rieck, Krueger, and Dewald [161], we map every possible
q-gram to a component of the vector using the function:
φq : x→ (φqs(x))s∈S
where φqs(x) =
{
1, if x contains the q-gram s
0, otherwise.
Vectors produced by φb and φq have the same scale for every feature within each vec-
tor; therefore, unlike like the resource-based approach, these vectors do not need scaling.
Resource-related events are likely to perform better than the resource-based model on sys-
tems with different computing power because they focus on particular patterns observed
on the sequence of API calls, rather than using the actual amount of resources consumed.
Notwithstanding, we cannot use vectors produced by φb and φq as the feature vectors
yet. The main problem is that, so far, this feature vector would give more weight to event
sequences x containing more q-grams. Thus, we normalized vectors produced by φb and
φq using the `2 (or also known as Euclidean) norm. After normalization, the bag of word
vectors are mapped from N|E| to R|E| and q-grams vectors are mapped from B|S| to R|S|;
furthermore, every vector has the same norm after normalization. As a result, the value
represented in a single q-gram dimension is diminished when sites contain many other
q-grams.
On the contrary, for an event sequence with very few q-grams, each one of them would
have more weight. An important advantage of normalization over scaling is that normal-
ization is applied only considering a single sample, i.e., no need to know the distribution
of the data beforehand. Avoiding pre-processing for each sample to scale it in comparison
the whole dataset is critical from an implementation point of view. In this way, classifiers
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using events do not need to modify the feature vector depending on other values observed;
instead, every single visit can be classified on its own when the classifier obtains it.
We must clarify that even though Cujo [161] and EarlyBird [168] use the same q-gram
representation, our approach uses a different set of features oriented to resource-related
APIs. More details on similarities and differences are discussed in Section 9.6.
The size of all possible q-grams grows exponentially with q; theoretically, |S| has an
upper bound of |E|q. However, we found that in the case of APIs used by sites the
combinations observed on the q-grams is considerably smaller as q grows, i.e., |S| was
3,698, 17,604, 48,657, 103,034 for q values of 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Still, due to
the q-gram’s high dimensionality and the fact that they would have many components
of each vector with null values, we used a sparse “triplet” representation for the matrix
containing all the vectors in Scipy [40]. Thus, the kth elements in the arrays i,j,v represent
that matrix[ik, jk] = vk.
9.3.4. Learning
Even though there are several classification algorithms such as linear discriminant analysis,
logistic regression, etc., SVMs are prevalent for tackling security problems because, unlike
other classification methods that minimize the empirical loss, SVM minimizes the gen-
eralization loss. To do this, the SVM draws a separator hyperplane in an n-dimensional
space and tries to find the separator that is the farthest away from known samples [162].
Therefore, minimizing generalization loss maximizes space around the separator for new
samples that have not yet been observed during training.
Another vital point visible by looking at the results of the labelling process is that we are
facing a problem with highly unbalanced classes (656 malicious sites from a total of 285,919
benign sites). From this point of view, we weighted the vectors provided during training
using the balanced class weight Scikit-learn [148]. Thus, the weight of every sample is
inversely proportional to the class frequency during training, i.e., mining samples have
more weight as their class is considerably smaller.
Lastly, we use a linear kernel on the SVM to achieve two aspects: runtime performance
and bound the kernel size to the number of dimensions of the vectors. Some other kernels,
e.g., radial base function, grow with the number of samples used for training. The bigger
the kernel is, the less feasible it is to execute the SVM on the browser after training it
with tens of thousands of sites.
We perform two kinds of quantitative evaluation of the proposed detection approaches.
First of all, we analyse the performance of the detection algorithm by measuring its pre-
cision and recall. Then, we assess the impact on page-loading time imposed by the API
monitoring and the effort required to calculate q-grams while Web sites are loading. Last
but not least, we measure the average time required by an SVM to classify a site within
the browser.
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9.4. Evaluation of Detection Precision and Recall
A common way to chose parameters for a particular machine learning model is to use cross-
validation. Although this is fine to tune arguments and to train the model, performance
metrics calculated during cross-validation, e.g., precision, should not be used to evaluate
the model. When metrics calculated by cross-validation are used, the model is evaluated
with data already used to tune the parameters; as a result, some information from the
training data can be implicitly included in the model which results in over-fitting and a
false increase on the metric [30].
To avoid this, we do not use the metrics calculated during cross-validation. As Figure 9.2
shows, we do a random split on the dataset between a training and an evaluation partition.
Then, we perform cross-validation with K-fold (k = 4), again splitting the set randomly,
to train the model and find the best classifier. Once the best classifier is obtained by
cross-validation, we apply it on the evaluation dataset.
Figure 9.2.: One iteration evaluating the detection [144]
Following the process described in Figure 9.2 guarantees us to obtain real performance,
i.e., precision and recall, because they are calculated by applying the best found classifier
on data which has never been used in the process so far. Also, this ensures that the
classifier can generalize well when classifying samples it has never seen. In other words,
during the evaluation process, the classifier judges sites it has never seen before, not even
during the training phase. Further, to have certainty that high performance is not due
to a “lucky” random split, we execute the procedure shown in Figure 9.2 five times, for
each set of features (resources, bag of words, and all q-grams), and calculate the mean
and standard deviation.
9.4.1. Metrics
Machine learning algorithms are sometimes evaluated based on their accuracy, i.e., right
predictions/total predictions; however, this metric does not consider the class for the
prediction. Thus, wrong classifiers can still have high accuracy on unbalanced datasets;
for instance, a wrong classifier predicting every site as benign would have high accuracy
because most of the sites in the dataset belong to the benign class in the first place. To
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avoid this, we apply the classifier to the full evaluation set and calculate precision and
recall5 on a per-class basis.
By using these two metrics on a per-class basis, we obtain complementary views concern-
ing how elements are labelled for a specific class. Recall for a single class shows whether
the classifier can detect all relevant samples. Precision ensures that the classifier does
not label elements that do not belong to the class. In simpler terms, only an optimal
classifier can have high precision and recall. A classifier detecting most of the elements
for the class obtains high recall; nonetheless, if the classifier labels too many elements, its
precision drops, e.g., blocking sites only due to high processor consumption. Conversely,
a classifier only labeling few elements in the class, to ensure that they are indeed there,
has high precision; however, it is more likely that several elements in the class remain
undetected, so its recall drops, e.g., blocking sites using blacklists. Last but not least, we
also calculate the f1 score6 to have a single metric balancing precision and recall at the
same time.
9.4.2. Benign Class
Figure 9.3.: Detection performance for benign class [142]
5precision =
|TP |
|TP |+ |FP | and recall =
|TP |
|TP |+ |FN | where TP is a set containing all true positives, FN
contains all false negatives, and FP contains all false negatives.
6f1 = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision + recall
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classifier precision recall F1
resources 99.98 (0.00) 97.97 (0.12) 98.97 (0.06)
bag of words html5 99.98 (0.00) 98.16 (0.46) 99.06 (0.23)
2grams html5 99.99 (0.00) 99.99 (0.00) 99.99 (0.00)
3grams html5 99.98 (0.01) 99.99 (0.00) 99.99 (0.00)
4grams html5 99.99 (0.00) 99.99 (0.00) 99.99 (0.00)
5grams html5 99.99 (0.00) 99.99 (0.00) 99.99 (0.00)
Table 9.3.: Mean and std. dev. for metrics (Benign)[142]
Table 9.3 shows the mean and standard deviations for precision, recall and the f1 score for
each classifier. From 10,000 benign sites, all q-gram classifiers detect 99.99 of them, i.e.,
99.99% recall. Q-grams obtained a similar result regarding precision; specifically, 2-, 4-
and 5-grams produce one false positive for every 10,000 sites predicted as benign (99.99%
precision). Also, the minimal standard deviation, below 0.01%, shows that we can be very
confident of these results. Moreover, in the case of 3-grams, which seem to have lower
precision than the others, they have a higher standard deviation. Thus, we interpret that
3-grams could have a precision between 99.97% and 99.99%. For the bag of words and
resource-based approaches, the classifiers still obtain very high precision and accuracy,
i.e., they only differ by 0.01% and 1.83% in comparison to q-grams. Considering that the
benign class is the biggest class, results presented in Table 9.3 and Figure 9.3 show that
most of the samples are correctly classified.
9.4.3. Mining Class
Figure 9.4 shows the mean and standard deviation for precision and recall; further, Ta-
ble 9.4 contains the same metrics along with the f1 score. From the recall point of view, all
classifiers perform over 93%. All classifiers based on q-gram have recall between 95% and
97%. From the precision point of view, q-grams perform really well, e.g., from 100 sites
labelled as mining by a q-gram classifier there are between three and four false positives.
Even though the number of false positives seems high, we must keep in mind that this
calculation is based on a set containing very few mining sites, in comparison to benign
sites; therefore, the actual number of false positives is considerably lower. Moreover, this
is also the reason why we observe relatively high standard deviation for all the precision,
and recall values for the mining class in comparison to the benign class.
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Figure 9.4.: Detection performance for mining class [144]
classifier precision recall F1
resources 13.32 (0.98) 93.89 (1.34) 23.31 (1.54)
bag of words html5 15.20 (3.74) 93.52 (1.62) 25.95 (5.48)
2grams html5 96.57 (1.06) 96.98 (0.96) 96.77 (0.70)
3grams html5 96.79 (1.34) 95.33 (1.91) 96.04 (0.86)
4grams html5 96.47 (1.07) 97.84 (1.29) 97.15 (1.04)
5grams html5 96.54 (1.15) 95.48 (1.38) 96.00 (0.76)
Table 9.4.: Mean and std. dev. for metrics (Mining) [144]
9.4.4. Overview
In the presence of two complementary and significantly unbalanced classes, false positives
and false negatives have a higher impact on precision and recall for the smaller class. Let
us assume we have a mining class with ten sites and a benign class with 10 million sites.
Let us further assume we have a classifier detecting all ten mining sites, but also producing
ten false positives. In such a scenario, the classifier would only have 50% precision for the
mining class and 100% recall. Apparently, as we only looked at the mining class, with
ten sites, the previously mentioned classifier has very poor precision. However, we should
keep in mind that such classifier is producing ten false positives for 10 million sites, so it
would generate one false positive the 0.0001% of the times it is used.
The benign and mining classes whose results are presented in Table 9.3 and Table 9.4
have unbalanced sizes, i.e., 285,919 from which 656 sites perform mining. So, although
the real classes are not as unbalanced as the previous example, a small amount of false
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positives or false negatives has a considerably higher impact on precision and recall for the
mining class than for the benign class. Further, due to these high variations, introduced
by a few false positives, the smaller class has higher deviations than the benign class. To
bring the precision and recall values of the smallest class into context, we use the known
precision and recall values for each classifier to calculate a theoretical upper bound for
the total number of false positives and negatives that formalizes how false positives
and false negatives have a higher impact on smaller classes.
Based on footnote 5, the precision formula can be transformed to Equation 9.1. We
should consider that every true positive needs to belong to the class, i.e., it needs to to
be in a class and to be correctly classified; thus, the number of true positives is always
smaller than the size of the class, i.e., |TP | ≤ |Class|. With this constraint in mind, we
can put an upper bound to the number of false positives using the size of the class as
shown in Equation 9.2. Likewise, we can make a similar statement about false negatives
and recall, i.e., Equation 9.3.
FP = |TP |∗
(
1
precision
− 1
)
(9.1)
FP ≤ |Class|∗
(
1
precision
− 1
)
(9.2)
FN ≤ |Class|∗
(
1
recall
− 1
)
(9.3)
By applying Equations 9.2 and 9.3, we created Table 9.5 for the maximum number of
false positives and negatives with respect to the whole dataset, i.e., 285,919 sites in total.
classifier false positives false negatives
resources 1.493 % 0.015 %
bag of words html5 1.282 % 0.016 %
2grams html5 0.008 % 0.007 %
3grams html5 0.008 % 0.011 %
4grams html5 0.008 % 0.005 %
5grams html5 0.008 % 0.011 %
Table 9.5.: Upper bound of false positives and false negatives based on Equations 9.2 and
9.3 using precision and recall from Tables 9.3 and 9.4 [142]
Based on the theoretical upper bound of false positives and false negatives from Ta-
ble 9.5, we can see that q-grams have a low false positive rate (0.008%) and false negative
rate (0.005-0.011%) even though we overestimated the actual values. In other words, a
user needs to visit 100 thousand sites to have 8 false positives and 7 false negatives with a
2-gram classifier. Also, the resource-based and the bag of words approaches produce 1.5%
and 1.3% of false positives and 0.015% false negatives, which shows lesser performance
but could also be acceptable in particular scenarios.
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Window WSocket Destination
streamcherry.com/ kdowqlpt.info:443
openload.co/ azvjudwr.info:443
www.tvnetil.net/ prv.co.il:2052/proxy
mydream.lk/ googlescripts.ml:8892/proxy
www.comicsporn.net/de/ 163.172.103.203:8892/proxy
duroos.org/ googlescripts.ml:8892/proxy
pokemgo.info/358kqm abc.pema.cl/socket
www.watchfaces.be/ wp-monero-miner.de:2096
multfun.com/ m.anisearch.ru/proxy
shopon.noip.us/ googlescripts.ml:8892/proxy
www.homfurniture.com/ www.homfurniture.com/
bonkersenergy.com/ minr.pw/socket
torrentbada.net/ moneone.ga/proxy
www.harveker.com/ io.truconversion.com
gifmixxx.com/9lG0 ws001.chapi.co
www.vipmatureporn.com/ 163.172.103.203:8892/proxy
anunciosintimos.pt/ googlescripts.ml:8892/proxy
www.coinfloor.co.uk/ api.coinfloor.co.uk/
madnessbeat.com/ ws001.chapi.co
Table 9.6.: WS connections opnened by frames labelled as “false postives” [142]
During all the executions on the evaluation set, all q-gram approaches only flagged 22
sites as “false positives”. After further investigation, we found that the classifier was de-
tecting new mining proxies that were not part of the training set. For example, moneone.ga
was reported to blockers only after we labelled our training set. Further, we found several
domains with the same Monero URL structure, i.e., ending in /proxy or starting with
ws01. In some cases, we came across proxies that were not part of the blacklists but are
clearly associated with miners, i.e., wp-monero-miner.de. Thus, the performance of
the classifiers is even higher than the reported values. For completeness, we list
the sites along with the proxies found as false positives in Table 9.6.
Another takeaway from Tables 9.3 and 9.4 is that q-grams perform similarly. The
f1 score, precision, and recall show that even though there seems to be a slight trend
to increase performance towards 4-grams and then decrease for 5-grams, the standard
deviation values do not let us have certainty that this is the case. So, depending on
performance overhead introduced by the q-gram calculation, a reasonable trade-off could
be to use 2-grams instead of 5-grams: more on this is explained in Section 9.5.1.
To summarize, the best classifier we found has 97.84% recall, i.e., detects 97.84% of
all mining sites in an entirely new dataset. Moreover, the best classifier also attains
99.7% precision; that is to say, from 1,000 sites predicted to perform mining, there are
997 on average indeed abusing the browser. Also, all detection mechanisms presented
by us are resilient to obfuscation techniques because they only rely on dynamic informa-
tion. Nonetheless, our detection mechanisms based on resource-event can misclassify sites
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whose API usage pattern change; for instance, we have observed differences in versions
of CoinHive rendering different geometrical figures. In such cases, the classifier should be
trained again with proper labels to solve the problem. Also, existing solutions such as
Revolver [89] could be used to prevent evasion. Kapravelos et al. proposed Revolver to use
the detection mechanism as an oracle to detect sites that used to be classified as malicious
and change class suddenly, therefore showing a sign of evasion [89].
9.5. Evaluation of Impact on Page Loading Time
We have produced a proof-of-concept implementation using Chrome Debugging Tools to
inject the necessary scripts to monitor the resource-related APIs and apply the bag of
words classifier predicting whether a site is mining or not. However, to quantify the
overhead on the client side, we split our analysis on the runtime performance on the client
side into two parts. First, we measure the overhead induced on page-loading time when
APIs are monitored, and bag-of-words or q-grams are being calculated simultaneously.
Then, we evaluate in which cases can a classifier be executed within the browser and its
execution time. We split the analysis into two parts because the classification takes place
after the full site has been loaded; thus, it is not useful to attempt to measure the impact
of the classifier on the page-loading time if it runs seconds after the page is rendered. On
the other hand, the constant monitoring and calculation of q-grams can impact the page
loading time; thus, it is critical to measure its impact during the initial stages of rendering.
Further, our measurements are a worst-case scenario from the runtime performance
point of view because we are instrumenting the browser APIs with JavaScript from a
remote program (Crawler Node) to obtain the resource-related events. Therefore, an
actual implementation of this mechanism within the browser can only improve the user’s
experience or deploy more powerful mechanisms than our prototypical version.
9.5.1. Speed Index
Analysing the performance impact on page loading time for real Web sites is a technically
challenging problem. Previously, there have been a number of attempts to measure a
particular event, e.g., window load, reflecting how favourable the user’s experience is on a
Web site; however, these metrics were not successful because client-side events are affected
by a number of factors and not necessarily correlates with the moment when content is
shown [201]. Thus, the speed index calculates a curve of visual completeness (Figure 9.5)
using video captures to overcome certain external factors. In particular, the index is
calculated based on the moment when a page has finished loading. To have a bounded
value evidencing the number of pixels that took a particular time to be rendered, the
speed index calculates the area over the curve (up to 100% of visual completeness), i.e.,
the background of the image that is not covered by histogram bars. Thus, a high-speed
index reflects a site that is taking longer to render content. The main drawback of this
index is that developers may need to remove visual content that is modified periodically,
such as ads or banners, as the speed index would classify this as content which has not
yet been loaded (as it keeps changing).
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Figure 9.5.: Facebook’s speedIndex visual completeness rendered by speedline [144]
The speed index is the better-known way to analyse how fast sites are loading; conse-
quently, we used it to measure the impact of the API instrumentation and calculation of
the bag of words or q-grams array. More to the point, we measured the speed index using
the set-up shown by Figure 9.2, with some differences. First, only one Crawling Node
was executed per VM. Also, we perform browser instrumentation that calculates q-grams
directly in the browser. Also, the speed index evaluation executed 20 subsequent visits
(each one with a new container). For Each visit, we performed remote browser profiling
and then used the Speedline library [82] in the Crawler node to calculate the speed index
over the profiling data and store it in the database.
As the speed index can severely vary due to many factors, e.g., networking delays, we
are mostly interested in the overhead induced by each monitoring approach instead of
the actual speed index for each site. Therefore, we executed five kinds of automated
visits: baseline, bag of words, 2-, 3- and 4-grams. The baseline experiment opened
a Web site and then closed it without performing any API instrumentation. The bag
of words experiment instrumented all APIs from Table 9.1 and monitored the number
times each API call was performed to keep the bag of words array in memory. The 2-, 3-,
and 4-grams experiments also instrumented the resource-related APIs but additionally
calculated the count for each q-gram observed during the execution. Moreover, to have real
comparable results, we executed all the speed index calculations simultaneously (baseline,
bag of words and q-grams) between June the 8th and June the 10th 2018. The simultaneous
execution of the experiments avoids any network delays or content updates on the Web
sites that could affect our measurements if they were executed at different times.
When performing the speed index measurements, we encountered a problem with certain
sites whose speed index varied too much across the 20 visits. We already suspected this
could relate to dynamic content; withal, we decided to investigate further. Figure 9.6 shows
a histogram for the standard deviations (calculated based on 20 sequential visits per site)
for the Alexa top 100. The histogram gives us a clear experimental threshold (deviation
of 1000) to keep most of the sites who had a deviation within the most significant part
of the population. From 88 sites that we were able to visit 20 times successfully from the
top 1007, 61 sites had a smaller standard deviation than the threshold while 21 sites were
above.
Interestingly, we found that although in several cases the speed index deviation hap-
7This relates to the non-deterministic bug in Chrome described in Section 9.3.1.
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Figure 9.6.: Histogram of std. dev. speed indexes for Alexa top 100 Sites [144]
pened due to visual elements that kept changing, e.g., banners or auto-playing videos,
there seemed to be more sites from Chinese domains or companies in the list. Accord-
ing to an online forum discussing the topic, there seem to be several factors influencing
network conditions when Chinese sites are accessed from outside of China. Apparently,
China uses three locations for the Great Chinese Firewall, charges significant amounts of
money for abroad connections and does not have enough submarine cable connections in
proportion to their population [180, 212]. If these arguments are indeed correct, this would
explain the variations on the speed index due to significant latencies and unpredictable
network conditions. The speed indexes are shown in Figure 9.7; further, the list of sites
along with their suspected reasons for high deviations are presented in Table 9.7.
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Figure 9.7.: Speed index values ignored for the Alexa top 100 [144]
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Alexa domain ranking possible reason
baidu.com 4 located in China
reddit.com 7 dynamic UI (GIF images)
taobao.com 10 located in China
tmall.com 13 located in China
jd.com 20 located in China
weibo.com 21 located in China
360.cn 22 located in China
ebay.com 36 dynamic UI (banner)
alipay.com 47 located in China
google.com.mx 44 dynamic UI (canvas)
gmw.cn 48 located in China
aliexpress.com 54 located in China
hao123.com 56 located in China
blogspot.com 61 dynamic UI (banner)
youth.cn 68 located in China
whatsapp.com 74 dynamic UI (banner)
detail.tmall.com 78 located in China
coccoc.com 82 dynamic UI (banner)
txxx.com 84 not verified (videos?)
dropbox.com 86 dynamic UI (banner)
tianya.cn 97 located in China
Table 9.7.: Reasons for high std. dev. of sites not sonsidered [144]
For the sake of conciseness, we report the mean speed index (based on 20 visits for each
site) for the top 20 Alexa sites in Figure 9.8, but we still present the full Alexa top 100 list
in Figure 9.9. Figure 9.8 shows the mean speed index and their standard deviations for the
top 20 sites within the deviation threshold described above. Overall, visits yield a higher
index as the computation increases, e.g., baseline requires less computation than to bag of
words and therefore has a lower speed index. Notwithstanding, although there is a clear
trend for more complex monitoring schemas to increase the speed index, the overhead
induced is not significant enough to guarantee that all sites have higher indexes for all
comparisons. For example, the speed index for Instagram has a lower value for 4-grams
than for 3-grams, although it exposes an increasing behaviour between the baseline, bag
of words, 2- and 3-grams. Most likely, the minor differences observed could relate to some
dynamic features of the sites, but it could also happen because values for the mean of the
speed index lie within an error margin (related to the standard deviation). So, we can
only know that they are close, to a certain extent, to the value that is the one we observe.
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Figure 9.8.: Speed index vs instrumentation method (top Alexa 20 sites) [144]
To provide an even more intuitive view on the results from the Alexa top 100 speed index,
we show the mean and standard deviation of the overhead of the different instrumentations,
using the baseline as a reference for the different instrumentation approaches, in Table 9.8.
From this, we conclude that q-grams can have an overhead ranging from 20 to 40% on the
speed index, for our prototypical implementation of the monitoring and feature calculation.
However, based on our precision and recall results obtained in the previous section, we can
be confident that increasing the length of q-grams does not have a significant impact on
the detection; therefore, using 2-grams for CryptoJacking detection is enough, i.e., 24% of
increase on the speed index.
approach overhead mean overhead std. dev
bag of words 9.25 % 10.16 %
2-grams 24.94 % 15.67 %
3-grams 38.31 % 26.48 %
4-grams 39.16 % 24.46 %
Table 9.8.: Overall overhead in comparison with the baseline [144]
9.5.2. Execution of a Classifier in the Browser
To evaluate to which extent can we use classification mechanisms based on JavaScript in
the browser today, we used a libSVM port to WebAssembly [101] to attempt to execute an
SVM. Unfortunately, we found out that only the bag of words SVM could be executed in
the browser. The primary constraint for the q-grams was that WebAssembly runs out of
memory when trying to load the SVM. The main difference between the implementation of
the libSVM WebAssembly library and Scikit-learn is that Scikit-lean provides the “triplet”
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representation for sparse data, and the WebAssembly wrapper requires a regular matrix
with the samples.
Withal, we executed a micro benchmark in JavaScript measuring the time in milliseconds
required to do 100,000 classifications individually in a loop using a Lenovo TS470S with 16
GB of RAM and an Intel Core i7-7500U CPU @ 2.70GHz. We decided to perform many
classifications between the time measurements to decrease possible measurement error and
because we realized that sometimes classifications took less than one millisecond. After
executing the micro-benchmark described above ten times, we obtained a mean of 181
milliseconds, for the 100,000 predictions and a standard deviation of 6.54 milliseconds.
So, we can say that on average each prediction takes 0.01 milliseconds.
9.5.3. Overview
According to Section 9.5.1, we conclude that an overhead between 9 and 24% on the speed
index allows for a very rudimentary implementation of a bag of words or 2-gram detec-
tion algorithm within the browser. However, these values can only improve if a browser
would implement the monitoring instead of executing on-the-fly JavaScript instrumenta-
tion through a remote protocol, i.e., Chrome Debugging Protocol. Also, the execution of
a SVM performing classification based on the bag of words (with an overestimation of
1% false positives and 0.01% of false negatives) shows that implementing this approach
in the browser is feasible. However, we still faced an engineering challenge to deploy our
best classifier (with 0.008% and 0.007% false positive and false negative rates). Until
the WebAssembly port of LibSVM supports a sparse representation of vectors, the ex-
ecution of q-grams directly in the browser is not possible. However, this is technically
solvable considering that other machine learning frameworks, e.g., Scikit-learn, support
sparse representations and execute quickly in regular desktops today.
9.6. Related Work
We start highlighting previous work on JavaScript detection relating to our approach.
Then, we move on to concurrent work related to CryptoJacking detection.
9.6.1. Malicious JavaScript Detection
Our detection took inspiration from some of the previous work on malicious JavaScript
detection approaches presented in Section 9.1. Particularly, we are following a similar
approach as HoneyMonkey [197] and Capture-HPC [170] in the sense that we also use
real browsers to visit sites but at the same time perform data collection in lower layers;
for example, previous work used the OS to measure indications of compromise while we
use docker. Also, our approach uses similar techniques as IceShield [68] to redefine the
resource-related APIs and monitor them, yet we do this by instrumenting the browser
through the Chrome Debugging Protocol API instead of using browser extensions.
Our approach relates to JSAND [41], the work by Egele et al. [50], and the inter-module
communication monitoring from Song et al. [175], NOZZLE [155] and ZOZZLE [42] as
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they all collect features based on observations for a particular security problem; however,
our observations consider more than one particular attack.
Clearly, the closest previous work is Cujo [161] and [168] because they both use q-grams
and a SVM. However, Rieck, Krueger, and Dewald focus on more broad features using
dynamic and static analysis of code, even including variable assignments; on the contrary,
we focus on particular resource-related events and do not rely on static analysis. Also,
EarlyBird and Cujo are deployed on a Proxy server; instead, we have studied, a worst-
case scenario, in which the API-based classifier is deployed directly in the browser. We
consider that spending effort to deploy the mechanism within the browser is valuable due
to the increasing adoption of TLS. TLS channels, which are currently widely used, make
it harder to deploy secure proxies, e.g., Cujo. Specially, considering that proxying TLS
connections requires a man-in-the-middle attack: known to decrease security and privacy
for users [133].
9.6.2. CryptoJacking Detection
There have been three conference papers [75, 100, 178] and a technical report [124] focused
on detection of CryptoJacking published simultaneously with our paper [142]. However,
there are two main differences between their work and ours. First, most of the related
work has an intensive focus on financial benefits obtained by attackers. Also, related
work based their feature selection on a detailed analysis of the anatomy of Web miners to
derive specific characteristics, only visible for mining. Instead, our work was inspired by
the generalization of resource abuse, discussed in Section 9.2.
Konoth et al. proposed a detection approach based on features from WebAssembly
code called Minesweeper [100]. Konoth et al. crawled the Alexa top 1 Million to collect
particular indications of mining and proposed their detection approach. The authors of
Minesweeper consider two main data collection approaches: static and dynamic. First,
they propose a static approach where they dump the WebAssembly component and detect
low-level instructions such, e.g., XOR or bit shifts, required to implement the CryptoNight
algorithm. Then, they compare the number of instances of such instructions to a set of
fingerprints they observed. However, they also consider a dynamic approach to prevent
evasion. In the dynamic approach Minesweeper monitors the L1 and L3 cache events
during the execution of the WebAssembly component; therefore, as they observed a high
amount of events in comparison to other benign WebAssembly components, e.g., video
games, they propose to rely on this feature to detect miners.
Hong et al. propose a detection algorithm, i.e., CMTracker, based on two aspects: hash-
ing or the stack of the browser [75]. On the one hand, they search for particular function
names offered by cryptographic libraries. Besides, Hong et al. also propose to monitor
the stack of the browser and detect whether the same height and call chains are observed
during most of the time of the visit. They evaluated their detection approach with the
Alexa top 100K and followed links from the visited sites. CMTracker also uses the Chrome
Debugging Protocol and the profiling features we used.
Musch et al. wrote a detailed study of CryptoJacking in the wild [124]. Particularly,
they classified mining sites in three phases. The first phase, they visited the Alexa top 1
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Million ranking for 5 seconds and choose sites that used a high amount of CPU, an unusual
amount of WebWorkers or WebAssembly. Then, in a second phase, Musch et al. verified
the subset found in phase 1 by measuring, also with the Chrome Debugging Protocol,
whether a site used a single function in multiple scripts running in parallel. In phase 3,
Musch et al. use a set of statically generated features which includes hashes of the code
and URLs where the code is hosted.
Last but not least, Tahir et al. proposed MineGuard [178]: an approach based on VMs
and a hypervisor tracking Hardware Performance Counters (HPC) to monitor specific
events related to mining at a processor-level. Although their approach resembles more
Capture-HPC [170], it relates to our approach because we also measure resources on a
lower level, i.e., docker, to compare with our API-based detection approach. However,
our approach is not based on hardware consumption values. Instead, we just used these
values as a comparison point for our API-based detection.
9.7. Summary
After evaluating possible countermeasures based on the existing security model in Chap-
ter 8, we expand our search for solutions against resource abuse beyond the possibilities
implemented today. Undertaking this effort had a unique challenge: finding a detection
approach applicable to all resource abuse scenarios, yet with the possibility to perform
well when facing a specific instance for abusive behaviour.
The first step to provide a detection mechanism was to review existing solutions, to
capitalize lessons learnt from previous approaches to detect malicious JavaScript. There-
fore, we looked into previous attacks such as exploitation of COM modules, Drive-by
Downloads and Heap Sprays. Then, we revisited lessons learnt from the contributions
of this thesis, i.e., case studies. Precisely speaking, we abstracted properties applicable
throughout all case studies; on top, we also considered relevant browser APIs required for
the previous case studies. With these insights, we propose a detection of resource abuse
attacks based on resource-related event patterns observed during a visit.
From this point on, we performed a two-fold evaluation focused on the detection’s
performance in terms of precision and recall; also, we evaluate the performance overhead
introduced on the client’s side on a worst-case scenario. On the one hand, our evaluation
for the performance overhead can be extrapolated to any other resource abuse attack
scenario because the resource-related events and browser APIs monitored are the same.
On the other hand, the evaluation of our detection algorithm cannot be automatically
extrapolated to every resource abuse scenario because resource-related patterns used for
detection will vary on a case to case basis. Notwithstanding, we are confident that the
same approach, with different parameters learnt during training, will generalize provided
there is enough data to train and validate our detection mechanism against a new attack.
We argue that our detection can generalize because we are in the best position possible
considering our existing limitations, i.e., lack of real-life examples for more resource abuse
attacks. Specifically, we have designed a detection algorithm based on features collected
from four case studies, i.e., three attacks which have not been observed in the wild, and
a real-life scenario. Based on our generic algorithm, we were able to train it with data
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for a particular case study, i.e., CryptoJacking. More to the point, we obtained very
good precision and recall for our detection. Most importantly, our approach does not
consider features pertaining to mining but not to other resource attacks, whereas every
other solution published simultaneously with our publication focuses on low-level aspects
of mining, e.g., the stack structure of WebAssembly code [75, 100, 124].
This chapter used ideas and content following associated publication “RAPID: Resource
and API-Based Detection Against In-Browser Miners” [144].
CHAPTER10
Conclusions
This thesis bridges the gap between single instances of computational resource abuse
through the browser and a comprehensive understanding of the problem.
First of all, we produced three previously unknown attacks and analysed APIs and
concepts involved in each one of them; afterwards, we defined a unified attacker model
and proposed abstractions applicable to all scenarios. Moreover, our case studies were
enhanced by actual attackers who started stealing computing power from browsers for
their financial benefit. Including this attack in our case studies confirmed that concepts
abstracted from previous instances were observed again in the case of CryptoJacking. To
name one, attackers commonly require multiple instances of an element, obtained through
a resource-related API, which provides them direct access to resources. Although the
specific API may vary, e.g., use multiple WebWorkers instead of multiple Iframes, this is
a constant across all abuse scenarios.
After abstracting an attacker from multiple instances of resource abuse, we rediscover
the “regular” Web attacker described in the literature. However, even though our attacker
model matches the existing Web security model, we found that the Origin-based security
model deployed in all modern browsers fails to restrict access to computational resources
by default.
Be that as it may, we kept analysing existing, and upcoming standards, searching for
additional support provided to engaged and security-conscious users, i.e., not the typical
user. Furthermore, we concluded that although there are some countermeasures available,
there are outstanding challenges for their deployment. For example, users need to have a
deep understanding of the inner workings and configuration properties of their browsers.
Also, the proliferation of CryptoJacking and the lack of widespread CSP adoption hints
that developers are still struggling to deploy mechanisms against popular attacks such as
XSS. Therefore, it is unlikely that developers can dedicate the time required to understand
and prevent resource-related abuse scenarios.
We also expect this thesis to contribute to future standard developments in Web security;
more to the point, our reasoning behind the existing security model and countermeasures
highlights the need for a more resource-friendly security model. As an initial step, we
describe a conflict between current and upcoming standards when it comes to protecting
computational resources. Mainly, the adoption of Suborigins would simplify the abuse of
persistent storage, due to its flexibility, while rendering some existing countermeasures
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useless.
Based on our lessons learnt, we argue that browsers, or browser plug-ins, must empower
users to control their computational resources; however, the user’s interaction should be
limited to setting a single flag to avoid a particular attack, e.g., CryptoJacking. Thus, we
also address how to detect abusive behaviour from the browser’s point of view to support
such an enforcement mechanism.
We improve the state of the art by proposing a novel resource abuse detection mechanism
based on resource-related API patterns. More to the point, in spite of only using common
characteristics observed across our case studies and monitoring resource-related events,
we were able to train a classifier to detect CryptoJacking successfully. In a nutshell, we
attribute this success to one fact: even though the model is generic, the training phase
ensures that the classifier learns specific patterns for the given abuse case.
Lastly, we hope that future outbreaks of in-browser resource abuse help researchers to
validate our detection approach after evaluating its abilities to detect the relevant resource-
related API patterns.
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Glossary
Abusive Script Used throughout the thesis to refer to a malicious script abusing the
system’s resources through the browser.
ActiveX An adaptation of the earlier Component Object Model produced by Micrsoft to
support browser modules.
Churn Rate Refers to the frequency in which members of a population enter and leave it.
CryptoJacking Use of the user’s resources to perform crypto-currency mining without
obtaining his consent.
Discretionary Access Control If an individual user can set an access control mechanism
to allow or deny access to an object, that mechanis is discretionary access con-
trol [Bishop:2002:ASC:579090].
Drive-by Download Downloads of potentially malicious software performed by the browser
without the user’s knowledge.
Heap Spray Allocating several instances in the heap memory in order to execute an ex-
ploit.
Iframe An HTML inline element representing a nested browser context, commonly used
to execute resources on a different JavaScript context.
Intended Site Used throughout the thesis to refer to a Web site that is intentionally
visited by the user (in which an attacker can inject an abusive script).
Interactive Connectivity Establishment Network protocol to establish connections across
peers [ice:rfc].
Intranet Private network accessible only to a limited amount of users, e.g. the company’s
staff.
JavaScript Interpreted language executed in every major browser.
Mandatory Access Control When a system mechanism controls access to an object and
an individual user cannot alter that access, the control is a mandatory access con-
trol [Bishop:2002:ASC:579090].
Origin Scheme, host, and port for a given URL.
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Same Origin Policy Security mechanism restricting how resources, e.g. scripts, loaded
from a particular Origin can interact with resources loaded from other Origins.
Script Context Context where a particular JavaScript code is executed. This context
includes global variables and functions.
Session Traversal Utilities for NAT Network protocol to find information about other
peers in the network to establish peer-to-peer connections [stun:rfc].
Shellcode A piece of code exploiting a particular vulnerability. Its name is kept for
historical reasons, i.e. code opened a shell after a successful exploit was performed.
SpiderMonkey Mozilla’s JavaScript engine.
Suborigin Mechanism for programmatically defining origins to isolate different applica-
tions running in the same physical origin[205].
Transparent Proxy A proxy that does not modify the request or response beyond what
is required for proxy authentication and identification [http:rfc].
Traversal Using Relay NAT Network protocol to relay information through a server [turn:rfc].
URL Uniform Resource Locator.
WebSocket Full-duplex communication mechanism available as a JavaScript API.
WebWorker Used to execute scripts in background threads to avoid disturbing users with
heavy computation algorithms.
Acronyms
API Application Program Interface.
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit.
AST Abstract Syntax Tree.
CC Command and Control.
CDN Content Distribution Network.
CMS Content Management System.
COM Component Object Model.
CORS Cross Origin Resource Sharing.
CSP Content Security Policy.
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service.
DFA Deterministic Finite Automaton.
DHT Distributed Hash Table.
DOM Document Object Model.
ETLD Effective Top-Level Domain.
GPU Graphics Processing Unit.
HTML Hypertext Markup Language.
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
IdP Identity Provider.
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force.
JSAND JavaScript Anomaly-based aNalysis and Detection.
LDA Linear Determinant Analysis.
LOIC Low Orbit Ion Cannon.
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140 Acronyms
NAT Network Address Translation.
NPAPI Netscape Plugin Application Programming Interface.
OS Operating System.
RFC Internet Request for Comments.
RTT Round Trip Time.
SVM Support Vector Machine.
TLD Top-Level Domain.
TLS Transport Layer Security.
Tor The Onion Router.
VM Virtual Machine.
WOP Web Onion Peers.
XHR XMLHttpRequest.
XSS Cross-Site Scripting.
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